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CHAPTER
1
Introduction
Health and infectious diseases were, are and probably will be an important
factor in economic development. The course of economic history has also been
affected by plagues. McNeill (1977) notes that the Black Death had enormous
economic and social effects. Moreover, Watts (1999) showed that Venice lost
its dominance in international trade due to the Black Death because Dutch
and English businessmen acquired major markets which had previously been
handled by Venetian traders, during a period of high mortality in Venice. Fur-
thermore, the Nobel Laureate Robert William Fogel considers it likely that
the decrease of mortality in Britain in the 18th century paved the way for
the industrial revolution. More specifically, Fogel suggests that the health im-
provements and better nutrition led to increases in labor force participation
and productivity of workers. Finally, he calculates that these factors can ex-
plain around 30-50% of the economic growth of Britain in the years from 1790
to 1980.1
After the discovery of Penicillin by Alexander Fleming in 1928 many scien-
tists began to believe that the battle against infectious diseases was coming to
an end. For instance, Cockburn et al. (1963) predicted that within 100 years
all major infections would have disappeared. Moreover, Russell et al. (1955)
published an article on man’s mastery of malaria. While it is true that some
diseases like smallpox have been eradicated, other infectious diseases continue
to exist and claim thousands of deaths every year. Moreover, malaria is far
1For further information see Fogel (1994), Fogel (2004) and Price-Smith (2001).
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from being mastered and was still responsible for 2.2% of all deaths worldwide
in 2002. Since the discovery of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in the
80’s, the view of being able to eradicate infectious diseases has slowly changed.
The acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) – caused by HIV – was a
new infectious disease for which there is still no treatment available today.
Besides AIDS, other new infectious diseases continue to appear. In the years
from 1981 until 2006, 38 new germs were found (Turkington and Ashby 2007).
Examples of newly emerging germs are HIV, avian flu, severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (also known as human mad
cow disease). Moreover, due to antimicrobial resistance new germs are an even
more serious threat to health (Weber and Courvalin 2005).
Coming to the present day a study of the World Health Organization (2004)
estimates that 57 million deaths occurred worldwide in 2002. In terms of
death cause the most common causes of death were cardiovascular diseases and
infectious diseases, with around one quarter of total deaths each.2 Pinheiro
et al. (2010) use a different method to compare the threat of different diseases.
They calculate disability-adjusted life years, a measure also taking into account
the non-lethal aspect of diseases.3 In 2001, across all regions of the world, the
average burden of disease amounted to 250 disability-adjusted life years per
1,000 inhabitants. Of these, 26% were due to infectious diseases which formed
the primary cause, while cardiovascular diseases only account for 14%.4 The
vast majority of disability-adjusted life years due to infectious diseases (more
than 98%) occur in low- and middle-income countries. However, for high
income countries infectious diseases also represent a threat that should not
be disregarded. Less than 100 years ago, the Spanish Flu killed between 50
and 100 Million people all over the world (Johnson and Mueller 2002). Public
health experts warn that another pandemic can strike at any time (Turkington
and Ashby 2007). The question is not if it will happen, but rather when
(Barry 2005, p. 463). Moreover, it is estimated that a pandemic of a similar
scale as the Spanish Flu would kill between 180 and 360 million people today
(Osterholm 2005).
Historically, smallpox was the most severe disease in terms of total death
toll. Smallpox already appeared in 1500 B.C. and was responsible for 200
million deaths in cumulative total (± 100 million due to low data availability
the further one goes back in history) until its eradication in the 70’s (see
2Other important causes were cancer and injuries with 12.5% and 9.1% respectively.
3This measure was developed in 1996 and is widely used by the World Bank and the
World Health Organization. It is formed by the sum of years lost due to premature death
and years lost due to disability (Murray et al. 2002).
4The main reason for this loss of importance of cardiovascular diseases is that infectious
diseases kill many children and thus have a higher cost in terms of life years missed due to
premature death.
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for instance Hopkins 2002). Proceeding in chronological order, the Plague
of Justinian killed as many as 25 million people (around 10% of the world
population) troughout the world in the years in 541-542 (Kulikowski 2007). In
the 14th century the Black Death killed an estimated 35 million in Europe –
around 45-50% of Europe’s population (Byrne 2006). The last two pandemics
with similar death tolls appeared in the last century. After World War I,
the Spanish Flu appeared with a total death toll of 50-100 million worldwide
– around 5% of the world population (Johnson and Mueller 2002). Finally,
AIDS was discovered in 1981 and no treatment is available until today. By
2007 a cumulative total of 24 million people had died from AIDS and by 2030
this cumulative total is predicted to reach 75 million (Bongaarts et al. 2010).
In this dissertation we analyze the economic consequences of infectious
diseases. In particular, we study the effects of the Spanish Flu and HIV/AIDS
on key economic indicators. What distinguishes these two conditions from
other diseases is that most victims were prime-age individuals. Since they are
at their peak in terms of productivity before their infections, the economic
consequences should be even larger. Moreover, as we will show in the second
part of this dissertation, there is also an important feedback from the economy
which affects the spread of infectious diseases. More specifically, we study
how the business cycle can enforce the spread of diseases causing procyclical
sickness absence rates.
Health economics arose as a subdiscipline of economics in the 70’s. It
applies economic theory to health-related problems. Economic science was
always concerned with the allocation of scarce resources. In the area of health
it is important to find a price for the priceless (as described in the introduction
to Health Economics, Zweifel et al. 2009). Such a price is needed to be able
to compare the costs of different diseases and allocate limited resources in
terms of finding cures for different health problems. Therefore, measuring the
economic consequences of illnesses is a central topic in health economics. The
estimates of the cost of illness are important for decision makers, since they
offer an alternative perspective and can thus determine research priorities.
Moreover, one of the most fundamental questions in economics has always
been the role of the state. Smith (1776, Book IV, Chapter IX, pg. 749) claims
in the Wealth of Nations, that the first duty of the sovereign is protecting
society. Even though Smith probably did not think about infectious diseases
when he made this statement, one cannot deny that infectious diseases are a
serious threat to society. Therefore, it seems important to study these diseases
from an economic perspective.
Research in the field of infectious diseases by health economists only started
quite recently. However, from an economic perspective this field seems fruitful.
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Firstly, individual behavior in terms of prevention has large potential external-
ities, a topic already studied by economists for several decades. Secondly, given
the threat infectious diseases pose to humans, studying their consequences in
more detail and analyzing how the spread of diseases is affected by the economy
appears important. Moreover, studying the economic outcomes can be helpful
in establishing appropriate policy responses. The pandemics studied in this
dissertation represent a large labor supply shock, which usually does not occur
with such force. Thus, our results also are informative with respect to the
empirical performance of macroeconomic models – since estimated outcomes
can be compared to the diverging predictions of neoclassical and endogenous
growth models.
In the first part of this dissertation we study the effects of HIV/AIDS
and the Spanish Flu on different economic outcome variables. Estimating the
relationship between these two diseases and economic outcomes is complicated
by the fact that there are so many channels through which the epidemic might
affect economic performance.
The first channel, affecting production factors immediately, involves a) a
reduction in productivity of infected workers, and b) a possible reduction in
average human capital due to replacement of skilled workers with less skilled
workers. These channels might appear to be the most obvious ones, and yet,
they have been contested in the literature. For example with respect to HIV,
Bloom and Mahal (1997b) argue that these channels are of secondary impor-
tance since the most heavily affected countries have considerable reserves to
draw upon. Nevertheless, there is evidence that in some countries agricultural
production has been disrupted due to HIV (Gaffeo 2003). On the other hand,
a reduced number of workers per unit of capital could in fact have a positive
effect on per capita growth rates (Young 2007).
A second channel is the disruption to the transmission process of human
capital that the pandemic imposes. For the Spanish Flu Boucekkine and Laf-
fargue (2010) show that an increase in the number of orphans may have impor-
tant distributional consequences in the long term. With respect to HIV/AIDS
there are at least 16 million children aged 0–17 worldwide who have been or-
phaned due to HIV, and this figure has not yet started to decline (UNAIDS
2010). According to Bell et al. (2006), this channel might become very impor-
tant in the long run, and may actually lead to an outright collapse in economic
activity. The authors attribute these strong consequences to the fact that the
disrupted human capital accumulation lingers for several generations, since or-
phans will also be unable to give their own children an appropriate education.
A recent empirical study (Coneus and Mühlenweg 2011) estimates the im-
pact of orphanhood on educational and health outcomes in eleven sub-Saharan
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African countries. According to their estimates, there is strong evidence that
orphans lag behind their non-orphaned peers in terms of educational outcomes.
The estimated effect is 1/5 to 1/2 of a year. However, the group of ‘social or-
phans’, who live away from their biological parents although the latter are
alive, consists of a much larger group and exhibits very similar patterns in
terms of educational and health outcomes. It should further be noted that
there will probably be lower investment in human capital in affected families
even before orphanhood, to the extent that children have to leave school in
order to care for their parents and carry out other household tasks (Gaffeo
2003).
In order to deal with the difficulty posed by various channels, we take
different approaches. In a first step, we analyze the effect of HIV on GDP in
African countries. Here we use a new econometric method developed by Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003), relying on synthetic control groups. For every country
in consideration the method forms a weighted average of countries not affected
by HIV. This average forms the counterfactual and thus allows estimation of
the effects of HIV. The advantage of this method is that we do not have to
model the single channels through which HIV affects the economy. However,
this also makes it difficult to interpret the effects, because the method gives
no information on what caused the effects.
In a second step we try to obtain a clearer understanding of how HIV affects
GDP growth. Again we employ the synthetic control group method. However,
instead of estimating the effects on GDP directly we look at demographic
variables. This allows us to restrict the analysis to fewer channels.
Moreover, the analysis is complicated by the fact that different measures
were taken in different countries in order to control the disease. This adds
additional noise and makes estimation of effects difficult. Therefore, in a third
step, we analyze the Spanish Flu in Sweden, a disease that occurred very
rapidly and thus public health could not react. We analyze the effects in
Sweden because of the fact that the disease spread shortly after World War
I, in which Sweden was neutral. This is helpful because the World War could
confound the effects.
In the second part of this dissertation we study the feedback effect of the
economy on infectious diseases. The economy and its fluctuations pose different
incentives which alter the behavior of humans. This is also true in terms of
infectious diseases. As noted by McNeill (1977) migration of individuals was
one of the most important factors allowing the spread of disease. Therefore,
globalization increased the vulnerability of humans to infectious diseases due
to a higher mobility and urbanization (Lederberg 1997).
Also, the business cycle was found to be an important determinant of
5
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health. Ruhm (2000), for instance, finds that mortality varies with the busi-
ness cycle, with more deaths during economic booms. The reason for this
finding is revealed when mortality is divided by its cause. Ruhm (2000) notes
that the main reason are more traffic accidents during booms leading to higher
mortality. For sickness absence, the literature also suggests a procyclical re-
lationship. Here the explanations are based on labor force composition and
reduced moral hazard due to fear of unemployment. However, so far the cause
for sickness absence has not been taken into consideration. We decompose
sickness absence by causes and find that the procyclical pattern appears only
for infectious diseases. Therefore we propose a new explanation, where the
business cycle alters the spread of infectious diseases leading to higher sickness
absence during economic booms.
Investigating this relationship is important since worker absenteeism is
costly for firms, especially during times of upswing of the economy, where
labor demand is higher (see for instance Audas and Goddard 2001). Identify-
ing the cause therefore helps to reduce costly absenteeism.
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes how HIV
prevalence affects the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the twelve most
heavily affected countries, i.e. the countries which have ever exhibited a HIV
prevalence rate of 10% or more. As we show in Chapter 2, the effects of
HIV on GDP growth are very heterogeneous. This is probably due the high
number of channels through with HIV affects the economy. In Chapter 3 we
analyze demographic effects of HIV in order to restrict the possible channels
and gain more insights about the channels generating the effect heterogeneity.
More specifically, in Chapter 3 we analyze how HIV affects life expectancy,
and death and birth rates. Again some effect heterogeneity with respect to
the fertility rate persists. Another reason for the effect heterogeneity is that
different countries took different measures to prevent the spread of the disease.
Therefore, we provide an in-depth analysis of one country in Chapter 4. In
Chapter 4 we analyze the economic consequences of the Spanish Flu, a disease
that occurred very rapidly and thus prevention was very limited. In Chapter
5 the causal channel is reversed and the relationship between business cycles
and the spread of diseases is analyzed. This Chapter provides a new explana-
tion for the procyclical nature of sickness absence caused by presenteeism (i.e.
working while sick) and infections. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes.
6
CHAPTER
2
The Economic Impact of the HIV
Pandemic ‡
2.1 Motivation
The main purpose of this Chapter is to analyze the impact of the HIV pandemic
on economic performance. In particular, it is our goal to apply a new method
and a new identification strategy in order to estimate the causal effect of the
pandemic in some particularly strongly affected countries. Our method relies
on a careful selection of suitable comparison countries, and allows the effect of
HIV on economic performance to vary not only with the prevalence rate, but
also between countries and time periods. Moreover, we employ some new high-
quality datasets which improve our ability to perform an empirical analysis.
The previous literature has typically estimated versions of an augmented
Solow model using dynamic panel data techniques. Starting from initial esti-
mates using simple cross-sectional techniques, the methods used have become
increasingly sophisticated: after the difference GMM estimator (Arellano and
Bond 1991), the systems GMM estimator has been introduced (Blundell and
Bond 1998, Maclaine 2006). Some authors also explicitly take the possible en-
dogeneity of the AIDS epidemic into account: McDonald and Roberts (2006)
estimate a separate reduced form equation for health. Cahu and Fall (2011)
use a similar approach but rely on a dynamic prediction of the prevalence
‡This Chapter is based on Karlsson and Pichler (2012b).
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rates. Even if the evidence supporting a reverse causality running from eco-
nomic performance to HIV incidence is weak (Durevall and Lindskog 2009),
other endogeneity problems related to omitted variables still abound. More-
over, Goenka and Liu (2012) show in a recent paper that economic effects of
diseases are highly non-linear. Therefore estimating a reduced model where
some economic outcome variable depends on the prevalence rate will yield
biased estimators.
Leaving endogeneity aside, the empirical specification of the relationship
between AIDS and economic growth is complicated by the fact that there are so
many channels through which the epidemic might affect economic performance.
Some channels which are similar for HIV and the Spanish Flu and have already
been analyzed in the introduction. There we mentioned that these diseases
decrease productivity and might affect human capital. Moreover, since both
HIV and the Spanish Flu kill prime-age individuals dependents might be left
behind, and in the case of orphans they might fail to acquire skills normally
taught to them by their parents. On top of these channels already discussed,
the specificity of HIV gives rise to additional channels which might harm the
economy. In particular, the alteration of individual incentives and effects due
to changing relative prices should also be considered.
The AIDS epidemic is assumed to have an impact on growth through chang-
ing individual incentives for people living in affected areas. An increased de-
mand for health care might lead to reduced savings rates. Moreover, the
reduction in life expectancy induced by the disease is likely to lead to weaker
incentives to save and to invest in human capital, and thus reduce growth
(Boucekkine et al. 2002, Fortson 2011).
Fortson (2011) analyses the impact of the regional AIDS prevalence rate
on human capital investment. She finds that a 10 per cent increase in the
prevalence rate is associated with a reduction in average years of schooling by
half a year. Considering the low level of schooling in affected countries, this is
a large effect, and it cannot be attributed to direct effects like orphanhood or
care for infected family members. Instead, the empirical evidence is suggestive
of reduced longevity affecting the optimal human capital investment. On the
other side of the labor market, an increased turnover of workers may reduce
incentives of employers to invest in skills and training. Finally, the incentives
to engage in sexual activity will undoubtedly change, with possible implica-
tions for fertility and thus growth. However, there is remarkable disagreement
as to the effects of HIV on fertility (Durevall and Lindskog 2011). The rea-
son may be that there are several different mechanisms at work – preference
for fertility, avoidance of infection, longevity-induced effects – which work in
different directions. Young (2005, 2007) identifies a large negative effect of
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the epidemic on fertility, whereas other studies (Fortson 2009, Kalemli-Ozcan
2006, Juhn et al. 2008) report a much smaller or even positive effect. Accord-
ing to Durevall and Lindskog (2011), the effect appears to be heterogeneous
and depend on the age and the number of previous children.
Moreover, as relative prices change in response to the pandemic, behaviors
of investors may be affected as well. The returns on investment in affected
countries might change for two reasons. Firstly, the pandemic imposes costs
on the private sector which are in some parts similar to the costs of the public
sector mentioned above (Liu et al. 2004). Secondly, the capital deepening
that possibly occurs due to the illness will reduce returns on capital. To the
extent that these changes discourage foreign direct investment, there will be a
second-order effect on growth.
Concerning the estimated effects, the comparability of studies is limited to
some extent, since some of them focus on the marginal effect of a small increase
in the prevalence rate, whereas others estimate the overall effect towards a
benchmark scenario of no AIDS at all. Some earlier studies on heavily affected
countries estimated an overall reduction in the growth rate of 1.2-1.7 per cent
(Gaffeo 2003) – which obviously translates in to considerable long-run effects.
More recent studies, using more sophisticated techniques, reach somewhat less
dramatic conclusions. For example, Cahu and Fall (2011) estimate that GDP
per capita will be 12 % lower in the long term compared to a no-AIDS scenario.
In our analysis we do not need to restrict ourselves to one channel. We
are able to see the total effect of these channels on GDP per capita. Our
results suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity in the effects. For some
countries, we fail to identify an effect at the per capita level as well. However,
there are three countries in the dataset which have suffered a large impact of
HIV on their living standards. For these countries, the estimated effect ranges
from from -25 to -77% in terms of GDP per capita, or -1.5 to -5.5% in terms
of annual growth rate.
In a final step we employ regression analysis to look at the overall rela-
tionship between GDP and deviation from a previous growth path. Here we
estimate that on average one percentage point of HIV prevalence costs 3-4%
in terms of GDP. Furthermore, in this anaylsis we can rule out that our results
are driven by an “Africa effect” often found in the empirical growth literature.
Due to the fact that we are able to find a general relationship, but we still
observe a high level of heterogeneity between countries, this Chapter comple-
ments case studies that analyze how HIV disrupted the economcy within a
certain country.5
This Chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 gives a brief introduction
5See for instance Arndt (2006) for a case study in Mozambique,(MacFarlan and Sgherri
2006) for Botswana and Robalino et al. (2002) for Kenya.
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on the HIV pandemic. In Section 2.3 we present the econometric approach,
while Section 2.4 will describe the data. We will first focus the most strongly
affected countries and estimate a treatment effect for each country individually
in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6 we will look at all affected countries and analyze
heterogeneity in estimated treatment effects. Finally, we discuss the obtained
results in Section 2.7.
2.2 The AIDS pandemic: some stylized facts
In this Section, we give a brief overview of the evolution of the AIDS pandemic
from its very beginning up until the most data available, with a particular focus
on aspects of the pandemic that are of importance to the current study.
The acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) was first recognized in
1981. According to the latest estimates from the UNAIDS agency, the world-
wide prevalence was 33.3 million as of 2009 (UNAIDS 2010). Although the
prevalence rate has been increasing over the past decade, there are some signs
that the growth rate of pandemic decreased and there are clear signs of re-
covery in some heavily affected countries. According to the latest available
figures, incidence has dropped by around a fifth during the last decade (UN-
AIDS 2010).
However, the prevalence of the disease varies significantly between coun-
tries and also between regions within countries. By all measures, Sub-Saharan
Africa is by far the most heavily affected region in the world: 22.5 million,
or two-thirds of the world’s total AIDS-infected population resides in a Sub-
Saharan country. Some further comparisons between world regions are pro-
vided in Table 2.1.
The current HIV prevalence rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at 7.2
per cent. Women are generally more strongly affected than men, with the
proportion of HIV infected individuals being 56 per cent female.
2.2.1 Evolution of the Pandemic: Affected Countries
We now take a closer look at the evolution of the AIDS pandemic in Sub-
Saharan Africa since the 1970s. In this part, we use data from Oster (2007),
which have been derived based on UNAIDS statistics, using earlier information
on trends form UNAIDS and linear interpolation. The UNAIDS statistics are
in turn based on population-based testing, antenatal clinic data, expert advice
from country-level HIV organizations, and epidemic modeling. There is a
severe lack of reliable information to go by, but the dataset we use appears to
be the best available. Oster (2010) considers an alternative method which bases
prevalence estimates on age-specific HIV-related mortality and information on
10
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Table 2.1: HIV Statistics by Region
Region Year Adults & Children Adults & Children Adult prev. AIDS related
Living with HIV Newly Infected rate (15–49) Deaths (Adults)
Sub-Saharan 2009 22.5 M 1.8 M 5 1.3 M
Africa [20.9–24.2 M] [1.6–2.0 M] [4.7–5.2] [1.1–1.5 M]
2001 20.3 M 2.2 M 5.9 1.4 M
[18.9–21.7 M] [1.9–2.4 M] [5.6–6.1] [1.2–1.6 M]
Middle East & 2009 460 000 75 000 0.2 24 000
North Africa [400,000–530,000] [61,000–92,000] [0.2–0.3] [20,000–27,000]
2001 180 000 36 000 0.1 8300
[150,000–210,000] [32,000–42,000] [0.1–0.1] [6,300–11,000]
South and 2009 4.1 M 270,000 0.3 260,000
South-East Asia [3.7–4.6 M] [240,000–320,000] [0.3–0.3] [230,000–300,000]
2001 3.8 M 380,000 0.4 230,000
[3.5–4.2 M] [350,000–430,000] [0.3–0.4] [210,000–280,000]
East Asia 2009 770,000 82,000 0.1 36,000
[560,000–1.0 M] [48,000–140,000] [0.1–0.1] [25,000–50,000]
2001 350,000 64,000 <0.1 15,000
[250,000–480,000] [47,000–88,000] [< 0.1–< 0.1] [9,400–28,000]
Oceania 2009 57,000 4,500 0.3 1,400
[50,000–64,000] [3,400–6,000] [0.2–0.3] [<1,000–2,400]
2001 29,000 4,700 0.2 <1,000
[23,000–35,000] [3,800–5,600] [0.1–0.2] [<500–1,100]
Central and 2009 1.4 M 92,000 0.5 58,000
South America [1.2–1.6 M] [70,000–120,000] [0.4–0.6] [43,000–70,000]
2001 1.1 M 99,000 0.5 53,000
[1.0–1.3 M] [85,000–120,000] [0.4–0.5] [44,000–65,000]
Caribbean 2009 240,000 17,000 1 12,000
[220,000–270,000] [13,000–21,000] [0.9–1.1] [8,500–15,000]
2001 240,000 20,000 1.1 19,000
[210,000–270 000] [17,000–23,000] [1.0–1.2] [16,000–23,000]
Eastern Europe 2009 1.4 M 130,000 0.8 76,000
and Central [1.3–1.6 M] [110,000–160,000] [0.7–0.9] [60,000–95,000]
Asia 2001 760,000 240,000 0.4 18,000
[670,000–890,000] [210,000–300,000] [0.4–0.5] [14,000–23,000]
Western and 2009 820,000 31,000 0.2 8,500
Central Europe [720,000–910,000] [23,000–40,000] [0.2–0.2] [6,800–19,000]
2001 630,000 31,000 0.2 7,300
[570,000–700,000] [27,000–35,000] [0.2–0.2] [5,700–11,000]
North America 2009 1.5 M 70 000 0.5 26 000
[1.2–2.0 M] [44,000–130,000] [0.4–0.7] [22,000–44,000]
2001 1.2 M 66,000 0.4 30,000
[960,000–1.4 M] [54,000–81,000] [0.4–0.5] [26,000–35,000]
TOTAL 2009 33.3 M 2.6 M 0.8 1.8 M
[31.4–35.3 M] [2.3–2.8 M] [0.7–0.8] [1.6–2.1 M]
2001 28.6 M 3.1 M 0.8 1.8 M
[27.1–30.3 M] [2.9–3.4 M] [0.7–0.8] [1.6–2.0 M]
Source: UNAIDS (2010)
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life expectancy after infection. The prevalence rates that emerge from that
analysis follow dynamics similar to those found in the UNAIDS data, but for
some countries the two measures diverge. This does not represent a major
challenge to our identification strategy, but it would of course be useful to
consider the sensitivity of estimates with respect to the prevalence rates.
For our analysis, it is useful to establish two general thresholds for the
prevalence of HIV.6 Thus, from now on we will refer to a country as strongly
affected if the estimated prevalence rate is above 1 per cent.7 Likewise, we
refer to countries with prevalence rates above 10 per cent as severely affected.
The rest of the countries, i.e., those that have never crossed the 1 per cent
threshold, will be referred to asmildly affected. This categorization of countries
may seem arbitrary, however it allows us to go from a continuous treatment
to a discrete one. It gives us twelve countries to analyze more in detail and
compare the results across different countries. Later, in Section 6, we will look
at all strongly affected countries.
Our method allows for some degree of endogeneity in the treatment indi-
cator – in the sense that the occurrence of the intervention may be correlated
with unobservables. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that in the
early stages, the spread of the disease was relatively exogenous. As Figure 2.1
shows the spread of the disease appears to be mainly driven by geographical
factors (all countries in the Sub-Saharan region are hit by the disease), while
the actual prevalence level reached in each country will also be influenced by
other factors, like poverty for example. Thus, treatment assignment is reason-
ably exogenous, whereas the development and wider spread of the disease is
probably not. Summing up we will contrast severely affected countries with
mildly affected countries, what matters is that the ‘treatment group’ (severely
affected countries) and the ‘control group’ (mildly affected countries) differ in
a way that is interesting for policy purposes.
Available evidence suggests that the pandemic spread at a very high speed
during the early years in affected countries. For example, in Malawi, the first
AIDS case was diagnosed in 1985, a 1 % prevalence rate was reached in 1988,
and in 1990 the prevalence rate was at 2 % already (Arrehag et al. 2006).
Moreover, our data shows that the average time it took from a prevalence rate
of 0.5% to 1% was 1.1 years, while only 14 out of 91 mildly affected countries
ever reached a prevalence rate greater or equal to 0.5%. Finally, given that the
incubation period is some 6-8 years on average, this means that governments
and aid agencies had very small possibilities to moderate the epidemic during
the early years (Gaffeo 2003).
6We only have data on HIV prevalence, therefore what we will estimate is the empirical
relationship between HIV and growth (and not AIDS directly).
7Bell et al. (2006) consider a similar threshold to determine the start of the pandemic.
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Figure 2.1: Spread of HIV
Some summary statistics are provided in Table 2.2. In the first column, we
provide the estimated HIV prevalence rate as of 2007. The next column shows
when a country first crossed the threshold of 1 per cent prevalence. Clearly,
all countries in the sample but Niger have done so to date, but the year of
crossing varies from 1982 (Uganda) to 2007 (Senegal). Most countries entered
the strongly affected group in the late eighties or the early nineties.
The last column in Table 2.2 reports the year when the countries are esti-
mated to have crossed the 10 per cent threshold to become severely affected (if
ever). Twelve countries in the sample have done so, and the estimated timing
varies between 1987 and 2001. Interestingly, some Eastern African countries
(Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda) that observed prevalence rates above ten per cent
have afterwards reduced their rates to a lower level. The observation that the
severely affected countries diverge over time is also confirmed in Figure 2.2,
which plots prevalence rates over time.
2.2.2 Control Group
We defined our control group as countries which, according to UNAIDS es-
timates, have never crossed the 1 per cent prevalence threshold, i.e. mildly
affected countries according to the terminology above. As Table 2.3 reveals,
there is a large number of countries available which are at different levels of
13
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Table 2.2: HIV Prevalence Rates
Country Rate Started Reached 10+
Angola 2.1 1997 .
Benin 1.2 1996 .
Botswana 23.9 1987 1993
Burkina Faso 1.6 1987 .
Burundi 2 1985 .
Cameroon 5.1 1988 .
Central African 6.3 1986 .
Chad 3.5 1988 .
Congo 3.5 1985 .
Cote d’Ivoire 3.9 1987 .
Equatorial Guine 3.4 1990 .
Eritrea 1.3 1996 .
Ethiopia 2.1 1991 .
Gabon 5.9 1991 .
Ghana 1.9 1994 .
Guinea 1.6 1999 .
Guinea-Bissau 1.8 1996 .
Kenya 7.8 1987 1996
Lesotho 23.2 1991 1995
Liberia 1.7 1993 .
Malawi 11.9 1988 1994
Mali 1.5 1997 .
Mozambique 12.5 1990 2001
Namibia 15.3 1990 1997
Niger .8 . .
Nigeria 3.1 1991 .
Rwanda 2.8 1983 1988
Senegal 1 2007 .
Sierra Leone 1.7 1995 .
South Africa 18.1 1991 1997
Swaziland 26.1 1991 1995
Togo 3.3 1991 .
Uganda 5.4 1982 1987
United Republic 6.2 1985 .
Zambia 15.2 1984 1991
Zimbabwe 15.3 1985 1990
Source: Own calculation based on Oster (2007)
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of HIV Prevalence Rates in Severely Affected Countries
development.
There are forty additional countries for which HIV prevalence statistics
are available, but since these belong to the strongly but not severely affected
countries, we could not use them in our main analysis. The vast majority of
these countries are African, but notable exceptions are Ukraine, Jamaica and
Thailand.
2.3 Econometric Approach: Synthetic Control
Groups
Traditionally, comparative case studies of this kind rely on comparisons be-
tween affected and non-affected units, using aggregate data. This type of
analysis differs from standard microeconomic evaluation studies in two impor-
tant respects. Firstly, the choice of comparison units is not as straightforward
as for micro studies. Secondly, since data tend to be collected at the popula-
tion level, sampling error is not an issue. Hence, standard tools for inference
do not apply.
The synthetic control group approach (Abadie et al. 2010) has been devel-
oped to address these issues,
• providing a transparent, data-driven method for selection of control units,
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Table 2.3: Control Group: Mildly Affected Countries
Country Prev 2007 Country Prev 2007
Algeria .1 Argentina .4
Armenia .1 Australia .1
Austria .3 Azerbaijan .1
Bangladesh .1 Belarus .2
Belgium .2 Bhutan .1
Bolivia .2 Bulgaria .1
Cambodia .6 Canada .2
Chile .4 Colombia .6
Comoros .1 Costa Rica .3
Croatia .1 Cuba .1
Czech Republic .1 Denmark .2
Dominican Republ .8 Ecuador .4
Egypt .1 El Salvador .8
Fiji .1 Finland .1
France .4 Georgia .1
Germany .1 Greece .1
Guatemala .7 Hungary .1
Iceland .3 India .4
Indonesia .1 Iran .2
Ireland .2 Israel .2
Italy .3 Japan .1
Kazakhstan .1 Korea Rep .1
Kyrgyzstan .2 Lao PDR .2
Latvia .6 Lebanon .1
Lithuania .1 Luxembourg .3
Madagascar .2 Malaysia .5
Maldives .1 Malta .1
Mauritania .7 Mexico .3
Mongolia .1 Morocco .1
Myanmar .6 Nepal .4
Netherlands .2 New Zealand .1
Nicaragua .2 Norway .1
Oman .1 Pakistan .1
Papua New Guinea .9 Paraguay .3
Peru .4 Philippines .1
Poland .1 Portugal .5
Qatar .1 Republic of Mold .4
Romania .1 Senegal .8
Serbia .1 Singapore .1
Slovakia .1 Slovenia .1
Somalia .6 Spain .4
Sri Lanka .1 Sweden .1
Switzerland .4 Tajikistan .2
Tunisia .1 Turkey .1
United Kingdom .2 United States of .6
Uruguay .5 Uzbekistan .1
Vietnam .4
Source: Own calculations based on UNAIDS data.
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which is not based on extrapolation.
• offering alternative tools for inference in aggregated data analysis.
An additional strength of this method is that no information on post-
intervention outcomes is needed to design the study. Thus, there is a much
lower risk that the study design is biased. Moreover, non-linearities in the
outcome variable are not a problem since the method will only employ a few
thresholds in terms of prevalence, rather than prevalence rates at each point
in time. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) used this method for estimating the
effect of terrorism on GDP per capita in northern Spain and the effect of a
Californian anti-Tobacco law in 1988 on cigarette consumption (Abadie et al.
2010). Examples of other studies using this method are Hinrichs (2011) who
studies the effects of affirmative action bans on minority students, or Montalvo
(2011) studying the effects of terrorism on voting behavior.
2.3.1 Assumptions
We now present the main assumptions needed for the analysis. Since the HIV
epidemic reached critical levels in different countries at different points in time,
each affected country needs to be analyzed separately. Thus, in our notation
below we proceed as if there were only one single treated unit and J further
control units.
We denote by Y Nit the natural logarithm of GDP per capita that would
have been observed in country i at time t in absence of the HIV epidemic.
Also, we denote by T0 the last pre-intervention period, i.e.
T0 = inf {t|R1t ≥ 0.01} − 1
where R1t denotes the HIV prevalence rate in the affected country.
Moreover, let Y Iit be the GDP per capita that would be observed for unit i
at time t if the epidemic had started to take off at time T0 + 1. Since HIV is
unlikely to have had an effect on GDP before the outbreak of the pandemic,
we also have Y Iit = Y Nit ∀t = 1, . . . , T0,∀i = 1, . . . , J + 1.
A further assumption which is needed is that the outcomes of non-treated
countries is unaffected by the intervention. There are several ways in which this
assumption could be violated. Firstly, there is obviously the risk of contagion,
to the extent that the countries of the control group also become affected
by the pandemic. For example, Oster (2007) delivers strong evidence that
trade between countries elevates incidence rates. However, this possibility
has been eliminated by considering only countries which have had very low
prevalence rates throughout. Secondly, the outburst of the HIV epidemic could
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affect countries in the control group via migration, aid flows, foreign direct
investment, and international trade.
Concerning migration, the outflows from Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to
be too small to have had an impact on the receiving countries’ economies. For
example, the total stock of immigrants from Sub-Saharan countries in OECD
countries was around 3.9 million in 2002, working out at less than 0.5 per
cent of the total population (OECD 2005). The possibility of HIV-induced
migration between Sub-Saharan countries cannot be entirely discarded, but it
is difficult to see how this could possibly have a discernible impact on aggregate
economic performance (United Nations 2009).
Concerning financial flows between countries – aid, FDI and trade – there
are two possible effects to consider. One is that the HIV epidemic in the
treated units has a direct effect on the developed countries from which these
flows typically originate. This is again unlikely, considering the tiny shares
of these countries’ economies that these flows make out. Besides, these rich
countries are unlikely to be important as controls anyway. A more serious
threat to the identification strategy is the possibility that other poor countries
are affected: international and bilateral aid may be diverted to Sub-Saharan
countries due to the HIV epidemic, and FDI may be diverted away for the
same reason. Even though we are well aware of this problem, we think it
can be disregarded for two reasons. Firstly, with 865 million inhabitants as
of 2010, Sub-Saharan Africa comprises only 15 % of the world’s total LDC
population (Haub 2010). Thus, to the extent that FDI and international trade
have been disrupted due to the HIV epidemic and diverted to other countries,
the effects have probably been quite thinly spread. Secondly, considering the
ongoing debate on aid effectiveness (Banerjee et al. 2007), it is unlikely that an
HIV-induced diversion of aid to Sub-Saharan countries has led to discernible
negative effects in the countries that might otherwise have received the aid.
Next, define Ait ≡ Y Iit − Y Nit as the effect of the HIV epidemic for unit i at
time t, and let Dit be an indicator which takes on the value one whenever the
HIV epidemic has crossed the 1 per cent threshold: D1t = 1 (t > T0). Thus,
the observed outcome for unit i at time t equals
Yit = Y Nit + AitDit (2.1)
2.3.2 Modeling Growth
The synthetic control method does not require an explicit theoretical model
for the outcome variable, but given the rich theoretical and empirical litera-
ture on economic growth and development, it appears reasonable to frame the
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estimation procedure with reference to growth theory. Abadie et al. (2010)
suggest the following generic equation for the outcome in the non-intervention
case:
Y Nit = δt + θtZi + λtµi + it (2.2)
where δt is a time effect common to all units, θt is a vector of possibly time-
dependent coefficients, λt is a vector of unobserved common factors, and µi is
a vector of unknown factor loadings. Clearly, we may think of Equation 2.2
as a growth regression in reduced form, where the autoregressive element has
been eliminated by insertion.8 Thus, initial value of GDP, Yi0 should clearly
be included amongst the regressors Zi. Furthermore, we include gross capital
formation, indicators of the labor force, sectoral composition, human capital,
population growth, rural and total population.
Moreover, there is a large empirical literature that is very useful to identify
variables which are important determinants of economic growth and develop-
ment. Much of this literature actually revolves around the so-called “Africa
dummy”, i.e., whether the poor growth performance of Sub-Saharan Africa is
attributable to observable differences or not. The starting point of this liter-
ature was a study by Barro (1991), according to which there was a negative
growth effect associated with being a country in Sub-Saharan Africa. A paper
by Sachs and Warner (1997) also considered Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor growth
record during the period 1965-1990. Their main finding was that the growth
experience of African countries can be studied within the same framework as for
other countries; in other words, there is no specific effect associated with being
a country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Factors found to be particularly important
determinants of growth were, in diminishing order of importance, openness to
trade; life expectancy; institutional quality; central government saving; natural
resources; relative growth of the labor force; climate; and whether the country
was landlocked or not. Literature reviews by Collier and Gunning (1999a,b)
from the same time generally confirm these findings; however, they challenge
the view that the landlockedness or population growth rates may be seen as
exogenous. A good review of the entire growth regression literature, with a
particular focus on Africa, is provided by Ndulu et al. (2008).
Several authors have tried to explain the poor macroeconomic performance
in Africa with reference to their poor institutions and their colonial past. A
seminal paper by Acemoglu et al. (2001) found that institutions matter a lot
more than what a simple cross-sectional regression reveals; however, that pa-
per has since been heavily criticized (Albouy 2008). Nevertheless, there is
8Abadie et al. (2010) show that the synthetic control approach is unbiased also in an
autoregressive model
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widespread consensus that institutions matter. Englebert (2000) introduces
the concept of “state legitimacy”, which is generally – but not uniformly –
worse in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other parts of the world. He finds that the
colonial inheritance of poor state legitimacy explains not only inferior growth,
but also to a large extent policies that are harmful to growth. Also Bertocchi
and Canova (2002) attribute a large portion of sluggish growth in Africa to
its colonial inheritance. Even though these studies are very useful to generate
hypotheses concerning the variables that are associated with economics growth
in an African context, it should also be noted that the growth regression lit-
erature has been criticized. In a recent contribution, Jerven (2009) challenges
the view implicit in many growth regressions, that the African performance
has been uniformly worse since independence. In fact, the period of sluggish
growth – predominantly from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s – was preceded
by a period of higher-than-average growth on the African continent. This
is an important point; however, our data-driven empirical strategy has been
designed precisely to allow for that kind of irregularities.
2.3.3 Implementation
The synthetic control method involves estimating two matrices: V is the
weighting matrix determining the relative predictive power of various outcome
variables Zi and of the outcome variable itself. The vector W is a vector of
non-negative weights given to the J control countries.
The criterion minimized is given by
∥∥∥X¯1 − X¯0W∥∥∥V =
√(
X¯1 − X¯0W
)′
V
(
X¯1 − X¯0W
)
(2.3)
where X¯j is a vector of averages over the pretreatment period of elements of Zi
and Yi, for treated and control units, respectively. This will give us an optimal
country weight matrix among all diagonal positive definite matrices depending
on the variable weight (W ∗(V )).
The predictors V are chosen such that the average distance from of the out-
come variable, i.e. the root of the mean squared prediction error is minimized
in pre-intervention periods:
RMSPE =
√∑
t (Y1,t −Y0,tW∗(V))2
N
(2.4)
where N represents the number of years in the pretreatment period.
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2.4 Data and Variables
For our analysis we use data from various sources. As already mentioned above
the main source of our HIV data is Oster (2007). Our dependent variable is
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP).9 In order to enrich this
dataset we also used population data from Rosling (2012) and GDP data from
the Penn World Tables (Alan Heston et al. 2006). All variables used and their
sources are presented in Appendix A. As mentioned earlier, we use different
predictor variables in order to find a close match of the treated country as
synthetic control unit.
Combining these datasets, we are able to construct a balanced panel dataset
for almost all countries from 1962 to 2007 with only a few missing values for
some countries. The median year of the intervention (when the HIV prevalence
rate increases to more than 1%) is 1987, with minimum of 1982 and maximum
of 1991, which gives us on average 25 pre-intervention years and 22 post-
intervention years. 10
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, the choice of variables included in X will
influence the countries the estimator uses to replicate the treated country and
will thus also affect the estimates. We follow two complementary strategies in
order to obtain a reliable estimate: in a first set of estimates, we rely on the
theoretical literature on economic growth and include variables motivated by
standard economic models, while in a separate set of estimates, we base our
estimation on the empirical growth literature for the choice of our variables in
X.
We embed the first step of our analysis in an augmented Solow growth
model. Our predictors for GDP are as follows: gross capital formation; pop-
ulation in the labor force; total population; population growth; proportion
of population living in rural areas and the value added of the agricultural,
industrial and service sector respectively.11 Moreover, we include human cap-
ital from two sources: years of schooling as provided by Barro (2001) and
proportion of the population who completed primary, secondary and tertiary
education respectively, provided by Lutz et al. (2007) and transformed into
9We also performed a similar analysis using total GDP as dependent variable. However,
as Oster (2007) finds the median time to death from infection to death is around ten years,
also in African countries. Therefore it is not too surprising that we do not find any effects
in the aggregate. As Table 2.2 shows most of our treated countries hit the prevalence rate
of 10% in the 90’s. Consequently the effects of mortality should only be seen 10-15 years
later and so these effects can be observed only recently or even in the future.
10An issue in this context is that many countries are not independent at the beginning
of our analysis. Data is available also for them, even though the influence of parent states
is not clear. Therefore, as a robustness check, we drop all pre-independence observations.
The results however were not affected by this change.
11The source of these variables and the GDP variable is the World Bank database
(Mundial 2011)
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years of schooling by us.
In a second set of estimates we relate our estimation approach to the em-
pirical literature mentioned in Section 2.3.2. In these empirical studies it was
shown that many different variables may play an important role for economic
growth. Moreover, as shown in equation (2.3) the growth indicators are av-
eraged over the pre-intervention period. One could imagine that information
on the colonial origin of a particular country or landlockedness might have a
higher predictive power for long term GDP growth than the capital stock av-
eraged over 20 years. Therefore in a second step we include different variables
often used in empirical growth studies and employ a data-driven strategy, such
that the vector of variables X is allowed to differ from country to country. In
these data-driven specifications, the variables are chosen in a way to obtain
the best match between the treated unit and its synthetic control group in the
pre-intervention period. This way we find variables that are closely related to
the growth trajectory in each country.
These additional data come from various empirical studies. We use the
data from (Mundial 2011) on percent of females in labor force and arable land
and total land area in hectares. The climate and soil suitability of a country
determine its potential for food production and thus the possibility to meet
the basic needs of the population. For this reason we included several agricul-
tural suitability variables, such as climate and soil quality and data on physical
geography (e.g. average meters above sea level) and population from Gallup
et al. (2001). Furthermore, we obtained data on ethnic and cultural fraction-
alization from Fearon (2003) and here the logic is that a country with a very
high degree of fractionalization might have more frequent conflicts disrupting
economic growth. Moreover, we merged our dataset with the dataset from Ci-
ccone and Jarocinski (2010) which includes several determinants of economic
growth, such as religion, influences from colonialization, life expectancy, fertil-
ity and many more. Many economic studies indicate that institutions might
play an important role (see, e.g. Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005). In order to take
them into account we included several variables from La Porta et al. (1999) and
Englebert (2002) measuring the quality of the government along several dimen-
sions such as bureaucratic delays, the estimated size of the black market, the
level of corruption and other variables. We also include regime characteristics,
using the Polity IV authority variable (Marshall et al. 2009), which measures
the political authority on a scale ranging from -10 (‘hereditary monarchy’) to
+10 (‘consolidated democracy’). Moreover, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
show that violence and terrorism significantly affected economic outcomes in
the Basque Country. This may well be the case in other countries as well,
and therefore we also control for political violence within a country using the
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Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset (Marshall 2010), which measures
violence within a country on a zero (peace) to ten (highest violence level) scale.
Finally, the globalization index provided by Dreher (2006) was used to measure
overall globalization. Some empirical papers found that the ratio of GDP to
GNP, a proxy for structural openness (see for instance Armstrong and Read
1998) also matters for growth, this dataset was downloaded from Alan Heston
et al. (2006).
The actual donor pool depends on GDP data available. For some countries
GDP is only available long after 1962. Therefore we face a trade-off between
the size of the interval before the treatment and the number of donors available.
Following Abadie et al. (2010), we maximize the length of the pretreatment pe-
riod. Our donor pool contains almost 60 countries in most cases. For Namibia,
however, we only have information about Namibia’s GDP starting from 1970.
Therefore, also the donor pool is slightly bigger. In Table 2.4 below we present
the treatment states the time interval of the analysis and the size of the donor
pool respectively.
Table 2.4: Treatment Years and Donor Pool Size
Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi
treat year 1987 1987 1991 1988
start year 1962 1962 1962 1962
end year 2007 2007 2007 2007
size donor 58 58 58 58
Mozambique Namibia Rwanda S. Africa
treat year 1990 1990 1983 1991
start year 1962 1970 1962 1962
end year 2007 2007 2007 2007
size donor 58 60 58 58
Swaziland Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
treat year 1991 1982 1984 1985
start year 1962 1962 1962 1962
end year 2007 2007 2007 2007
size donor 58 58 58 58
Before we proceed to the main analysis we need to make some remarks
about the countries considered in the analysis. Zimbabwe is currently one of
the poorest countries in the world. In the pre-treatment period (prior to 1985)
GDP per capita never exceeded 150$ (at PPP). Since the synthetic control
group only allows interpolation from the convex hull and thus the elements of
the vector W can only be positive, Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita is too low to be
matched by other countries. Therefore we are not able to find countries with
similar growth paths and we are not able to analyze the effects of HIV. The
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same holds true for Mozambique. Initial GDP in 1960 equals 153 $ (at PPP).
Even though it rises to 289 $ by 1990 (the treatment year) no country can
be found matching this growth path. Also Botswana is a critical candidate,
however the reason is slightly different: its GDP went from 331$ in 1961 to
3130$ in 1986 (the year just before the intervention). This rapid growth was not
matched by any other country in the world, and therefore we do not have any
counterfactual for this country either. Two further countries are problematic
and possibly have to be excluded: Rwanda and Uganda. Both of them have
had wars with severe consequences for the population and for economic growth.
The data reveal that Rwanda’s GDP per Capita dropped by 60% in the year
1994 due to the effects of war and genocide, while Uganda’s GDP dropped
by 20% due to a war in 1979. Such a rapid decline in growth cannot be
matched by other countries.12 For all of these countries it is impossible to find
suitable donors that match this behavior and thus the effect of HIV can not
be identified, since it overlaps with different other circumstances.
Analyzing the remaining seven treated countries and their donor pools, we
construct control countries. We build a synthetic control unit for each treated
country using synthetic control groups. In the next Section we present the
results of this optimization.
Since GDP per capita has a clear time trend in most countries, we focus
on relative differences between treated and donor GDP in each year, instead
of absolute deviations. Without this adjustment results are not comparable
between countries.13
2.5 Results
In this Section, we present and discuss the main findings from our analysis.
First, we devote our attention to the fit in the pre-treatment interval, and then
we turn to the estimated effects.
12For the same reason we will exclude former members of the Soviet Union and other
countries from the donor pool such as: Georgia (GDP per capita dropped by 55% in 1992),
Lebanon (GDP drop of 52% in 1989), Armenia (drop of 50% in 1992), Serbia (drop of 37%
in 1993), Latvia (drop of 35% in 1992), Moldova (drop of 35% in 1994) Tajikistan (drop of
33% in 1992), Bosnia and Herzegovina (drop of 30% in 1992), Azerbaijan (drop of 25% in
1992), Lithuania (drop of 21% in 1992), the Kyrgyz Republic (drop of 20% in 1994) and
Bulgaria (drop of 17% in 1996) from the further analysis (as a possible placebo candidates).
13In Abadie et al. (2010) this poses only a minor threat since the variation of the outcome
variable, cigarette packs within the US, is much lower than variation of GDP per capita in
the World.
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2.5.1 Pre-treatment interval: Match between treated
units and synthetic controls
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 below display the match of the synthetic control group with
the actual data for all seven countries we are analyzing. In Table 2.5 we display
the results using variables from the theoretical literature, while in Table 2.6 we
choose the variables from a vast array of variables and use the variables that
minimize the root of the mean squared prediction error (RMSPE). The RMSPE
is displayed in the last row and provides information on the fit of treatment
and synthetic control in the pre-treatment period. Following equation (3.4)
the prediction error represents the average difference in the logarithm GDP of
treatment and synthetic control in each year. Since the GDP is measured in
logs and not in levels the percentage deviation will be minimized. This criterion
is preferable to the absolute deviation, since the GDP is usually growing over
time and this way the growth path will be matched. Finally, in the third
column of for each country we compare the estimates of the synthetic control
unit with a simple average of the donor pool over the same time period.
Table 2.5: Means of Control and Treatment Group: Theory Based Predictors
Kenya Lesotho Malawi Namibia
Predictors Treated Synthetic Average Treated Synthetic Average Treated Synthetic Average Treated Synthetic Average
GDP p Cap start 578.047 588.597 2619.675 219.832 279.479 3209.104 233.873 280.221 2619.675 2476.831 2394.095 3632.563
GDP p Cap mid 639.771 658.737 4200.542 384.195 368.761 4625.789 310.231 317.443 4200.542 2349.967 2522.410 4771.887
GDP p Cap end 838.129 820.440 6877.661 643.403 779.971 8864.206 419.903 520.463 7260.500 2803.402 3085.495 8232.726
Cap Form p Cap 137.648 151.599 1046.254 120.361 117.254 1302.181 64.267 59.426 1070.488 480.098 703.941 1302.838
Perc LForce 41.486 40.735 39.619 41.440 43.205 40.410 46.593 41.995 39.689 29.460 33.285 40.223
Human Capital 4.423 4.334 7.048 4.050 3.766 7.105 3.197 3.106 7.048 6.224 4.849 7.138
Pop Growth 3.610 2.833 1.788 2.185 2.186 1.678 3.151 2.224 1.777 2.986 2.862 1.675
Total Pop in M 13.348 12.357 50.939 1.257 324.200 52.877 5.335 172.100 51.433 1.024 19.263 56.831
Value Add Ser 45.308 47.300 43.392 43.107 28.475 46.137 37.420 28.246 43.772 44.598 44.172 46.787
Value Add Ind 19.103 18.801 30.795 21.007 23.774 31.340 17.847 17.605 30.802 44.247 36.202 31.866
Value Add Agr 35.589 34.000 17.774 35.886 47.751 16.512 44.733 54.149 17.644 11.155 15.175 15.816
Rural Pop 87.672 79.745 48.889 89.276 86.637 46.490 92.606 90.781 48.659 75.085 50.999 45.999
RMSPE . 0.054 1.347 . 0.114 2.170 . 0.088 2.111 . 0.051 0.271
South Africa Swaziland Zambia
Predictors Treated Synthetic Average Treated Synthetic Average Treated Synthetic Average
GDP p Cap start 3295.960 3532.077 3209.104 414.260 566.892 3209.104 483.210 483.376 2619.675
GDP p Cap mid 3940.744 4791.631 4625.789 1010.298 1129.152 4625.789 705.673 674.742 3920.849
GDP p Cap end 5758.561 8501.042 8864.206 2523.079 2517.122 8864.206 807.678 902.464 5832.941
Cap Form p Cap 1061.496 1479.724 1302.181 290.019 349.062 1302.181 171.975 140.408 984.688
Perc LForce 27.531 30.698 40.410 32.048 37.898 40.410 36.852 37.886 39.436
Human Capital 5.927 5.154 7.105 4.200 5.692 7.105 4.465 3.688 6.706
Pop Growth 2.322 2.250 1.678 3.221 2.192 1.678 3.259 2.585 1.826
Total Pop in M 26.933 17.962 52.877 0.588 92.553 52.877 4.546 6.078 49.471
Value Add Ser 51.863 49.812 46.137 40.478 38.445 46.137 27.978 38.359 42.154
Value Add Ind 41.382 41.547 31.340 32.718 32.625 31.340 52.734 26.667 30.653
Value Add Agr 6.754 8.641 16.512 26.804 28.930 16.512 12.101 33.172 18.220
Rural Pop 51.244 48.335 46.490 84.072 72.639 46.490 68.766 82.508 49.588
RMSPE . 0.084 0.352 . 0.118 1.147 . 0.057 1.294
GDP p Cap stands for the GDP per capita at the beginning and the middle and the end of the pre-treatment period. Cap Form p Cap represents the capital formation per
capita. Perc LForce measures the percentage of the inhabitants in the labor force. Human Capital is measured as average years of Schooling, Pop Growth represents the
growth rate of the Total Pop in M(illions) in per Cent. Finally, our predictors include the value added by the service, industrial and agricultural sectors as percentages and
the per Cent of inhabitants living in rural areas. RMSPE stands for the root of the mean squared prediction error. All predictors except for GDP are averaged over the
pre-intervention period.
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Table 2.6: Means of Control and Treatment Group: Empirical Predictors
Kenya Lesotho Malawi Namibia
Predictors Treated Synthetic Average Predictors Treated Synthetic Average Predictors Treated Synthetic Average Predictors Treated Synthetic Average
GDP p Cap start 578.047 629.798 2748.996 GDP p Cap start 219.832 270.410 3275.372 GDP p Cap start 233.873 253.741 2698.547 GDP p Cap start 2476.831 3159.160 3869.680
GDP p Cap mid 639.771 608.290 4387.395 GDP p Cap mid 384.195 332.636 4693.540 GDP p Cap mid 310.231 305.212 4256.071 GDP p Cap mid 2349.967 3450.347 4989.836
GDP p Cap end 838.129 845.068 7069.874 GDP p Cap end 643.403 743.894 8886.832 GDP p Cap end 419.903 542.574 7086.283 GDP p Cap end 2803.402 6330.320 8521.207
Pop Growth 3.610 2.994 1.823 Area Tropics 0.011 0.304 0.257 Total Size Mkm2 0.111 1.099 1.372 GNP GDP ratio 86.699 91.640 98.068
Openness Measure 0.606 0.578 0.499 Latitude -29.691 25.308 24.921 Openness Measure 0.614 0.165 0.422 Latitude -22.104 6.720 23.819
Political Rights 5.330 4.973 3.130 Value Add Ind 21.007 27.185 31.666 Number Ethn Gps 6.000 7.438 4.037 RMSPE . 0.042 0.312
RMSPE . 0.044 1.381 RMSPE . 0.106 2.193 Density 1960 26.659 15.166 99.129
Democracy Score 0.320 1.604 5.664
RMSPE . 0.076 2.116
South Africa Swaziland Zambia
Predictors Treated Synthetic Average Predictors Treated Synthetic Average Predictors Treated Synthetic Average
GDP p Cap start 3295.960 4297.585 4473.441 GDP p Cap start 414.260 592.247 3274.753 GDP p Cap start 483.210 531.547 2620.489
GDP p Cap mid 3940.744 5147.026 6406.770 GDP p Cap mid 1010.298 1148.863 4686.925 GDP p Cap mid 705.673 696.583 3910.450
GDP p Cap end 5758.561 8154.849 12482.447 GDP p Cap end 2523.079 2662.569 8825.189 GDP p Cap end 807.678 958.771 5702.235
Political Rights 7.000 6.356 5.895 KOF Glob Index 40.501 36.742 46.653 Perc Muslim 0.000 0.184 0.170
Latitude -29.051 -21.844 30.070 LForce Female 40.405 35.450 35.194 Value Add Agr 12.101 24.283 18.723
Black Market 0.025 0.133 0.116 Political Rights 2.000 2.053 5.317 Latitude -13.495 3.436 21.686
Tax Evasion 2.400 3.090 3.202 MASL 305.444 385.559 612.349 Political Viol 0.050 0.397 0.736
RMSPE . 0.026 0.220 RMSPE . 0.110 1.169 RMSPE . 0.086 1.313
Area Tropics represents the percent of the land area in the tropics. Total Size Mkm2 stands for the total land size in million square kilometers. GNP GDP ratio is the ratio from GNP to GDP and is supposed to be a proxy for openness. The
Openness Measure comes from the Ciccone and Jarocinski (2010) dataset. The KOF Glob Index represents a globalization index. MASL stands for meters above sea level. All predictors except for GDP are averaged over the pre-intervention
period.
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Looking at the theory-based predictors first, GDP per capita varies largely
from country to country. While the average of the control group is around 3,000
PPP $ in 1961 the treated countries exhibit a GDP of around 500 PPP $ with a
vast variation upwards (for example South Africa with 3,300 PPP $) as well as
downwards (Lesotho’s average GDP per capita was equal to 219 PPP$). GDP
per capita roughly thirty years later (just before the treatment) is of course
higher, for example Lesotho’s GDP per capita increased to over 600 PPP $
and also the GDP per capita of South Africa reached almost 6000 PPP $. The
average number of schooling years ranges from 3 (Malawi) to 6 (Namibia).
Also sectoral composition varies largely from country to country. While most
treated countries have around 30-40% of the workforce in agriculture, Namibia,
South Africa and Zambia form exceptions with 11%, 7% and 12% respectively.
Consequently these countries also have a lower share of rural population with
75% 51% and 68% respectively.
When we instead consider data-driven predictors, population growth is the
only theory-based predictor that survives. Instead, political rights (Kenya,
South Africa and Swaziland) and latitude (Zambia, South Africa and Namibia)
gain importance. Moreover, openness seems to be an important predictor for
Kenya and Malawi. Other important predictors are the sectoral composition
(Lesotho and Zambia) and institutional quality measured by the democracy
score (Malawi), tax evasion and the black market premium (South Africa).
Comparing the predictive power of the synthetic control unit with that
of a simple average amongst donor countries, the advantage of the method
becomes obvious. For GDP per capita we find very good synthetic control
groups (less than 5% in terms of the root of the squared prediction error) for
Kenya, Namibia and South Africa.14. All others have a prediction error higher
than 5%, with Swaziland and Lesotho having the highest deviations around
10%.
14For comparison, it may be noted that Abadie et al. (2010) in their study find a RMSPE
of about 3%, analysing sales of cigarette packs in the United States.
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Table 2.7: Country Weights
Panel A: Theory Based Predictors Panel B: Data-Driven Predictors Overall
Donor Kenya Lesotho Malawi Namibia S. Africa Swaziland Zambia Sum Kenya Lesotho Malawi Namibia S. Africa Swaziland Zambia Sum Sum
Nepal 0 0.519 0.689 0 0 0 0.07 1.278 0 0.234 0.771 0 0 0 1.005 2.283
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0.617 0 0.617 0 0.125 0.151 0 0 0.649 0 0.925 1.542
China 0.002 0.333 0.184 0 0 0 0 0.519 0 0.403 0.078 0 0 0 0 0.481 1
Sri Lanka 0 0.049 0 0 0 0.08 0.323 0.452 0 0 0 0 0 0.514 0.514 0.966
Madagascar 0.372 0 0.12 0 0 0 0.036 0.528 0 0 0 0 0 0.298 0.298 0.826
Mauritania 0.059 0 0 0 0 0 0.545 0.604 0.146 0 0 0 0 0 0.146 0.75
Algeria 0 0 0 0.166 0.536 0 0 0.702 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.702
Comoros 0.291 0.078 0 0 0 0 0 0.369 0.312 0.312 0.681
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0.261 0 0.261 0 0 0 0 0 0.351 0 0.351 0.612
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0.596 0 0.596 0.596
Senegal 0 0 0 0.11 0 0 0.026 0.136 0.433 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.434 0.57
Philippines 0.176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.176 0 0 0 0 0.272 0 0 0.272 0.448
Niger 0.101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.101 0.109 0.238 0 0 0 0 0.347 0.448
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.372 0 0 0.372 0.372
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0.311 0 0 0.311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.311
Iran 0 0 0 0.267 0 0 0 0.267 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.267
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.246 0 0 0 0.246 0.246
Bolivia 0 0 0 0.244 0 0 0 0.244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.244
Peru 0 0 0 0.214 0 0 0 0.214 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.214
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.2
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.158 0 0 0.158 0.158
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.156 0 0 0.156 0.156
Morocco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.152 0.152 0.152
Tunisia 0 0.101 0 0.101 0 0 0 0.101
Romania 0 0.021 0.007 0 0 0.042 0 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.07
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0.052 0 0 0.052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.052
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.035 0.035 0.035
Sum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 7.00 14.00
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Turning to the donor pool, Table 2.7 displays the actual weights given to
the different countries when using the theory-based (Panel A) and data-driven
predictors (Panel B), respectively, in order to replicate the trajectory of the
treated unit.15. The differences in country weights between the two approaches
are sometimes notable; for example in the case of South Africa, where none
of the countries appearing in the theory-based set appears in the data-driven
one. Even though countries like Argentina – having a high weight and allowing
a much better fit (since the fit in general for South Africa is much better for
the empirical donors) – for the data-driven predictors are available as donors,
using theory based predictors it is not chosen by the estimator. Therefore the
choice of predictors has a great influence on the choice of donor countries.
Nepal obtains the overall highest weight, while among the African countries
Madagascar is the country with the highest weight.
2.5.2 Post-treatment interval: Effects of HIV preva-
lence
We now turn to the effects of HIV prevalence on GDP. Our most striking re-
sult is actually that the estimated effects differ strongly from one country to
another. Results can be found in Figure 2.3. The solid vertical line represents
the cutoff, i.e., the year in which the HIV prevalence rate is thought to have
crossed the 1% threshold. We also added some further reference lines: dashed
lines indicate that HIV prevalence reached 10% and dotted lines signal that
HIV prevalence transcends 20%. Red lines indicate that it crossed the respec-
tive prevalence rates in the opposite direction. In terms of GDP the solid lines
represent the actual outocome of each country. Dashed and dotted lines rep-
resent the counterfactual, namely how the country would have behaved, based
on our models, if there were no HIV. These counterfactuals are derived from
weighting the donors as displayed in Table 2.7. The dashed line represents the
weights derived from empirical (data-driven) predictors and the dotted line
represents the counterfactual derived from theory based predictors. However,
these results should be interpreted with caution since they only show the point
estimates and do not tell anything about significance, which will be analyzed
using placebo estimates in the next subsection.
For Kenya our figure shows that the actual GDP slightly exceeds both
counterfactuals provided by the two different sets of predictors. For the other
countries the result is the opposite: the actual outcome lies below the trajec-
tories of the synthetic control group – thus suggesting a negative impact of the
epidemic.
15Countries having a zero weight for all treatment units are dropped. Therefore the
number of donors here do not correspond to the numbers of Table 2.4
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Figure 2.3: GDP per Capita Trends, Treated Countries vs. Synthetic Controls
Note: Solid lines represent the actual development while the dotted and dashed lines
represent the predicted outcomes by the synthetic control group for theory based and
empirical predictors respectively.
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Table 2.8 provides a clearer picture of the size of the effect. Following
Abadie et al. (2010) we calculate the prediction error in the pre-treatment
period (1st column) and for the period after the treatment (2nd column) and
construct the ratio of the two RMSPE (last column). Moreover we estimate
the average treatment effect in the third column, defined as the average dif-
ference between the actual GDP and its counterfactual (3rd column). Finally,
in the forth column, we report the difference between synthetic control group
and treatment country in the final period, i.e. 2007. Since the deviation is
cumulative this variable also represents an important indicator of the total
effect.
Table 2.8: Prediction Errors
Panel A: Theory Based Predictors
Country RMSPE RMSPEpost Estimated Treatment Effect TE final period RMSPE ratio
Zambia 0.057 0.452 -0.414 -0.588 7.880
Malawi 0.088 0.488 -0.461 -0.665 5.550
South Africa 0.084 0.275 -0.268 -0.294 3.272
Kenya 0.054 0.135 0.133 0.171 2.522
Lesotho 0.114 0.264 -0.244 -0.419 2.325
Swaziland 0.118 0.088 -0.053 -0.151 0.739
Namibia 0.051 0.022 -0.011 0.002 0.432
Part B: Data-Driven Predictors
Country RMSPE RMSPEpost Estimated Treatment Effect TE final period RMSPE ratio
South Africa 0.026 0.217 -0.211 -0.236 8.220
Malawi 0.076 0.529 -0.509 -0.669 6.940
Zambia 0.086 0.579 -0.538 -0.768 6.757
Lesotho 0.106 0.275 -0.255 -0.447 2.601
Namibia 0.042 0.088 -0.073 -0.083 2.116
Kenya 0.044 0.075 0.068 0.093 1.705
Swaziland 0.110 0.143 -0.125 -0.206 1.307
In both Panels, South Africa, Malawi and Zambia show the highest ratios,
indicating that the difference between the counterfactual and the realized GDP
after the treatment is considerably higher than before the treatment. More-
over, the estimated treatment effects are quite high for Malawi and Zambia,
and measure between 40 and 50% of the GDP. Even though the treatment
effect of South Africa around 20% is comparably small, the fact that the esti-
mate occured with a very high precision for the data-driven predictors results
in the highest RMSPE ratio of all, with an average deviation in the post treat-
ment period around eight times as high as before the treatment. For the other
countries these ratios are smaller and reach only around 2. In Swaziland and
Zambia they are even smaller, indicating a larger deviation before the treat-
ment than afterwards.
Contrasting the overall results from theory-based and empirical predictors
we find that the RMSPE for the theory based models is higher (8% on average)
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than for the empirical predictors (7% on average). This is also to be expected,
since the latter approach has access to a larger set of predictors. Neverthe-
less, the treatment effects estimated by the two approaches are quite similar.
Given this similarity, we focus on results based on empirical predictors for the
remainder of this Section. The results of the robustness checks below are very
similar for the theory based predictors. We will return to the theory based
predictors in the next Section.
2.5.3 Placebo estimates
In order to assess whether the above differences are actually due to the treat-
ment and not just random variation, we now provide an estimate of the signifi-
cance of our findings using placebo estimates. We perform placebo estimations
for the non-treated countries and compare the outcome these estimates to the
countries severely affected by HIV. In order to get comparable estimates we
randomly select the treatment year from the pool of treatment years in the
severely affected countries. Figure 2.4 shows the results of this placebo analy-
ses for all the years where we have a common support, i.e. data points more
than 14 years away from the treatment year are not shown, in order to ensure
comparability between the lines in the graph.
Figure 2.4: Placebo Estimates with respect to Treated Countries
Figure 2.4 shows that Malawi and Zambia have suffered the largest esti-
mated (negative) effect among all countries. Since there are 77 countries in the
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graph this suggests that significance is reached at the usual 5% level. For the
other countries the treatment effect is smaller. However, the effects might still
be significant: For countries having a relatively bad fit in the pre-treatment
period a large deviation post-treatment is only expected. Therefore the devia-
tion prior to treatment needs to be considered as well. Following Abadie et al.
(2010), we also provide the table of estimates with the RMSPE ratio.
Table 2.9: Prediction Errors for Empirical predictors: Placebo Analysis
Country Treatment RMSPE RMSPEpost Estimated Treatment Effect TE final period RMSPE ratio
1 Mongolia 0 0.031 0.305 -0.295 -0.302 9.850
2 South Africa 1 0.026 0.217 -0.211 -0.236 8.220
3 Ireland 0 0.023 0.182 0.129 0.280 7.867
4 Canada 0 0.015 0.110 -0.102 -0.132 7.162
5 Malawi 1 0.076 0.529 -0.509 -0.669 6.940
6 Zambia 1 0.086 0.579 -0.538 -0.768 6.757
7 Comoros 0 0.057 0.310 -0.279 -0.535 5.463
8 Argentina 0 0.057 0.308 -0.286 -0.379 5.421
9 Malta 0 0.136 0.716 0.663 0.689 5.274
10 Spain 0 0.027 0.139 0.135 0.201 5.245
..
32 Lesotho 1 0.106 0.275 -0.255 -0.447 2.601
..
44 Namibia 1 0.042 0.088 -0.073 -0.083 2.116
..
52 Kenya 1 0.044 0.075 0.068 0.093 1.705
..
63 Swaziland 1 0.110 0.143 -0.125 -0.206 1.307
..
77 Pakistan 0 0.097 0.049 0.001 -0.031 0.503
According to the Table 2.9, in which countries are ordered by their RMSPE
ratio, South Africa, Malawi and Zambia rank second, fifth and sixth respec-
tively indicating a significance of 2.5, 6.5 and 7.8 per cent respectively. The
next treated country, Lesotho, has rank 34 and is thus far away from being
significant according to this definition.
Summing up, there is substantial heterogeneity in estimated effects. For
one group of countries, we find no effects of HIV on GDP per capita (Botswana,
Lesotho, Kenya and Namibia) – while for South Africa, Malawi and Zambia
we find effects that are quite large and also significant.
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we performed additional ro-
bustness checks not included in the current version of the paper. The synthetic
control group estimator uses the mean in order to replicate a country, while the
variance is not taken into account. For example a middle income country could
be replicated by another country of middle income or by the mean of a high
income and a low income country. The results in the post-treatment interval
might depend upon whether rather similar or rather different countries are
chosen by the estimator. In order to prevent that, we performed a robustness
check including only countries in the donor pool that are close enough, both in
terms of GDP per capita and population size. Using this restriction affected
our results only slightly. While South Africa and Zambia ended up having a
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higher RMSPE ratio, the ratio of Malawi decreased from 6.9 to 4.5. Another
issue is that our estimator might be overfitting. Given the fact that we always
include the first, the middle and the last year of the pre-intervention period of
the dependent variable among the predictors, might be too restrictive. In ac-
cordance with theoretical models we only include the variable at the beginning
(t=0). This increases the RMSPE ratio in Zambia and Malawi and slightly
decreases the ratio in South Africa from 8.2 to 6.7. However, based on our
previous ranking (Table 2.9) all treated countries would still be among the top
six. Summing up, we see quite a robust treatment effect for Zambia, Malawi
and South Africa, while for other countries we find many placebos with effects
of similar magnitude.
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2.6 HIV prevalence and growth
In the previous Section, we have identified negative effects of HIV in some
countries, while for other countries also severely affected by the pandemic,
there seem to be no effects. We now analyze how these estimated effects relate
to the HIV prevalence rate and also to some key economic and public health in-
dicators which can be suspected to be important mediators of the relationship.
Thus, we apply the synthetic control group estimator (with theory-based and
empirical predictors) to all countries in our sample (i.e. mildly and strongly
affected countries). Then we employ regression analysis on the generated data
to estimate the following equation:
αˆit = c+ βZit + γRit + εit (2.5)
where, αˆit is the estimated treatment effect (the difference between actual and
predicted GDP per capita), Rit represents HIV prevalence in country i a given
year, Zit are some other variables that might influence the difference such as
political violence. We estimate the equation concentrating on the time interval
after the intervention. Moreover, we weight observations by the performance
of the estimator in the pre-treatment period (using the square of the deviation
between the treated country and its synthetic control). In total, we have
551 (32 severely affected countries) and 658 (40 severely affected countries)
country-year observations for the theory-based and the empirical predictors
respectively.
First we present the relationship between HIV prevalence and relative GDP
loss in each country (for the empirical predictors). Figure 2.5 below shows all
single observations, each datapoint representing one country.
Figure 2.5 shows that there appears to be an approximately linear, and
statistically significant, negative relationship between the level of HIV preva-
lence and the estimated effect in terms of GDP. This will be confirmed in the
regression analysis below (Table 2.10).
In the first model (1) of each Panel we only include the HIV prevalence
rate and year dummies as control variables. In the next step we vary the
time lag of HIV. We find that a time lag of seven years leads to the highest
explanatory power, measured by the Wald chi square indicator. This result
is consistent with the fact that the average incubation time is around seven
years as well. No higher orders than the linear term turned out significant. In
a third step we include a dummy variable for African countries (column 3).
Although the Africa dummy is significant in most specifications our estimate
of the treatment effect is hardly altered. So in our estimates we find an Africa
effect, but it appears not to bias the influence of HIV prevalence. In terms of
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Figure 2.5: Local Polynomial of GDP on lagged HIV
the size of the effect of the HIV prevalence rate, we find that the GDP decreases
between 1.1 and 2% for each additional percentage point of prevalence.
In the columns 4 and 5 of each Panel we control for other variables in order
to identify important mediators. Here we concentrate on key economic and
public health indicators and other variables that were chosen as important
predictors for the data-driven synthetic control group estimator (see Table
2.6).16 We find that land area in the tropics are an important mediator leading
to larger treatment effects. The same holds true for political rights. For land
size and pre-intervention population growth on the other hand we find no
effect, even though our estimates are very precise.
16Although the latitude has been chosen as an important predictor including it as a linear
term in a regression context, would have no meaning economically.
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Table 2.10: Correlations between GDP and HIV
Panel A: Theory Based Predictors Panel B: Data-Driven Predictors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Diff. in GDP Diff. in GDP Diff. in GDP Diff. in GDP Diff. in GDP Diff. in GDP Diff. in GDP Diff. in GDP Diff. in GDP Diff. in GDP
L.HIV Prevalence Rate -0.0123∗∗∗ -0.00601∗
(0.00215) (0.00311)
L7.HIV Prevalence Rate -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗∗ -0.0197∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0132∗∗∗ -0.0197∗∗∗
(0.00256) (0.00245) (0.00227) (0.00215) (0.00373) (0.00375) (0.00319) (0.00269)
Africa Dummy -0.232∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ -0.0426 -0.203∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗
(0.0359) (0.0343) (0.0605) (0.0326) (0.0395) (0.0575)
Land Area in Tropics (Per Cent) -0.247∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗∗
(0.0467) (0.0412) (0.0719) (0.0815)
Land Size (Area in M km2) -0.00945 -0.0135 -0.00333 0.00875
(0.0498) (0.0260) (0.0605) (0.0395)
Political Rights -0.0338∗∗∗ -0.0442∗∗∗
(0.00979) (0.0112)
Population Growth (Per Cent) 0.0575∗∗ 0.0454
(0.0291) (0.0323)
Constant -0.00436 0.0149 0.193∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ -0.0622∗∗∗ -0.0488∗∗ -0.0262 0.202∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
(0.0175) (0.0181) (0.0358) (0.0471) (0.0849) (0.0208) (0.0212) (0.0264) (0.0798) (0.113)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 551 551 551 551 551 658 658 658 658 658
Wald Chi2 74.98 94.81 142.60 295.03 460.73 51.20 59.16 59.73 90.19 284.36
The table represents the regression results of a random effects model with the yearly deviation from the counterfactual as a dependent variable. 32 (theory based predictors) and 40 (data-driven predictors)
severely affected countries and all years after treatment year up to 2007 are included. Observations weighted by the inverse of the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) in the pre-intervention period.
Standard errors corrected for unit root in parentheses. Political rights come from La Porta et al. (1999) and population growth Mundial (2011) from the year 1980; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.7 Discussion
In this Chapter, we estimate the effects of HIV prevalence on GDP in the
twelve Sub-Saharan countries most heavily affected by the pandemic. We
employ the synthetic control group approach (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003),
which provides a novel data-driven econometric method for case studies. With
the help of this approach, we are able to find fairly good control groups for
most countries in our sample. However, for Mozambique and Zimbabwe the
method also shows its limits. Due to the fact that their GDP per capita are
lower than in all other countries, we are not able to construct a good control
group for them. For Botswana, on the other hand, the growth path is to
steep to be replicated by any other country. Moreover, the method does not
allow for disentangling the effects of different events that coincide with the
intervention. For Rwanda and Uganda, political change occurs in the same
time interval as the pandemic, which reduces the credibility of our estimates
for these countries. Despite these problems, we are able to find fairly good
control units for most treated countries in the interval before the intervention.
Our results suggest that HIV left substantial effects in South Africa, Malawi
and Zambia, while for Lesotho, Swaziland, Kenya and Namibia we are not
able to identify significant effects on GDP per capita. Concentrating on the
countries where we find effects at the per capita level, our results suggest that
those countries lost 24% to 77% in terms of GDP per capita as compared
to the counterfactual without HIV. For Zambia we find the largest effect of
the pandemic, with an cumulative impact of about 77% of GDP from 1984
to 2007. Considering that Zambia has a 24-year history of HIV, this means
that on average Zambia had a growth rate which is 5.5% lower per year than
what would have been achieved without HIV. The second largest effect, can
be found in Malawi, where the effect measures around 67% of GDP from 1988
to 2007 (or a 4.5% reduction in the growth rate). Finally, for South Africa we
find the smallest effect with around 23% of GDP from 1991 to 2007 or a 1.5%
reduction of the growth rate.
In order to analyze the effect heterogeneity more closely we perform a
regression analysis, where the difference in economic growth between treatment
and control group was the dependent variable. This allowed us to take a step
into the black box, seeing what contributed to the economic consequences of
HIV prevalence.
We find that the effects of HIV on GDP arise with a time lag of around
seven years. This time interval matches the average incubation time without
medication. Since initially the disease is "‘sleeping"’, the infected individuals
don’t exhibit symptoms. Therefore it seems reasonable that economic conse-
quences can be measured only after the outbreak of the disease. The effect we
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find is is highly significant and thus suggests that on average there are large
effects of GDP on HIV. Quantitatively we find that each percentage point
increase in prevalence leads to a decrease in GDP of around 2%.
Moreover, the regression analysis shows that African countries exhibited
more severe economic consequences. This result is expected as well. However,
even when including an Africa dummy the point estimate of the prevalence
rate remains unaffected.
Furthermore, we were able to identify important mediators. The first me-
diator is a higher percentage of land area in tropics. According to Gallup et al.
(2001) countries in tropics develop rather poorly compared to other countries,
since diseases spread more rapidly. People infected with HIV, usually do not
die from AIDS itself, but their immunity system is weakened by HIV making
them more vulnerable for other diseases. Therefore a region prone to diseases
might be especially dangerous for individuals, whose immunity system has
already been weakened by HIV.
For population growth we find mixed effects. The claim of Young (2005),
that HIV had also positive consequences since it stopped excessive population
growth in African countries, might lead to the conclusion that a high popula-
tion growth will lead to less severe consequences of HIV. Our data shows that
population growth works as a mediator and thus reduces economic growth.
However, in order to verify the claim of Young (2005) one would still need to
confirm that HIV affects fertility and population growth which will be analyzed
in the next Chapter.
Finally, we also find that more political rights exacerbate the economic
consequences of HIV. This finding might seem a bit surprising at first glance,
however the logic is just the same as with population growth, although in the
opposite direction. Countries with more political rights are found to have a
higher growth potential (La Porta et al. 1999). Therefore there is potentially
more economic prosperity to be disrupted by HIV prevalence in these countries.
In the next Chapter we analyze the effects on demographic variables in
order to gain more insight in the different channels.
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3
Demographic Consequences of HIV ∗∗
3.1 Motivation
As we saw in the previous Chapter the treatment effects of HIV appear quite
heterogeneous. This is in line with previous literature. Many papers esti-
mate the impacts on economic growth and results vary widely. While some
studies find quite large negative effects (see for instance Gaffeo 2003, who es-
timates a reduction in the yearly growth rate of 1.2-1.7 percentage points),
some studies like Bloom and Mahal (1997b) find no effects, and Young (2005)
even predicts positive effects. This ambiguity might result from effects working
through many different channels and different channels dominating in different
countries.
In this Chapter we analyze the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on de-
mographic variables for the Sub-Saharan region. Estimating the demographic
impact of HIV restricts the possible channels and therefore helps to clarify the
heterogeneity in terms of economic consequences. For instance Young (2005)
suggests that HIV leads to a reduction in fertility and therefore fosters eco-
nomic growth for future generations. In order to assess the validity of this claim
it is important to obtain a clear estimate of the effects of HIV on fertility.17
Since HIV/AIDS is a lethal disease a substantial disruption of demographic
∗∗This Chapter is based on Karlsson and Pichler (2012a).
17Several later studies – such as Kalemli-Ozcan (2012) – reject the result of Young (2005),
however in this paper we combine an analysis with other demographic variables in order to
obtain a clearer relationship.
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variables such as life expectancy and the mortality rate can be expected. How-
ever, a clean estimate of the causal impact is complicated by the fact that
important secular trends in several demographic variables were observed be-
fore the pandemic hit. Furthermore, life expectancy in African countries is
quite low in general, compared to other countries with similar development.
Therefore it is important to assess how much of the difference is due to HIV
and to which degree other conditions are responsible.
Moreover, HIV will very likely change incentives for engagement in sexual
activity and thus there might also be an effect on fertility. However, different
mechanisms imply different results. On the one hand women who know about
their infection might not want to infect their children and partners and thus
fertility could be reduced. Moreover, there exists evidence that HIV biologi-
cally affects fertility through increased rates of miscarriage and stillbirth (see
for instance Fabiani et al. 2006). On the other hand HIV might also lead to
positive effects in the birth rate. Chen (2010) suggests that higher life ex-
pectancy in general leads to a decreased fertility since parents might prefer to
concentrate their investments on fewer children. HIV might reverse this pat-
tern since the decrease in life expectancy might lead to an increase in fertility.
Estimating the effect of HIV on fertility helps to identify which mechanism
prevails.
This is the first analysis in the literature to focus on the three outcome
variables life expectancy, death and birth rates. Other papers with a demo-
graphic focus concentrate on direct effects and thus estimate the effects on
the mortality and life expectancy (see for instance the publication of the UN
Population Division 2004). A second often considered relationship is the be-
havioral effects on fertility (see Kalemli-Ozcan 2012, for a recent study on this
topic). Analyzing both direct and indirect demographic effects together is use-
ful because the effects are interrelated. The mechanism considered above with
lower life expectancy leading to to higher fertility can only take place if there
is in fact a large enough drop in life expectancy.
As in the previous Chapter, we focus on the effects of HIV/AIDS in the
twelve most severely affected countries. Also the method will be similar. How-
ever, in this Chapter we extend the approach of Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) to three variables.
Our results show that HIV decreased life expectancy by 15 years on aver-
age, while the death rate was increased by seven additional deaths per 1,000
inhabitants. In terms of the birth rate however, we do not find any effect.
This Chapter is structured as follows: First an overview of impact of HIV
on demographic factors will be given. In Section 3.3 the synthetic control
method for comparative case studies of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) will be
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presented and discussed, followed by the description of the data and variables
used in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 we will describe how we adopt the method to
our setting with three outcome variables. The results are presented in Section
3.6. Finally, an evaluation of the achieved results will be given in Section 3.7.
3.2 Literature review
We already saw how the disease affected different parts of the world in Section
2.2 in the previous Chapter. In this Section we will briefly review the literature
on the effects of HIV on demographic variables.
The increase in life expectancy was in the past driven by a decline in mor-
tality rates which came along with improved medical care and consequently
improved health (Cutler et al. 2006). This increase in life expectancy was
therefore strongly associated with economic growth even though the relation-
ship between the two variables is a complex and dynamic one (Fogel 2004).
Chen (2010) shows in a theoretical model that a higher life expectancy will in
general lead to a decline in the fertility rate and a higher educational level due
to a quality-quantity trade-off concerning the number of children and their ed-
ucation. But he also considers a possible steady-state situation with exogenous
mortality rates, where the demography of a country is caught in a “poverty
trap” with characteristically high fertility rates, low educational level and low
life expectancy. Becker et al. (1990) also consider two steady-state situations,
where one equilibrium is characterized by a low fertility rate, increasing invest-
ments in education and physical capital and the second steady-state is found
with a high fertility rate and consequently low investments in human and phys-
ical capital. This is referred as the “Malthusian” equilibrium which can only
be changed with a strong investment policy. The fertility rate, mortality rate
and educational level are mostly seen as decisive factors for life expectancy
(see e.g. Becker et al. 1990). Even if it is not really known how these deter-
minants contribute to changes in life expectancy it is likely that an external
shock to the determinant “mortality” would probably cause a reaction in all
other variables. The HIV/AIDS pandemic can be seen as such an external
shock.
Several studies contemplate the relation of demographic determinants such
as fertility rate to the HIV prevalence rate. Fortson (2009) reports only a small
effect of HIV/AIDS prevalence rates on fertility rates when comparing 12 dif-
ferent Sub-Saharan countries. She argues however, that if educational levels
are taken into account, the relation between HIV/AIDS prevalence rates and
fertility becomes evident. Fink and Linnemayr (2008) also consider how edu-
cation affects the effect of HIV on fertility. They find a weak and statistically
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insignificant positive correlation between the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate and
the fertility rate for the overall data, but if one considers the data in groups
with different educational levels a positive effect of HIV/AIDS prevalence on
fertility of non-educated mothers and mothers with primary schooling is found.
But there is a negative effect of HIV/AIDS prevalence on fertility of mothers
with secondary and higher school education. The social transformation there-
fore leads to smaller prevalence amongst the better educated. Thus education
has an effect on the average HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in one or another way.
Whether the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate influences the decision for human cap-
ital investments, or the fertility rate in HIV/AIDS infected areas is influenced
by the educational level of the parents, cannot be solved here. Durevall and
Lindskog (2011) also investigate the effect on fertility and find mixed results
in Malawi. They find a relation between the age of mothers and their desired
number of children. Their study shows that younger women increase their
desired number of children while older women decrease it. The mechanism is
not directly traceable, but it is believed to have its cause in the prevention of
giving birth to HIV-infected children. Moreover, Young (2005, 2007) identi-
fies a large negative effect of the epidemic on fertility, whereas other studies
(Kalemli-Ozcan 2012, Juhn et al. 2008) report a much smaller or even positive
effect. Summing up, there is remarkable disagreement as to the effects of HIV
on fertility (Durevall and Lindskog 2011).
A further related subject is how investment in human capital is affected
by HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. Since there is a strong correlation between
fertility rates and educational attainment, several studies focus on the role of
education with respect to HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. Fortson (2011) finds
that the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is directly negatively correlated to years
of school attendance. Her analysis shows that a prevalence rate of 10 percent
lowers the average years of school attendance by 0.5 years. She resumes that
the lower investment in human capital is a consequence of the higher mortality
risk and the associated drop in investment.
A further parameter which is obviously affected by the HIV pandemic is
the mortality rate since HIV/AIDS is a deadly disease. In 2004 about 3.9
percent of all deaths worldwide were caused by AIDS. While in most parts of
the world this fraction was around 1 percent, it was 15 percent in Sub-Saharan
Africa. An even more drastic picture emerges if one takes a look at age groups.
Among adults aged 15-59 the dominant cause for death in Sub-Saharan Africa
in 2003 was AIDS (e.g. 85 percent in Botswana and 61 percent in Uganda).
The projected percentage of deaths caused in 58 countries most affected by
HIV will remain at a level of around 16-18 percent of all death for adults aged
15-59. The group of adults between 15-59 years additionally makes up for 86
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percent of all AIDS victims in 2007 (Bongaarts et al. 2010). This makes it
especially dramatic for the economic development of the Sub-Saharan region
because these deaths reduce the labor force of this area considerably. The
death rate connected with HIV is therefore not a direct relationship, but is
also relevant for the demographic composition.
In summary, it is not surprising that HIV/AIDS has had an effect on life
expectancy and death rates in this area (UNAIDS 2010). However, the size
of this impact and the effect on other key demographic indicators such as the
birth rate is still an open issue. The estimation of magnitudes of effects is
difficult considering secular trends and the selection effects inherent in HIV
mortality. Thus, there is no obvious counterfactual available, against which
the impact of the pandemic may be assessed.
We use the synthetic control group method introduced by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) and already used in the previous Chapter to generate such
a counterfactual. The main challenge in our setting is that the method so far
was only used with respect to one single outcome variable. We have identified
three variables of interest, namely life expectancy, death and birth rate. There-
fore we extend the approach introduced by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) to
several dependent variables.
As in the previous Chapter we will use the HIV data from Oster (2007).
The other variables used here were taken from different sources and come with
the same problems as the HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. Data for birth rates
and death rates were taken deployed from the World Bank datasets (Mundial
2011) and data on life expectancy was collected from different sources and
compiled by Rosling (2012).
Finally, we use the same thresholds already defined in the previous Chapter
(see Section 2.2.1). Thus, we will refer to a country as strongly affected if the
estimated prevalence rate is above 1 per cent. Likewise, we refer to countries
with prevalence rates above 10 per cent as severely affected. The rest of the
countries, i.e., those that have never crossed the 1 per cent threshold, will be
referred to as mildly affected.
3.3 Econometric Approach: Synthetic Control
Groups
The synthetic control group method tries to find matches from a donor pool in
order to minimize the distance for one outcome variable. This poses a problem
because the minimization occurs along one dimension, while we have three
variables of interest, namely life expectancy, death and birth rates. In order
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to circumvent this problem we extend the method so that it can be applied
to multiple variables. Before we come to a more detailed description of the
extension method and the weighting in Section 3.5, we revise the standard
assumptions for the method in this Section and present the data in the next
Section. In what follows the dependent variable Y will be a vector consisting
of the variables life expectancy, birth and death rate.
Social scientists and economists often try to measure the consequence of a
specific action or event (e.g. law, tax, disaster) on a certain outcome. In order
to estimate the effect that is attributable to a specific intervention, comparative
case studies are often used. This technique employs control groups which are
unaffected by the analyzed intervention and compares them with the affected
group. The control groups themselves are supposed to be comparable to the
affected group before the intervention started and the differences between the
control groups and the treated one are used to calculate the total change
caused by the intervention. Although this method provides a good approach
for the calculation of the intervention’s effect, it comes with two methodological
problems. First, the selection of the control groups, which is normally based
on some kind of affinity to the affected group. Second, the uncertainty about
whether the true behavior of the treated group in absence of the treatment
would resemble the outcome of the counterfactual (Abadie et al. 2010).
In order to address these problems the synthetic control group approach
(for comparative case studies) offers a useful tool. The selection of the control
groups is based on data-driven procedures which reduce the bias caused by
subjective criteria of the researcher since the researcher has limited influence
on the selection of the control groups. Additionally, the synthetic control group
approach provides a safeguard against extrapolation – which is one main weak-
ness of regression-based methods. This is achieved by the construction of the
synthetic control group through the calculated weighted average of the cho-
sen donor groups, where weights are restricted to be non-negative. Thus, the
synthetic control group is the weighted average of comparable control groups
which increases the reliability of the prediction in comparison to traditional re-
gression methods (Abadie et al. 2010). An additional strength of this method
is that no information on post-intervention outcomes is needed to design the
study. Thus, there is a much lower risk that the study design is biased.
3.3.1 Assumptions
We now present the main assumptions needed for the analysis. Since the HIV
epidemic reached critical levels in different countries at different points in time,
each affected country needs to be analyzed separately. Thus, in our notation
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below we proceed as if there were only one single treated unit and J further
control units.
We denote by Y NIit the outcome that would have been observed in country
i at time t in absence of the HIV epidemic. Also, we denote by T0 the last
pre-intervention period, i.e.
T0 = inf {t|R1t ≥ 0.01} − 1
where R1t denotes the HIV prevalence rate in the affected country.
Moreover, let Y Iit be the outcome for the affected country i at time t, where
the epidemic had started to take off at time T0 + 1. Since HIV is unlikely
to have had an effect on the outcome variables before the outbreak of the
pandemic, we also have Y Iit = Y NIit ∀t = 1, . . . , T0,∀i = 1, . . . , J + 1.
Next, define Ait ≡ Y Iit −Y NIit as the effect of the HIV epidemic for unit i at
time t, and let Dit be an indicator which takes on the value one whenever the
HIV epidemic has crossed the 1 per cent threshold: D1t = 1 (t > T0). Thus,
the observed outcome for unit i at time t equals
Yit = Y NIit + AitDit (3.1)
Abadie et al. (2010) suggest that the untreated value Y NIit can be described
by a factor model given by the following equation:
Y NIit = δt + θtZi + λtµi + it (3.2)
where δt is a time effect common to all units, θt is a vector of possibly time-
dependent coefficients, λt is a vector of unobserved common factors, and µi is
a vector of unknown factor loadings.
A further assumption which is needed is that the outcomes of non-treated
countries are unaffected by the intervention. There are several ways in which
this assumption could be violated. Firstly, there is obviously the risk of conta-
gion, to the extent that the countries of the control group also become affected
by the pandemic. For example, Oster (2007) delivers strong evidence that trade
between countries elevates incidence rates. However, this possibility has been
eliminated by considering only countries which have had very low prevalence
rates throughout.
It is furthermore desirable that there is no other extraordinary impact on
the variables forming the vector after time period T0 neither for the regarded
country nor for the donor countries. These impacts could be hunger crises,
natural disasters, wars etc. It could of course be argued that, since the com-
parison units – the synthetic control groups – have been defined so as to closely
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mimic the behavior of all relevant variables in the treated country, including
severe and unexpected exogenous shocks. However, inference from the method
is based on small samples and for this reason, the occurrence of an exogenous
large-scale shock can lead to erroneous conclusions. Hence, major disasters
appearing after the treatment started need to be considered, and countries
exposed to such shocks should be excluded from the analysis as a sensitiv-
ity check. Information on these major shocks can normally be obtained from
public sources like UN reports or media archives.
A possible bias in this study can also come from migration to or from the
included countries. This happens if the life expectancy (or birth rates) of the
immigrants in comparison to the life expectancy of the immigration country
differs strongly and the number of immigrants is high and thereby significantly
affecting the population growth in these countries. However, the outflows from
Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to be too small to have had an impact on the
receiving countries’ demographic indicators. For example, the total stock of
immigrants from Sub-Saharan countries in OECD countries was around 3.9
million in 2002, working out at less than 0.5 per cent of the total population
(OECD 2005).
3.3.2 Implementation
The synthetic control method involves estimating two matrices: V is the
weighting matrix determining the relative predictive power of various outcome
variables Zi and of the outcome variable itself. The vector W is a vector of
non-negative weights given to the J control countries.
The criterion minimized is given by
∥∥∥X¯1 − X¯0W∥∥∥V =
√(
X¯1 − X¯0W
)′
V
(
X¯1 − X¯0W
)
(3.3)
where X¯j is a vector of averages over the pretreatment period of elements of Zi
and Yi, for treated and control units, respectively. This will give us an optimal
country weight matrix among all diagonal positive definite matrices depending
on the variable weight (W ∗(V )).
The predictors V are chosen such that the average distance from of the out-
come variable, i.e. the root of the mean squared prediction error is minimized
in pre-intervention periods:
RMSPE =
√∑
t (Y1,t −Y0,tW∗(V))2
N
(3.4)
where N represents three times the number of years in the pretreatment period
(since the outcome variable consists of three variables).
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3.4 Data and Variables
For our analysis we use data from various sources. As already mentioned
above the main source of our HIV data is Oster (2007). All other variables
were obtained from Mundial (2011). Furthermore we used data from Rosling
(2012) to enrich this dataset and replace missing values.
Our dependent variable is a vector based on crude birth and death rates
(per 1,000 inhabitants) and average life expectancy (at birth). We use crude
birth and death rates instead of adjusted mortality and total fertility rates,
because these measures provide the largest dataset in terms of countries we
are able to consider. Besides, it is more straightforward to compare crude
birth and death rates. In addition, we control for GDP per capita and human
capital measured as years of schooling.18 We also considered controlling for
the population structure; however, data availability was the main hurdle.
As Section 3.3.3 reveals the choice of variables included in X will influence
the countries the estimator uses to replicate the treated country and will thus
also determine the outcome of the estimation. Therefore it is important to
include demographically meaningful predictors such as life expectancy, death
and birth rate. While the death rate and life expectancy are directly connected
to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the birth rate is only indirectly connected to it
through various behavioral responses. Moreover, we saw in Section 2 that the
living standard which we measure by the GDP per capita is likely to influence
population growth. The last independent variable used in all calculations is
the average years of school attendance. This variable is influencing not only
economic development and birth rates, but is also a vital factor for strategies
for HIV prevention and knowledge about the disease as described above.
Combining all these variables from various datasets, we are able to con-
struct a balanced panel dataset for 103 countries (12 treated and 91 in the
donor pool, 11 of them are African countries) from 1960 to 2008. The median
year of the intervention (when the HIV prevalence rate increases to more than
1%) is 1987, with minimum of 1982 and maximum of 1991, thus giving us
around 27 pre-intervention years and 22 post-intervention years.
The synthetic control group estimator builds the average of several control
countries in order to replicate a treated country. However, the variance is not
taken into account. For example a country with a life expectancy of 50 years
could be replicated by another country with a life expectancy of 50 years or of
two countries with a life expectancy of 30 and 70 years respectively. The results
might depend upon whether rather similar or rather different countries are
chosen by the estimator. Abadie et al. (2010) recommends to use rather similar
18This last variable comes from Lutz et al. (2007) and Barro (2001). The full list of
variables and data sources may be found in Appendix B.
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donors. However, we find that the fit before treatment depends too strongly
on the donor, therefore we extend the estimator by considering different sets of
donor pools. First we only consider donors that are very close in terms of all
three outcome variables (1.5 standard deviations), then we stepwise include
more and more donors up to the full sample of donors. Finally, the donor
pool with the lowest RMSPE (defined in equation 2.4) was chosen. Table 2.4
below shows the number of donors considered for each group. South Africa and
Namibia lie somewhat in the center of the distribution and thus have a high
number of close potential donors minimizing the RMSPE. On the other hand
Malawi, Mozambique and Rwanda have quite low life expectancies and high
death and thus lie in the tails of the distribution and therefore more donors
do not improve their RMSPE.
Table 3.1: Treatment Years and Donor Pool Size
Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi
treat year 1987 1987 1991 1988
start year 1960 1960 1960 1960
end year 2008 2008 2008 2008
size donor 48 50 47 27
Mozambique Namibia Rwanda S. Africa
treat year 1990 1990 1983 1991
start year 1960 1960 1960 1960
end year 2008 2008 2008 2008
size donor 27 46 11 46
Swaziland Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
treat year 1991 1982 1984 1985
start year 1960 1960 1960 1960
end year 2008 2008 2008 2008
size donor 49 32 23 25
The table shows the considered years for each countries. Our starting year is 1960,
and our data ends in 2008. Treatment years, i.e. when HIV prevalence passes
the one percent level, differ between countries. In the last row of each country we
display the size of the considered donor pool for each country. As suggested by
Abadie et al. (2010) we only include donors that are quite comparable in terms of
the three outcome variables. The whole donor pool consists of 91 countries. Out of
this pool we first choose countries that are close in terms of the outcome variables.
Afterwards, we stepwise include more possible donors and then use the donor pool
that minimizes the RMSPE – defined in equation (2.4) – for our estimation. In
this way we reach the displayed donor pool for each country.
Analyzing these twelve treated countries and their donor pools, we con-
struct control countries. We build a synthetic control unit for each treated
country by weighting the donors so as to resemble each treated country as
closely as possible in the time interval before the treatment. In the next two
Sections we first describe how we extend the method to several variables after
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which we present the results of this optimization.
Before we proceed with the analysis and the results we should mention
that two countries in our sample experienced severe wars, namely Rwanda
and Uganda. According to our data Rwanda experienced a drop in GDP of
60% in 1994. Moreover, the death rate almost doubled from 20 deaths per
1,000 inhabitants in 1987 to 38 deaths in 1993, while life expectancy dropped
by 20 years. In Uganda the consequences were slightly less severe with a drop
in GDP by 20% in 1979. The demographic variables show no clear peak for
Uganda in terms of the death rate, even though it is generally quite high. For
instance the death rate only dropped below 15 deaths per 1,000 inhabitants
in 2004, while Kenya, the neighboring country shows a similar HIV prevalence
but a death rate smaller than 10 deaths in the years 1987-1994. Given these
wars the results for Rwanda and Uganda should be interpreted with caution,
since we can not distinguish between wars and consequences of HIV.
3.5 Adapting the synthetic control group to
multiple outcomes
Before we turn to the results we discuss more in detail how we extend the
synthetic control group method to several variables. We form a vector con-
sisting of all three variables with their pre- and post-treatment observations.
Minimization then occurs with reference to this vector. Moreover, as we will
describe below the method allows preferential weighting of the variables.
An important issue is how to weight the three variables respectively in
order to obtain the minimum over all three dimensions. This minimum will
not be unique, instead there will be a so called Pareto-frontier.19 Similar to the
Pareto-efficiency concept in the economic science, a Pareto frontier is defined
as a point, where improvements with respect to one variable, can only be
reached at losses in at least one other variable. Adopting this to our situation
obtaining a lower RMSPE along the dimension of life expectancy will lead to
a higher RMSPE along the dimensions of the death and/or birth rates.
Our minimization occurs along four steps. Firstly, we will divide each of
the outcome variables by their individual one-dimensional minimum, i.e. the
RMSPE that will be obtained by optimizing just with respect to this variable
as in the standard case. In this way we compare the obtained minimum with
the potential minimum, and therefore align the variables in relation to their
absolute minimum. We perform this step in order to bring the three variables
19This is a well known concept mainly used in multi-objective optimization. There is a
large literature in computational sciences on similar problems. Branke et al. (2008) contains
both introductory material and recent algorithms for finding the frontier and obtaining
desired solutions.
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on a common scale. Without this step differences in life expectancy would
receive the largest punishment, since the level of life expectancy is the largest
and thus life expectancy will get the highest weight. Therefore this step is
needed to ensure cross-variable comparability of the three considered outcomes.
As a second step we take the natural logarithm of the obtained values.
In this way percentage deviations are minimized instead of levels. This is
desirable since some of the variables either grow or decrease considerably over
time, and in this way we ensure that a deviation in the first period where the
level is comparably low (high) will get the same weight as a later deviation
with a relatively high (low) value. This step will lead to a better cross-time or
within comparability for all three variables.
In the third step we specify a weight between the variables. As mentioned
above there are many possible solutions along the Pareto-Frontier. Weighting
helps to obtain solutions which are desired by the researcher. In our case
we expect HIV to lead to very clear consequences on the death rate and life
expectancy even if precision is low. For birth rates on the other hand we
need a very high precision to verify whether HIV has an effect. Therefore,
it is preferable to have a synthetic control group which is especially close in
terms of the weight given to birth rates, while we will have a lower penalty for
deviations along the other dimensions. In order to obtain this we multiply the
birth rate by a certain factor – which is set at ten – to obtain a very precise
estimate. The choice of this factor is quite arbitrary, however it should exceed
one to ensure that the birth rate gets a higher weight as compared to the
other two variables. We tried several different weights and found no noticeable
difference between the estimates, which indicates that our results are quite
robust to changes of this factor.
After these three steps we will obtain a vector Y consisting of the three
outcome variables, adjusted by the weights we just described. This vector will
be obtained for every country in the sample, both treated and non-treated.
We then use the synthetic control group method suggested by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) described in Section 3.3 which weights the vectors of the
control or donor countries in order to replicate the vector of the treated coun-
tries along all considered dimensions.
As Figure 3.1 shows for Botswana (and also the other countries as seen
below) this will give us a very close match for the birth rate and a still relatively
close matches for the death rate and life expectancy.
As seen in Table 2.4 Botswana’s treatment occurred in 1987. This means
we have 27 years of pre-treatment and 22 years post-treatment observations.
Figure 3.1 displays the results of the minimization for Botswana. The dashed
lines show the synthetic control group while the solid lines show the actual
51
CHAPTER 3. DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF HIV
Figure 3.1: Pre- and Post-Treatment in Botswana for all Three Considered
Variables
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outcomes along all three dimensions for Botswana. The graph shows that
we achieve a synthetic control group with almost equal outcomes in terms of
life expectancy and the birth rate before treatment, while there remains some
difference in terms of the death rate. However, there is still a common trend
between treatment and synthetic control before treatment and the treatment
effect is still much larger than the apparent differences before treatment. For
the other 11 countries in the sample we will obtain quite similar results. In fact
Botswana’s RMSPE along all three dimensions is quite close to the average
RMSPE along the each of the three dimensions.
In the next Section we will apply this method to all twelve countries and
try to answer the question how HIV influences life expectancy, death and birth
rates.
3.6 Results
In this Section, we present the results of the synthetic control group estimates
with the vector formed by combining the three variables. We first look at the
weights in order to see which countries of the donor pool build the synthetic
control group for each treated country. Afterwards we state the results of the
three different outcome variables.
Looking at the donor pool, Table 3.2 displays the actual weights given to
the different countries. As mentioned in Section 4 our donor pool was restricted
to countries that are comparable with respect to life expectancy, the birth and
death rate. This helps us to get a synthetic control group that is comparable
also in these aspects.
Table 3.2: Country Weights
Donor Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Namibia Rwanda S. Africa Swaziland Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Mean Weight
Niger - 0.451 0 0.8 0.596 - 0.592 0.003 0.363 0.344 0.399 - 0.394
Nicaragua 0.557 0.412 0 0 0 0.319 0 0 0.204 0.18 0.082 0.558 0.193
Pakistan 0.164 0.043 0.181 0 0 0.527 0 0 0.282 0.121 0.256 0 0.131
Comoros 0.025 0 0.124 0 0 0 0.408 0 0.001 0.27 0 0.294 0.094
Senegal - 0 0.332 0.069 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.123 0.048
Algeria 0.192 0 0.114 0.131 0 0 0 0 0.011 0 0.09 0.025 0.047
Paraguay 0.063 0.095 0 - - 0 - 0 0 0.085 0.041 0 0.032
Kazakhstan - - 0 - - - - 0.085 0 - - - 0.028
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0.107 0 0 0.213 0 0 0 0 0.027
Nepal 0 0 0 0 0.224 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.019
Argentina - 0 0.105 - 0 0.022 0 0.045 0 0 0 0 0.017
Austria - 0 - - 0.045 - - 0 - - - - 0.015
Iran 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0.138 0 0 0 0.015
Mongolia 0 0 0 - 0 0.09 0 0.072 0 0 0 0 0.015
Fiji 0 0 0 - - 0 - 0.131 0 0 0 0 0.015
Mexico 0 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 0 0.132 0 0.013
Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.158 0 0 0 0 0.013
Qatar 0 0 0.018 - 0 0 - 0.097 0 0 0 0 0.012
...
Sum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
This table displays how the synthetic control groups are formed for the different countries. It displays the weights W given to the most important donors (see equation 3.3 for more
information. Donors with an average weight of less than 1% are not displayed. The "‘−"’ sign indicates that a certain country was not considered as potential donor because it was
not close enough in terms of outcome variables. The note of the previous table and the text before it explains which countries are considered as donors.
Niger shows the highest average weight. Other important donors are Nicaragua
and Pakistan. Moreover, there are some other noteworthy donors from African
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countries such as Comoros, Senegal and Algeria. Next we turn to the three
outcome variables to see how HIV prevalence affected each of them.
3.6.1 Life Expectancy
The first variable of interest is life expectancy. Before we turn to the result we
consider at the fit in the pre-treatment period. This is displayed in Table 3.3
below.
For each country we display the country’s actual values in the first column.
In the second column we present the outcomes from the synthetic control group
based on our vector outcome variable. Moreover, we compare this result to
the outcomes of three other synthetic control groups: The third column shows
the values if the minimization occurs with respect to one variable only, namely
life expectancy. Moreover, columns four and five display the synthetic control
group if minimization occurs only along the dimension of the birth and death
rate respectively.
As expected if we minimize with respect to life expectancy only, we get the
lowest RMSPE for most treated countries. Moreover, we can observe that the
death rate and life expectancy are highly correlated, since for most cases we
get a much lower RMSPE when we minimize with respect to the death rate as
opposed to the birth rate.
Finally, turning to the RMSPE formed by minimizing over all three dimen-
sions (2nd column), the obtained RMSPE is far below 10% in most cases.20
A notable exception is Kenya with an RMSPE of 6.4 which measures around
14% of average life expectancy in Kenya. Here we fail to find a suitable control
group along all three dimensions. The numbers further reveal that the birth
rate seems to be the problem in terms of finding a suitable control group,
since we obtain quite low RMSPEs when we minimize only along the dimen-
sion of life expectancy or the death rate. Also for Swaziland, Mozambique
and Zimabwe the RMSPE is relatively high and again the birth rate seems
problematic.
Summing up, we see that our suggested method of minimizing along three
dimensions produces fairly good control groups in terms of life expectancy.
However, the samples are clearly limited by the donors. The best example for
this is Kenya, where it seems impossible to find a donor which is close along
all three dimensions.
20Abadie et al. (2010) in their analysis obtain a value of around 3%.
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Table 3.3: Means of Control and Treatment Groups for Life Expectancy
Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi
Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death
Life Exp. (1960) 50.611 48.201 50.554 44.584 52.217 46.318 43.645 46.486 40.301 46.42 46.581 46.388 45.553 46.395 47.287 37.795 38.846 38.093 38.355 38.906
Life Exp. (Mid Year1) 53.567 52.923 53.768 48.091 55.682 51.023 46.147 51.07 42.012 50.789 48.805 49.459 49.39 50.162 49.93 39.74 39.819 40.166 39.392 39.975
Life Exp. (Mid Year2) 58.93 57.661 58.706 51.916 61.016 56.042 48.772 56.036 45.727 56.215 53.785 54.008 53.899 54.027 54.368 43.999 41.682 43.788 41.037 42.652
Life Exp. (T0) 63.227 61.723 63.202 56.483 66.068 59.499 51.233 60.096 50.519 60.536 59.308 58.783 58.74 58.67 59.884 47.484 44.056 47.58 43.53 45.82
RMSPE . 1.385 .128 6.336 2.211 . 6.465 .222 9.231 .398 . .531 .584 .816 .832 . 2.04 .256 2.451 1.135
Mozambique Namibia Rwanda South Africa
Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death
Life Exp. (1960) 35.019 38.17 37.799 38.982 38.553 46.885 48.653 46.842 47.265 47.702 42.283 39.846 42.138 39.998 41.938 49.048 49.168 48.838 48.878 48.616
Life Exp. (Mid Year1) 38.787 40.723 39.192 41.819 40.417 52.017 53.683 51.927 51.07 52.119 44.011 41.13 43.817 41.398 43.25 52.467 52.855 52.319 52.377 53.101
Life Exp. (Mid Year2) 42.712 44.56 41.567 45.903 42.947 57.342 57.864 57.318 54.767 57.235 44.671 42.722 45.025 43.142 44.594 56.792 58.243 56.875 56.858 57.999
Life Exp. (T0) 43.142 48.913 44.674 50.681 45.247 61.778 61.695 61.779 58.354 61.811 46.666 44.611 46.666 45.153 46.931 61.375 62.962 61.509 61.418 62.47
RMSPE . 3.123 1.241 4.372 1.784 . 1.188 .068 2.215 .293 . 2.348 .239 2.024 .492 . 1.05 .158 .089 .929
Swaziland Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Life S. Birth S.Death
Life Exp. (1960) 44.258 43.829 44.085 43.753 45.216 43.965 43.789 43.804 41.947 45.151 45.095 45.068 45.001 41.788 46.944 51.497 45.13 51.343 41.757 52.958
Life Exp. (Mid Year1) 47.459 46.954 47.579 46.785 48.99 47.31 45.598 47.236 43.379 49.043 47.663 47.129 47.859 44.003 49.186 53.898 48.826 53.85 44.505 55.382
Life Exp. (Mid Year2) 54.331 50.211 54.386 50.159 55.486 50.979 48.105 49.774 45.613 51.531 51.054 49.4 50.599 46.885 52.035 56.987 53.646 57.098 47.902 58.585
Life Exp. (T0) 60.533 53.677 60.445 53.557 62.275 49.979 49.985 51.2 47.778 52.482 52.082 51.531 52.831 50.647 54.443 60.935 57.188 60.569 52.068 61.912
RMSPE . 3.885 .11 3.933 1.323 . 1.943 .81 4.072 1.565 . 1.031 .362 3.482 1.588 . 4.507 .146 9.252 1.419
The table compares the actual outcomes for each country with four different synthetic control groups. The first control group (M. Opt.) is formed by simultaneously minimizing the distance to the treated country in terms of life expectancy, birth
and death rate. The three subsequent synthetic controls are formed by minimizing with respect to one variable only. The values are displayed for the year 1960, the year before the treatment year and the two years forming the first and second
third of the distance between the the treatment and 1960 – Mid Year 1 and 2 respectively. The RMSPE in the last row is defined in equation (2.4).
Figure 3.2: Life Expectancy
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Figure 3.2 shows a graphical representation of the table just presented. For
each country the black solid line stands for the actual value obtained, while
dashed lines stand for the synthetic control groups. The black dashed line is
usually closest to the real outcome since it shows the synthetic control group
when we minimize only the distance in terms of life expectancy. The dark
gray line presents the outcome when we minimize along all three dimensions.
Finally, the two light gray lines show the synthetic control group when we only
minimize the distance in terms of birth and death rate respectively. Again we
can see that in most figures one of the light gray lines is fairly close to the real
data, due to the high correlation of life expectancy and death rate. Moreover,
we can observe that although the performance of our synthetic control group
is weaker than minimizing only along the dimension of life expectancy, it is
still quite close to the actual value.
This Figure shows both the fit in the pre-treatment interval and the result
post-treatment. The treatment year is indicated by the vertical dashed line.
In all countries we observe a negative treatment effect, which is expected, since
higher HIV prevalence is bound to decrease life expectancy. Comparing the
post-treatment outcomes of the different synthetic control groups we find that
they are quite similar as long as there is a good fit before treatment. However,
it seems that our minimization leads to a quite conservative estimate of the
treatment effect: For almost all graph the treatment effect is largest when
we minimize along the dimension of life expectancy only (black dashed line).
Finally, we observe for most countries an increase in life expectancy towards
the end of the observed time interval. Also for mortality (below) we observe
a decreasing pattern in the last years. This is probably due to antiretroviral
drugs which are used to reduce the health burden of HIV.
In order to analyze the treatment effects in more detail we perform placebo
estimates. Here we randomly assign the treatment years of the 12 treated
countries to the countries of the donor pool and perform the same minimiza-
tion. Therefore the placebo estimates are created by minimizing the distance
along all three dimensions and so we obtain a synthetic control for each coun-
try in the donor pool as well. Since the countries in the donor pool did not
experience high HIV rates we should not observe a treatment effect there. By
comparison of the results of the placebos and the treated countries we are
able to interpret the previously measured effects. The results of this placebo
estimates are displayed in Figure 3.3 and Table 3.4 below.
In Figure 3.3 we see the outcomes of the placebo estimates (gray lines),
compared to the outcomes for the treated countries (black lines). The lines
show the difference between treatment and synthetic control. The lines are
aligned so that zero (on the x-coordinate) forms the treatment year for all
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Figure 3.3: Placebos: Life Expectancy
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countries. We see that before treatment all lines are quite close to zero (on the
y-coordinate) and thus treatment and control group show similar trends. After
treatment however, life expectancy decreases for almost all treated countries.
The graph also displays that our estimate is someway conservative: Most
treated countries show a positive deviation in life expectancy before treat-
ment, and thus the synthetic control group tends to underestimate actual life
expectancy before treatment. Since the treatment effect is negative this leads
to a more conservative estimate of the treatment effect.
Table 3.4 further describes the placebo estimates and shows the treatment
effects. Panel A of Table 3.4 displays the prediction errors before and after
treatment for placebos and treated countries. Following Abadie et al. (2010)
we calculate the prediction error in the pre-treatment period (1st column) and
for the period after the treatment (2nd column) and build the ratio of the two
RMSPEs (last column). The difference between the RMSPE and the Mean
Prediction Error (4th column) is that for the MPE we don’t square the error
(and thus also don’t take the square root of the mean afterwards). This way we
can still interpret the sign, however only the RMSPE are directly comparable
before and after the treatment. Finally in the fifth column we report the
difference between synthetic control group and treatment country in the final
period (2008). Since the deviation is cumulative also this variable builds an
important indicator.
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Table 3.4: Prediction Errors: Placebo Analysis Life Expectancy
PANEL A: Data
Rank Country Treated RMSPE RMSPEpost Est. Treatment Effect Final Period RMSPE ratio
1 Lesotho 1 0.644 12.500 -10.497 -19.247 19.401
2 Zambia 1 0.883 12.225 -10.556 -16.783 13.838
3 Botswana 1 1.071 13.891 -11.727 -17.626 12.967
4 Lao PDR 0 0.435 5.549 4.936 6.521 12.747
5 Guatemala 0 0.609 7.207 6.457 8.881 11.826
6 Fiji 0 0.375 3.237 -3.102 -4.496 8.641
7 Nicaragua 0 0.944 7.294 6.294 11.065 7.723
8 Georgia 0 0.280 2.086 -1.893 -3.703 7.452
9 India 0 0.602 4.358 -4.223 -6.112 7.242
10 Iran Islamic Rep 0 0.797 5.123 4.975 6.004 6.429
..
12 Namibia 1 0.951 6.000 -4.967 -7.338 6.307
..
19 Uganda 1 1.817 8.588 -7.886 -9.296 4.726
..
26 South Africa 1 2.346 8.362 -6.625 -13.883 3.565
..
27 Zimbabwe 1 4.720 16.736 -13.041 -23.881 3.546
..
32 Rwanda 1 2.357 7.705 -4.091 -2.440 3.269
..
38 Swaziland 1 3.766 10.332 -6.351 -16.234 2.743
..
51 Mozambique 1 2.727 6.097 -5.814 -9.758 2.236
..
60 Malawi 1 1.956 3.387 2.134 -0.932 1.731
..
78 Kenya 1 6.065 6.252 -1.621 -8.080 1.031
..
PANEL B: Regression
Est. Treatment Effect Final Period RMSPE ratio
Africa -0.00873 -0.180 -0.236
(0.643) (0.885) (0.765)
Treated -8.497∗∗∗ -14.59∗∗∗ 4.306∗∗∗
(1.245) (1.714) (1.171)
Constant 0.495∗ 0.600 2.667∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.406) (0.359)
N 101 101 101
R2 0.364 0.475 0.147
Panel A shows the estimated effects for each country. We distinguish treated countries (HIV prevalence≥10%) and placebo countries
(HIV precalence≤1%). The RMSPE is defined in equation (2.4). We calculate it before the intervention (column 3), afterwards
(column 4) and their ratio (column 7) by which the countries are ranked. Column 5 equals the RMSPE post, however without
squaring the difference and taking the square root of the mean. In column 6 we show the difference of the outcome variable in the
final period (2008). In Panel B we present the results from the regression Π = α+β1Treated+β2Africa for the treatment and African
dummy, where Π represents the column title. Thus each column represents one regression result. For the estimated treatment effect
and the effect in the final period the observations are weighted by the inverse of their RMSPE. The belligerent countries Rwanda
and Uganda are excluded from this regression.
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Countries in Panel A are ordered based on their RMSPE ratio. The table
shows that the first three countries in the list – Lesotho, Zambia and Botswana
– are treated and show treatment effects of around 10 years. In fact as Table
2.2 reveals Botswana and Lesotho have a very high prevalence rate of above
20%, therefore it is only expected that the treatment effect is largest for them.
Also Swaziland has a similar high prevalence rate; however, the fit before
treatment is quite low and therefore the estimated treatment effect is only
around 6 years. In order to analyze the average treatment effect for countries
having a prevalence rate above 10% we turn to Panel B of Table 3.4.
In Panel B we present the regression results of the following equation:
Π = β0 + β1Treated+ β2Africa (3.5)
The displayed result represents the βi coefficients. Moreover, Π represents
the outcome variable and thus varies from column to column. The aim of this
regression is to find out whether treated and African countries are significantly
different from the placebo countries with respect to the treatment effect and
the RMSPE ratio. Panel A includes two countries with severe wars (Rwanda
and Uganda), which might contaminate our treatment effect, therefore the
regressions are estimated without these two countries. Since these two coun-
tries are not exceptional in terms of HIV prevalence and we are estimating an
average effect, this should not affect the results too much. 21
The estimated coefficients reveal that the affected countries have on average
a life expectancy which is 8.5 years below their synthetic controls. Moreover, in
the final year the difference is 14.5 years on average. Furthermore, the RMSPE
ratio is more than four points higher than for the other countries. Therefore we
can conclude that HIV had quite large effects on life expectancy in the countries
with the highest prevalence rates. Finally, the African dummy is small and
insignificant in all specifications. Next we analyze the birth and death rates
presenting the same tables and figures already shown for life expectancy.
3.6.2 Birth Rate
Also for the birth rate we start by comparing the RMSPE of the different
synthetic control groups in Table 3.5. Here the advantage of our estimator be-
comes most obvious, since minimization along the dimension of life expectancy
or death rate only leads to very large RMSPEs. Of course it helps that we put
a higher weight on this outcome variable as compared to others – as described
at the end of the previous Section – however as just seen for life expectancy, the
side effects are quite low. The RMSPE is below one for all countries except
21In fact including the two countries leads to a slightly different point estimates, but for
all variables the estimates do not differ by more than one standard error.
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for Malawi and Kenya, and is smaller than 3% for all countries. Moreover,
minimizing only the distance in terms of life expectancy or birth rates results
in much higher RMSPEs which exceed 5 in almost all cases.
Figure 3.4 confirms this finding. Before treatment the actual outcomes and
the synthetic control group resulting from our optimization are very close for
most countries. Moreover, the two light gray lines are quite far away from the
actual birth rate. Summing up, our control group seems to be very close to our
treatment country before treatment. After treatment however, the results are
mixed and seem to be quite heterogeneous. For Botswana and Lesotho, which
had very large treatment effects in terms of life expectancy, the birth rate
seems unaffected by the high HIV prevalence. For other countries, like Zambia
and Mozambique we see that the birth rate in the synthetic control decreases,
while it keeps rather constant in the treated countries. This together with the
evidence on life expectancy observed above suggests a mechanism similar to the
one suggested by Chen (2010). While the synthetic control group experienced
an increase in life expectancy and the subsequent decrease in fertility, this does
not seem to have occurred for some treated countries. However, as seen in the
figure this does not seem to be the case for most other treated countries.
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Table 3.5: Means of Control and Treatment Groups for Birth Rate
Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi
Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death
Birth Rate (1960) 47 48.343 47.031 45.621 45.881 51.26 52.39 48.84 42.603 43.222 42.26 42.566 42.321 44.267 41.446 53.92 55.037 54.82 49.297 52.638
Birth Rate (Mid Year1) 46.01 45.67 45.926 41.68 41.197 50.67 50.256 50.81 39.911 40.249 42.68 42.938 42.65 42.317 40.268 55.9 55.947 55.757 49.479 54.269
Birth Rate (Mid Year2) 45.03 44.459 44.914 38.596 36.79 50.14 49.194 49.45 40.935 38.341 41.69 41.934 41.626 39.477 37.201 56.56 54.557 54.741 48.151 52.964
Birth Rate (T0) 39.08 39.405 39.091 35.206 33.646 46.3 46.108 45.51 41.489 36.363 36.42 36.654 36.252 30.345 34.259 50.93 52.045 52.554 46.122 50.665
RMSPE . .483 .061 4.844 6.111 . .73 1.049 9.071 10.622 . .254 .091 3.014 3.067 . 1.316 1.355 6.609 2.227
Mozambique Namibia Rwanda South Africa
Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death
Birth Rate (1960) 48.88 48.264 48.359 53.048 52.939 42.44 42.996 42.57 42.807 43.732 52.9 53.095 53.169 50.157 46.84 42.27 42.512 42.224 42.737 43.851
Birth Rate (Mid Year1) 47.72 48.058 47.97 53.684 53.372 43.04 43.392 43.368 40.127 40.005 52.67 53.054 53.241 50.036 46.975 38.03 38.408 38.114 38.56 40.159
Birth Rate (Mid Year2) 46.73 46.501 46.537 52.642 51.723 43.17 42.245 42.679 40.205 39.046 52.76 52.631 52.777 48.979 46.675 34.92 35.069 34.624 34.377 36.536
Birth Rate (T0) 43.47 43.811 43.267 51.069 51.107 38.48 38.395 38.449 38.334 36.77 55.28 53.084 53.175 47.432 46.124 29.28 29.471 29.251 30.643 31.823
RMSPE . .27 .221 6.146 5.658 . .606 .406 2.425 3.069 . .925 .914 4.53 6.786 . .264 .147 .647 1.908
Swaziland Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death Real M. Opt. S. Birth S. Life S.Death
Birth Rate (1960) 47.59 48.088 47.592 48.253 46.469 49.53 49.386 49.401 48.289 48.558 48.11 48.629 48.281 48.974 48.465 48.18 49.808 48.235 46.116 46.408
Birth Rate (Mid Year1) 49.19 48.477 49.087 46.705 43.695 49.03 48.702 49.033 47.628 47.978 49.2 48.974 49.103 48.246 46.845 47.61 46.8 47.681 43.23 44.566
Birth Rate (Mid Year2) 48.14 47.666 48.341 42.448 39.792 48.54 48.043 48.532 45.668 45.302 48.12 47.939 48.094 47.13 46.127 47.81 46.398 47.523 39.677 41.535
Birth Rate (T0) 43.37 43.134 44.047 35.42 34.811 48.9 48.046 48.807 41.757 43.571 45.02 45.238 45.028 45.233 46.329 43.45 42.842 43.54 37.389 38.713
RMSPE . .674 .313 5.159 7.029 . .502 .088 3.61 3.096 . .221 .091 .747 1.794 . .979 .131 6.146 4.651
The table compares the actual outcomes for each country with four different synthetic control groups. The first control group (M. Opt.) is formed by simultaneously minimizing the distance to the treated country in terms of life expectancy, birth
and death rate. The three subsequent synthetic controls are formed by minimizing with respect to one variable only. The values are displayed for the year 1960, the year before the treatment year and the two years forming the first and second
third of the distance between the the treatment and 1960 – Mid Year 1 and 2 respectively. The RMSPE in the last row is defined in equation (2.4).
Figure 3.4: Birth Rates
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In order to see whether the effects are significant we compare the outcomes
to the placebos in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Placebos: Birth Rates
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Figure 3.5 reveals that for most countries both in the treatment group
(black lines) and the placebos (gray lines) we find fairly good controls. After
treatment however the estimates largely diverge. Some treated countries seem
to have quite large negative effects, while others exhibit positive effects. This
confirms the effect heterogeneity already observed in Figure 3.4.
Finally, Table 3.6 allows a better analysis of treatment effects and their
significance for the countries. Panel B reveals that there is no overall effect
that can be measured. Moreover, the explanatory power is generally quite low
in these regressions. While the R2 in the regressions above was close to 0.5,
here it is only around 0.1. Therefore once more the results are mixed.
Looking at the effects in the single countries in Panel A we see a quite
large positive effect of 8 additional births in Uganda. For Uganda however,
we can not distinguish between the treatment effect due to HIV and the effect
caused by the war – which is why it is excluded from the regressions together
with Rwanda. Including Rwanda and Uganda leads to a slightly larger treat-
ment effect, however all point estimates are within one standard error of the
current estimate. The only country showing a treatment effect which is large,
significant at a 3% level and can be attributed to HIV is Zambia indicating 6
additional births per 1,000 inhabitants. The effects seen for the other countries
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Table 3.6: Prediction Errors: Placebo Analysis Birth Rate
PANEL A: Data
Rank Country Treated RMSPE RMSPEpost Est. Treatment Effect Final Period RMSPE ratio
1 Uganda 1 0.188 8.580 8.197 10.651 45.691
2 Bhutan 0 0.222 7.952 -7.774 -9.989 35.793
3 Zambia 1 0.202 6.961 6.003 9.411 34.392
4 Madagascar 0 0.256 5.978 5.926 6.441 23.381
5 Guatemala 0 0.258 6.008 5.285 7.363 23.298
6 Somalia 0 0.394 7.793 6.888 12.141 19.765
7 Bangladesh 0 0.411 6.159 -5.966 -8.413 14.971
8 Iran Islamic Rep 0 0.553 7.887 -6.857 -9.559 14.256
9 Oman 0 0.380 4.643 -3.787 -7.827 12.225
10 Mozambique 1 0.319 3.630 3.282 2.978 11.363
..
26 Lesotho 1 0.257 1.348 1.201 0.369 5.236
..
33 Rwanda 1 0.782 3.285 -2.192 -2.506 4.200
34 Kenya 1 0.695 2.437 -0.060 3.405 3.505
..
42 Swaziland 1 0.681 2.113 -2.059 -3.196 3.103
..
45 Namibia 1 0.671 2.027 2.015 1.448 3.023
..
60 Botswana 1 0.499 0.954 -0.740 -0.404 1.913
61 Malawi 1 1.326 2.489 -1.689 -6.002 1.878
..
73 South Africa 1 1.217 1.918 1.836 2.229 1.576
..
87 Zimbabwe 1 0.808 0.750 0.371 1.849 0.928
..
PANEL B: Regression
Est. Treatment Effect Final Period RMSPE ratio
Africa 0.409 1.060 2.502
(0.753) (1.073) (1.557)
Treated 1.653 1.891 0.472
(1.071) (1.525) (2.383)
Constant 0.00249 -0.192 3.717∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.511) (0.730)
N 101 101 101
R2 0.049 0.053 0.039
Panel A shows the estimated effects for each country. We distinguish treated countries (HIV prevalence≥10%) and placebo countries
(HIV precalence≤1%). The RMSPE is defined in equation (2.4). We calculate it before the intervention (column 3), afterwards
(column 4) and their ratio (column 7) by which the countries are ranked. Column 5 equals the RMSPE post, however without
squaring the difference and taking the square root of the mean. In column 6 we show the difference of the outcome variable in the
final period (2008). In Panel B we present the results from the regression Π = α+β1Treated+β2Africa for the treatment and African
dummy, where Π represents the column title. Thus each column represents one regression result. For the estimated treatment effect
and the effect in the final period the observations are weighted by the inverse of their RMSPE. The belligerent countries Rwanda
and Uganda are excluded from this regression.
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are quite small and not significantly different from the placebos.
3.6.3 Death Rate
The last variable of interest is the death rate. Looking first at the RMSPE
in Table 3.7 we see that it is quite high exceeding 10% for Botswana, Kenya,
Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Again this is caused by the fact that
we want to obtain a higher precision in terms of birth rate. Once more we can
confirm that the death rate and life expectancy are highly correlated, since
we find a quite low RMSPE in terms of the death rate, when we minimize in
terms of death rate or life expectancy. This is also seen in Figure 3.6 where
one light gray line is quite close to the actual outcome, while the second light
gray line created by minimizing along the birth rate is quite far away from the
real outcome. The synthetic control group obtained by minimizing along all
three dimensions on the other hand is somewhere in between these two lines.
Once more we compare our outcomes with the placebo estimates in order to
see the treatment effects and significance. While Figure 3.7 reveals that there
is already some deviation before treatment for many countries, the treatment
effects that can be observed afterwards are all positive and seem to be quite
large, exceeding most of the placebo outcomes.
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Table 3.7: Means of Control and Treatment Groups for Death Rate
Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi
Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth
Death Rate (1960) 16.51 18.15 16.579 17.333 21.386 20.21 20.339 20.211 20.365 24.29 19.2 19.309 19.206 20.869 19.976 28.28 25.343 25.351 25.176 25.797
Death Rate (Mid Year1) 13.82 14.595 13.726 14.386 18.386 16.3 17.961 16.289 16.338 23.1 17.56 17.412 17.523 17.267 17.157 25.18 25.069 24.994 23.869 25.607
Death Rate (Mid Year2) 10.12 11.89 10.179 10.963 15.557 12.65 15.92 12.604 12.989 19.61 14.07 14.266 14.148 14.014 14.388 22.88 23.157 22.519 21.001 24.241
Death Rate (T0) 7.39 9.056 7.484 8.616 11.814 10.12 13.874 9.864 9.815 15.2 10.67 10.802 10.669 10.41 10.95 18.71 20.189 19.648 18.186 22.068
RMSPE . 1.453 .06 .844 4.882 . 2.783 .106 .238 6.278 . .209 .124 .646 .393 . 1.23 1.084 1.632 1.943
Mozambique Namibia Rwanda South Africa
Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth
Death Rate (1960) 28.7 25.021 25.733 25.821 24.717 18.58 18.606 18.606 19.513 20.018 22.23 24.461 21.849 22.52 24.526 17.36 16.981 17.446 18.026 17.973
Death Rate (Mid Year1) 24.97 23.115 24.552 25.3 22.604 14.92 14.907 14.927 15.221 17.237 20.81 23.362 21.115 21.604 23.629 14.25 14.24 14.265 15.011 15.23
Death Rate (Mid Year2) 21.5 19.754 22.357 23.389 19.423 11.56 12.009 11.535 11.761 14.407 20.28 21.754 20.223 20.639 22.235 10.84 10.906 10.818 11.927 12.077
Death Rate (T0) 20.74 16.155 20.347 20.897 15.889 8.71 9.361 8.721 8.611 11.672 18.63 20.127 18.626 19.269 20.793 8.33 8.375 8.277 9.552 9.358
RMSPE . 2.776 1.108 1.353 3.113 . .445 .024 .367 2.572 . 1.974 .264 .559 2.318 . .206 .048 1.055 1.131
Swaziland Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth Real M. Opt. S.Death S. Life S. Birth
Death Rate (1960) 20.18 21.33 20.613 21.774 22.417 20.71 20.472 20.592 21.786 22.48 19.46 19.928 19.59 20.606 22.861 15.61 20.167 15.596 16.498 23.2
Death Rate (Mid Year1) 17.98 18.476 17.678 18.962 20.381 17.99 18.829 17.86 19.252 21.413 17.77 18.179 17.593 18.641 21.338 13.88 16.834 13.918 14.5 20.715
Death Rate (Mid Year2) 13.08 15.565 13.194 13.789 17.68 15.36 16.728 15.987 17.217 19.728 15.31 16.075 15.5 16.736 18.895 11.85 13.726 11.817 12.181 17.966
Death Rate (T0) 9.13 12.345 9.159 9.691 14.796 16.1 15.342 15.134 15.621 18.268 14.33 14.12 13.913 15.083 15.547 9.23 11.06 9.27 9.923 14.375
RMSPE . 2.112 .206 .964 4.017 . .984 .571 1.341 3.445 . .516 .207 1.116 3.214 . 2.707 .03 .594 6.414
The table compares the actual outcomes for each country with four different synthetic control groups. The first control group (M. Opt.) is formed by simultaneously minimizing the distance to the treated country in terms of life expectancy, birth
and death rate. The three subsequent synthetic controls are formed by minimizing with respect to one variable only. The values are displayed for the year 1960, the year before the treatment year and the two years forming the first and second
third of the distance between the the treatment and 1960 – Mid Year 1 and 2 respectively. The RMSPE in the last row is defined in equation (2.4).
Figure 3.6: Death Rates
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Figure 3.7: Placebos: Death Rates
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Table 3.8 confirms this and show that among the 10 countries with the
highest RMSPE ratio 5 are treated countries (Panel A). The estimated treat-
ment effect is around four additional deaths on average and 6.7 additional
deaths in the final period. Finally, the RMSPE ratio is significantly higher in
the treated countries.
3.7 Discussion
In this Chapter, we estimate the effects of the HIV pandemic on demographics
in the twelve most heavily affected countries. We employ an extension of
the synthetic control group approach (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003), which
allows the inclusion of several dependent variables. Using this method , we
find suitable control groups based on key demographic indicators, namely life
expectancy, death and birth rates.
The results reveal that HIV significantly decreased the life expectancy by
almost 15 years, and the effects range from one year for Malawi to almost 24
years for Zimbabwe. As expected, life expectancy decreased more in the more
heavily affected countries. In terms of death rate the average effect is close
to seven deaths per 1,000 inhabitants. Again there is a wide range of effects,
with Malawi showing no effect at all, while the largest effect is measured for
Zimbabwe with slightly more than ten additional deaths due to HIV.
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Table 3.8: Prediction Errors: Placebo Analysis Death Rate
PANEL A: Data
Rank Country Treated RMSPE RMSPEpost Est. Treatment Effect Final Period RMSPE ratio
1 Lao PDR 0 0.109 3.451 -3.230 -3.652 31.666
2 Lesotho 1 0.216 6.038 5.127 9.223 27.983
3 Guatemala 0 0.103 1.802 -1.456 -2.336 17.570
4 Zambia 1 0.602 7.490 6.707 8.908 12.445
5 South Africa 1 0.445 5.470 4.721 9.046 12.290
6 Mauritania 0 0.257 1.637 1.544 2.463 6.358
7 Namibia 1 0.390 2.345 1.869 2.564 6.011
8 Bangladesh 0 0.502 2.934 -2.547 -4.402 5.844
9 Madagascar 0 0.252 1.439 1.276 0.152 5.716
10 Rwanda 1 1.985 10.911 8.438 3.704 5.497
..
13 Uganda 1 1.027 5.081 4.847 4.495 4.945
..
16 Botswana 1 1.507 5.728 4.393 6.887 3.800
..
19 Zimbabwe 1 2.788 7.888 6.086 10.216 2.829
..
27 Swaziland 1 2.066 4.838 2.993 7.469 2.341
..
39 Mozambique 1 1.958 3.420 3.310 4.924 1.747
..
57 Malawi 1 1.216 1.459 -1.116 -0.359 1.200
..
65 Kenya 1 2.808 2.892 0.810 3.434 1.030
..
PANEL B: Regression
Est. Treatment Effect Final Period RMSPE ratio
Africa 0.504 0.668 -0.276
(0.329) (0.429) (1.125)
Treated 3.831∗∗∗ 6.691∗∗∗ 5.318∗∗∗
(0.568) (0.741) (1.721)
Constant -0.286∗ -0.385∗ 2.125∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.205) (0.527)
N 101 101 101
R2 0.421 0.552 0.109
Panel A shows the estimated effects for each country. We distinguish treated countries (HIV prevalence≥10%) and placebo countries
(HIV precalence≤1%). The RMSPE is defined in equation (2.4). We calculate it before the intervention (column 3), afterwards
(column 4) and their ratio (column 7) by which the countries are ranked. Column 5 equals the RMSPE post, however without
squaring the difference and taking the square root of the mean. In column 6 we show the difference of the outcome variable in the
final period (2008). In Panel B we present the results from the regression Π = α+β1Treated+β2Africa for the treatment and African
dummy, where Π represents the column title. Thus each column represents one regression result. For the estimated treatment effect
and the effect in the final period the observations are weighted by the inverse of their RMSPE. The belligerent countries Rwanda
and Uganda are excluded from this regression.
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Comparing the estimated effects with other studies the estimates are gen-
erally similar, even though their exist notable differences. The report by UN
Population Division (2004) is the only study we are aware of, that estimates
counterfactuals and actual rates of demographic variables for several coun-
tries. While they do not have estimates on the birth rates, they also cover
the crude death rate and life expectancy. The counterfactual without HIV was
formed by comparable countries and their death rates and causes (see Buettner
et al. 2003, for more information on the methodology). In terms of the sample
the paper distinguishes between the very heavily affected countries Botswana
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe and other
five heavily affected countries Cameroon, Central African Republic, Kenya,
Malawi and Mozambique. Comparing this to our sample the estimated HIV
prevalence they consider is higher in Cameroon and the Central African Re-
public, while our data sources consisting of Oster (2007) and UNAIDS (2010)
estimate higher prevalence rates for Uganda and Rwanda. In terms of results
the study indicates a decrease in life expectancy of 5.2 years in the years 2005-
2010 for the seven very heavily affected countries, and a decrease of 19.7 years
in the five heavily affected countries. These estimates are quite similar to the
14 years we estimate on average for the twelve most heavily affected countries.
However contrary to their results, we estimate the largest effects for the most
heavily affected countries. In terms of the crude death rate the UN Popu-
lation Division (2004) estimates effects of 17.9 and 9.5 additional deaths for
the very heavily affected countries and heavily affected countries respectively.
Our estimate is more conservative and estimates only seven additional deaths
on average. In summary both our study and the study of the UN Population
Division (2004) suggest large enough effects on life expectancy and the death
rate to induce changes in behavior, especially for the more heavily affected
countries.
We also analyze these behavioral effects by looking at the birth rate. For
the birth rate we obtain very precise estimates as well, indicating no overall ef-
fect, since the RMSPE after treatment is not significantly larger for the treated
countries. Moreover, the estimated effects are both positive and negative and
quite small in size. Zambia and Mozambique form a notable exception with
nine additional births and three additional births respectively, per 1,000 inhab-
itants due to HIV. The data suggests that while the birth rate in the synthetic
control group decreased, Zambia’s and Mozambique’s birth rate stayed rather
constant. In terms of mechanisms the large decrease in terms of life expectancy
in Zambia and Mozambique might be responsible for the non-decrease in terms
of the birth rate, as suggested by Chen (2010). However, it remains an open
issue why similar effects did not occur in other countries.
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Kalemli-Ozcan (2012) estimates the effect of HIV on fertility in a recent
study. The used sample consists of 44 countries and the author finds posi-
tive effects in between country comparisons, while results turn insignificant in
within-country comparisons. Our results are in fact quite similar. Also we find
positive effects for some countries, while on average the effect is insignificant
for the twelve countries analyzed.
We estimate the consequences and employ placebo studies to see whether
there are significant deviations from the estimated counterfactuals. Here we
find that there are indeed large differences between the countries with high
HIV prevalence rates and other countries with similar (initial) demographic
conditions. Therefore it seems that the method is suitable to estimate the
effects. However, we also reveal a drawback of the method. In Rwanda and
Uganda severe wars occur during treatment and the method does not allow to
disentangle treatment effects from HIV from other effects.
Before we turn to the impact of the Spanish Flu in Sweden, we briefly
recapitulate what we learned in terms of effects of AIDS in Africa. The clearest
finding is that the country with the largest loss in terms of GDP in Chapter 2,
Zambia, was also the only country to exhibit a positive, large and significant
effect on the birth rate. The large decrease in GDP can thus be explained by
the fact that due to HIV its birth rate did not decrease as in other countries.
Also for Lesotho we find similar effects, with a smaller decrease in birth rate as
compared to other countries and GDP losses. However, for Lesotho the effects
are less pronounced and not significant. Mozambique and Uganda show similar
effects with respect to the birth rate. The results for Zambia and Lesotho would
predict large effects in terms of GDP, however, Mozambique and Uganda were
revealed to be outliers in terms of GDP – due to too low GDP and large losses in
GDP due to war – therefore we have no results in terms of GDP. Other outliers
in terms of GDP are Zimbabwe (due to a too low GDP), Botswana (due to a
too high GDP growth) and Rwanda (due to war). For Kenya, Namibia and
South Africa the effects on GDP quite small, while in terms of the birth rate
we find no effects. Swaziland on the other hand experienced a drop in the
birth rate and no effects on GDP.
Summing up, the effect on GDP seems to be enforced by a non-decline in
terms of the birth rate, while countries where the birth rate decreased show
smaller or no effects in terms of GDP. The only exception to this finding is
Malawi, where we find no effects in terms of birth rate, but quite large effects
in terms of GDP.
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CHAPTER
4
The Impact of the 1918 Spanish Flu
Epidemic on Economic Performance in
Sweden ††
4.1 Motivation
Our results from the last two Chapters reveal that the results of HIV on African
countries differ from country to country. The reasons for this are twofold.
Firstly, there are many channels through which infectious diseases affect the
economy. Secondly, HIV is a long-term pandemic which has accompanied us
for decades. Therefore, measures were taken to control the disease and to
reduce the (economic) consequences. In order to gain a better insight on how
infectious diseases affect the economy, we concentrate on one country and turn
to a different disease which occurred very rapidly.
In 1918 the world is hit by the Spanish Flu. Estimates suggest that 500 mil-
lion individuals worldwide were infected by the virus, and that 50-100 million
people died in the aftermath of an infection between 1918 and 1920 (John-
son and Mueller 2002). Unlike when customary strains of influenza circulate
the world, the majority of the victims of the Spanish Flu were healthy young
people in the age interval 15-40 – not frail patients, nor children or elderly.
While much has been written about the medical causes of the Spanish Flu,
††This Chapter is based on Karlsson, Nilsson and Pichler (2012).
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the origins of the virus and its connection to more recent pandemics, such as
the 2006 bird flu (see e.g. Tumpey et al. 2005, Bos et al. 2011), limited attention
has been given to the societal and economic effects of the epidemic. What are
the economic consequences following from such a health shock affecting mainly
the population of working age within a very short time window?
Using administrative data from Swedish regions, we employ an extension of
the standard difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator to exploit the differing
mortality rates across Swedish regions. Focusing on Swedish regions has several
advantages. First, the variation in flu mortality is high across counties. Almost
one percent of the Swedish population died from the Spanish Flu, but there
were important regional differences (Åman 1990). For instance some counties
experienced more than twice the flu mortality rate of others. We use this
variation to examine the impact of the pandemic on earnings, capital returns
and poverty.
Second, many key economic indicators are available from Swedish admin-
istrative datasets and they are consistently collected across regions and time,
allowing for precise estimates.22 Hence, the data allow us to estimate the effects
of the influenza on a number of economic outcomes while carefully checking
key methodological assumptions.
Thirdly, Sweden did not take part in the World War I, during which the
flu pandemic started. In this way we reduce the risk of confounding effects of
the pandemic with disturbances related to the war. Obviously, Sweden was
affected by the war in many ways. However, in a non-belligerent country there
are no other major shocks to mortality coinciding with the disease. Finally,
Sweden is a unitary state and a very homogeneous country and thus there is
little need to worry about internal cultural differences or asymmetric responses
in regional institutions (cf. Tabellini 2010, Acemoglu et al. 2003).
Our empirical results support the prediction from endogenous growth the-
ory that there will be slower growth in the economy during a transition period
after the pandemic. However, in other parts, our empirical results are difficult
to reconcile with standard theoretical models. Most importantly, we do not
observe the immediate increase in GDP per capita which one would expect as
a result of capital deepening. Moreover, there is an apparent redistribution
between capital and labor taking place, which suggests that the impact of the
pandemic goes beyond what standard growth theory would predict. In the
22It is well known in the literature on pandemics that a death caused by influenza was
sometimes reported as pneumonia mortality in death records. However, the correlation
between influenza and pneumonia mortality at the county level transpires to be quite weak.
We interpret this as an indication of the quality of the data and that the detailed instructions
sent from national authorities to health personnel on how to verify the cause of death (see
e.g. Statistics Sweden 1911) served its purpose and that the correct disease was, in fact,
recorded.
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discussion of this Chapter, we make an attempt at explaining these findings
within the context of a growth model.
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3 presents a theoretical
model, of how the Spanish Flu affects the economy and reviews previous em-
pirical studies on this topic. In Section 3 we depict the economic environment
in Sweden at that time. Section 4 informs about our econometric approach.
In Section 5 we present our data. The results appear in Section 6 and are
discussed in Section 7.
4.2 The Spanish Flu Pandemic: Facts, Theory
and Empirical Evidence
The first official reports on the 1918 flu came from Spain; hence its popular
name.23 Upon reaching the European continent, the spread of the pandemic
was accelerated by increased troop movement due to the war (Patterson and
Pyle 1991). Among researchers in medical history there is consensus that the
disease ran its course in three to four waves. The first wave was in the spring
of 1918, with the disease returning in the fall of the same year and again in
1919. The last wave occurred mainly in Scandinavia and some islands in the
South Atlantic.
An interesting feature of the second wave of the pandemic is that it took
the world by complete surprise. The first wave of the pandemic had such a
low mortality rate that experts doubted whether it was influenza at all. For
example, in the summer of 1918, Little et al. (1918) conclude
we wish to point out that although this epidemic has been called
influenza for the want of a better name, yet in our opinion it cannot
properly be considered such for the following reasons:
1. The clinical course, though similar to that of influenza, is of
very short duration, and there is, so far as we have observed,
an absence of relapses, recurrence, or complications [...]
This is but one example of how medical experts were confused by the
mildness (!) of the influenza during the first wave, and consequently reluctant
to accept it as such. In addition, as the spread of the virus halted in the late
summer of 1918, many observers concluded that the epidemic had disappeared
(Barry 2005). Contemporary accounts by Swedish doctors also suggest that
the first wave was very mild and that there were conflicting views of whether
the disease was influenza or a new type of pneumonia (Petrén 1918a,b).
23The reason why the first report came from Spain is likely related to the fact that the
country did not take part in World War I and at the time had an uncensored media.
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This is in stark contrast to the second wave of the Spanish Flu with ex-
ceptionally high mortality rates. During a normal influenza epidemic, approx-
imately 0.1 per cent of all infected individuals perish. In comparison to this
case fatality rate, the second and most severe wave of the epidemic in the fall
of 1918 was 5 to 20 times more deadly. The main reason why the Spanish
Flu was so extraordinarily aggressive is that the virus not only attacked the
bronchus, but also the lungs, leading to many people dying from pneumonia
(Morens and Fauci 2007). The incubation time and the time between infec-
tion and death was very short. According to Taubenberger and Morens (2006),
most deaths occurred 6-11 days after the outbreak, but there is evidence that
some deaths occurred as early as two days after infection (Åman 1990). What
furthermore characterizes the disease is the heavy toll among young adults. It
is estimated that around half of the death toll was paid by individuals between
15 and 40 (Simonsen et al. 1998). This is unusual and unlike other (influenza)
diseases, which typically exhibit a U-shape in the mortality distribution over
age groups, the Spanish Flu had a W-shaped distribution over age.
4.2.1 Theoretical Perspectives
From a purely economic point of view, we may think of the Spanish Flu pan-
demic as labor supply a shock to the economy, which on the other hand leaves
physical capital intact. In order to generate hypotheses for how our outcome
variables may react to the pandemic, we briefly review the macroeconomic
literature on economic growth. Since we cannot observe GDP at a regional
level, we look at the returns to capital and labor. Moreover, we are concerned
with distributional effects and therefore look at poverty.
Our point of departure is a standard two-sector model (Lucas 1988). Con-
sider an economy with competitive markets. In each location, there is a large
number of production units producing a homogeneous final good. Preferences
over (per capita) consumption are given by
∫ ∞
0
U (c (t)) e−ρtdt (4.1)
where ρ is the rate of time preference. Let h (t) denote the skill level (human
capital level) of a typical worker and u (t) be the fraction of non-leisure time
devoted to goods production. Then 1 − u (t) is the effort devoted to the
accumulation of human capital. It is assumed that the growth of human capital
takes a simple form as
h˙ = δ (1− u)h (4.2)
where parameter δ is positive.
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The output per capita y(= Y/N) depends on the per capita capital stock,
k(= K/N), the effective work force uh, and the average level of human capital
in the region h¯:
y = Akβ [uh]1−β h¯γ (4.3)
where parameter β is the income share of physical capital, and parameter γ is
positive and captures external effects of human capital. The accumulation of
physical capital is assumed to take the form
k˙ = y − c (4.4)
In equilibrium, h = h¯ because all production units within the region are
treated as being identical. Substituting this into the production function and
solving the maximization problem, one gets the social optimum. However,
we want to solve for the competitive equilibrium here, which will be done by
deriving first order conditions taking the whole path of
{
h¯ (t) : t ≥ 0
}
as given.
Thus, the current-value Hamiltonian may be written as
H (k, h, θ1, θ2, c, u;A, σ, β, γ, δ, {N (t) , Y (t) : t ≥ 0}) = 11− σ
[
c1−σ − 1
]
(4.5)
+ θ1
[
Akβ [uh]1−β h¯γ − c
]
+ θ2δ (1− u)h
where θ1 and θ2 are the co-state variables for k and h respectively. Things
taken as given are put after the semicolon in the Hamiltonian.
The first order conditions are thus given as follows:
∂H
∂c
= c−σ − θ1 = 0 (4.6)
∂H
∂u
= θ1 (1− β)Akβu−βh1−βh¯γ − θ2δh = 0 (4.7)
−θ˙1 = −ρθ1 + βkβ−1θ1A (uh)1−β h¯γ (4.8)
−θ˙2 = −ρθ2 + (1− β)h−βθ1Au1−βkβh¯γ + θ2δ (1− u) (4.9)
k˙ = y − c (4.10)
h˙ = δ (1− u)h (4.11)
Boucekkine and Ruiz Tamarit (2005) present an analytical solution to this
problem for the special case where σ = β. However, before proceeding we
derive the factor returns which are crucial in our empirical analysis. Since
the economy is competitive, we assume that input factors earn their private
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marginal products. Hence, we have
r = ∂Y
∂K
= βyk−1 (4.12)
w = ∂Y
∂N
= (1− β) y (4.13)
and thus capital returns per capita are given by rk = βy. A population shock
has a direct impact on k = K/N and may also lead to adjustments in con-
sumption c and the allocation of workers to the production of final goods, rep-
resented by u. Both these control variables may be adjusted instantaneously,
but only u has an instantaneous effect on production and factor returns. Thus,
we may write:
dr
dN = β (1− β)AK
β−1 (uh)1−β N−βhγ + β (1− β)AKβ−1 (hN)1−β u−βhγ dudN
(4.14)
= (1− β)
(
1
N
+ 1
u
du
dN
)
r (4.15)
dw
dN = −β (1− β)AK
β (uh)1−β N−1−βhγ + (1− β)2AKβ (uN)−β h1−β+γ dudN
(4.16)
= β
(
− 1
N
+ 1− β
β
1
u
du
dN
)
w (4.17)
Now consider the responses of labor and capital returns expressed as elas-
ticities:
d (rk)
dN
N
rk
= dwdN
N
w
= β
[
−1 + 1− β
β
du
dN
N
u
]
(4.18)
Hence, the immediate impact of the shock is equivalent in the two factor
returns, and as long as there is limited accommodation on the part of time
spent in education – i.e. du∗/dN is low – the immediate effect of the pandemic
is an increase in earnings and also an increase in capital returns, even though
the regional interest rate is predicted to fall in response to the population
shock.
From (4.7), the optimal allocation of labor is given by
u∗ =
(
(1− β)A
δ
)1/β (
θ1
θ2
)1/β
h
γ
β
−1k (4.19)
Apart from k there are two variables in the equation that can potentially be
affected by the labor supply shock: θ1 and θ2. If the co-state variables were
unaffected, we might expect an increase in the number of hours worked in
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production, since capital deepening (the increase in k) has increased labor
productivity in this sector. However, this direct effect is likely to be counter-
acted in a reduction in the shadow cost of capital accumulation – represented
by θ1 – and thus the net effect on workforce allocation may be limited. Indeed,
Boucekkine and Ruiz Tamarit (2005) show that for parameter values σ = β,
the allocation of labor between production and education is not only constant
over time, it is also unaffected by a labor supply shock. In this special case,
the immediate elasticity of wages and capital returns with respect to the pop-
ulation shock simply equals β: for each per cent excess mortality, we expect a
β percent increase in wages and capital returns.
Turning to the medium-term consequences, the imbalance effects after the
population shock are analyzed by Boucekkine and Ruiz Tamarit (2005), again
for a particular combination of parameter values. Denoting by ω the ratio
between physical and human capital, it can be shown that the growth rate of
the economy in the aftermath of the pandemic is going to be proportional to
ω¯
ω
= k¯/h¯
k/h
(4.20)
where k¯ and h¯ are the values along the balanced growth path. After the
epidemic, ω is above the long-run equilibrium value, and thus the growth rate
in the economy is lower than otherwise.
We may thus summarize our theoretical predictions regarding earnings and
capital returns as follows:
Hypothesis 1 If the regional economies behave according to the Lucas-Uzawa
model, and the accommodation of labor allocation u∗ is incomplete, the in-
fluenza pandemic can be expected to lead to
1. An immediate increase in earnings w and capital returns rk.
2. A slower growth rate (in production, earnings and capital returns) during
a transition phase after the pandemic.
Finally, we also make some predictions concerning poverty. The analysis
of poverty is complicated for two reasons. First, the theoretical model does
not incorporate any worker heterogeneity and thus it is not useful for mak-
ing explicit predictions for this variable. Second, the pandemic may have two
distinct effects on poverty. First, individuals who were dependent on fam-
ily members for their living might lose this support in the aftermath of the
pandemic. This effect is quite immediate and not directly related to the func-
tioning of the economy – even though Boucekkine and Laffargue (2010) show
that an increase in the number of orphans may have important distributional
consequences in the long term. According to the 1920 census, on average
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each worker in Sweden supported one additional inhabitant (Statistics Sweden
1917). Hence, given the lack of a social gradient in flu mortality, and consider-
ing that not all dependents who lost their support became poor, we can think
of this number as an upper bound to this effect. Second, changes in wages
and capital returns – and their distribution within the population – may have
given rise to changes in poverty rates. Given the predictions from Hypothesis
1 above, we expect these changes to cause an immediate reduction in poverty
rates, followed by convergence between more and less affected regions during
the transition period. Hence, we may formulate the following proposition:
Hypothesis 2 The initial effects of the pandemic on poverty will be the net
effect of two countervailing forces:
1. An increase in poverty due to dependents losing their breadwinners; an
effect likely to be smaller than one.
2. A decrease in poverty due to rising wages and capital returns.
In the medium term, both effects are likely to lose importance; i.e., we expect
to see a closing of the gap in poverty between heavily and less heavily affected
regions.
4.2.2 Empirical Evidence
A growing literature tests the so-called Fetal Origins hypothesis, analyzing
the consequences of in utero exposure on later health and labor market out-
comes, focusing in particular on the effects of the Spanish Flu (cf. Almond
and Mazumder 2005, Maccini and Yang 2009, Nelson 2010). These studies
suggest long-term damage from prenatal exposure to pandemic influenza and
that children of infected mothers are more likely to have health problems and
experience lower wages as adults than non-affected children.
In this study, however, we are concerned with short- and medium-term
aggregate effects of the pandemic. Up to now there have not been many
empirical studies estimating this impact. Besides, existing empirical studies
face two serious problems. First, there is a lack of reliable data from the time
period. Second, identification is difficult due, inter alia, to the fact that the
flu occurred during and shortly after the World War I.
Brainerd and Siegler (2003) is one of few papers that consider the effects
of the influenza on economic growth. They study changes in real personal
incomes between 1919/21 and 1930. Due to data restrictions the analysis
only focuses on the medium-term effects and does not distinguish whether the
effect was due to recovery or economic growth. In any case, findings suggest
significant positive effects: states that where hit harder by the flu experienced
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a higher income growth rate from 1919/1921 to 1930. From a theoretical
point of view, this result might reflect either capital deepening or be driven
by increased investment in human capital and higher population growth after
the occurrence of the Spanish Flu.
More recently Garrett (2009) analyses the effects of the pandemic on manu-
facturing wages. Using the same mortality data as Brainerd and Siegler (2003),
but having access to wage growth between 1914 and 1919, the study can com-
pare before and after the pandemic, but is only able to estimate effects in the
very short term. The paper concludes that the epidemic appears to have had
a positive impact on manufacturing wages. However, it is not always clear to
what extent the results are attributable to the World War I.
Focusing on India, Bloom and Mahal (1997a) analyze the effects of the
Spanish Flu using data on population changes and acre sown per capita in
13 provinces. India was severely hit by the pandemic, with very high death
tolls and the epidemic affected various regions of the country quite differently.
Bloom and Mahal (1997a) do not find that any relationship between the mag-
nitude of population decline following from the influenza and the area sown
per capita across Indian provinces.
In summary there have been some attempts to estimate the economic effects
of the Spanish Flu pandemic in the US and India, but there is still no study
which rigorously applies methods typically used to conduct causal inference.
The main reason appears to be a lack of reliable data. As shown below, Swedish
data appear to offer a significant improvement in this regard.
4.2.3 Drivers of the Influenza
It has been argued that the 1918 influenza pandemic represents a good ‘natu-
ral experiment’ – for estimating short term effects (Brainerd and Siegler 2003)
as well as for considering the long-run effects of in utero exposure (Almond
2006). The facts that have been forwarded to support this claim are a) the un-
expected onset of the pandemic in 1918 – which rules out behavioral changes in
anticipation of exposure; b) its short duration: the majority of deaths occurred
within a few months only; c) the large proportion of the population infected;
and d) the random nature of influenza prevalence and influenza mortality.
The assumptions underlying Almond’s (2006) analysis have recently been
challenged by Brown (2010). The main problem, according to Brown, is that
US participation in World War I led to selection issues in childbearing in and
around 1919: fathers in the “treatment group” are likely to be older, less
educated and less healthy than fathers of surrounding cohorts.
Even though Brown raises valid concerns, it is unclear to what extent they
apply to our study. The World War I also led to mobilization and subsequent
81
CHAPTER 4. THE IMPACT OF THE 1918 SPANISH FLU EPIDEMIC
ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN SWEDEN
demobilization in Sweden, but the disruption caused is of less importance
when the short-term impact of the pandemic is concerned. Nevertheless, we
now briefly discuss the literature on the determinants of the influenza during
the pandemic.
Garrett (2008) analyses the determinants of influenza incidence in the U.S.
and finds that even though densely populated areas in general have higher
influenza mortality, there is no correlation between 1918 excess mortality and
population density.24 We find that this result also holds for Sweden (see Table
4.1).
One particularly relevant study is Mamelund (2006) that considers socio-
economic determinants of influenza mortality in the Norwegian capital Oslo
(then Kristiania). Using register data on influenza mortality, Mamelund esti-
mates the importance of variables such as age, marital status, socio-economic
status and quality of housing. Although there are significant class differences
in influenza mortality, these appear to be driven more by location than by
class itself. Marital status also appears to be insignificant. In a related study,
Chowell et al. (2008) consider socio-demographic and geographical patterns in
the transmissibility and mortality impact of the epidemic in England. They
also fail to find an association between influenza mortality and measures of
population density or residential crowding.
4.3 Sweden in the early 20th century
Since it is necessary to consider the particular economic environment which
Sweden represented when the influenza pandemic struck in 1918, this Section
presents an overview of the general economic and political conditions in Sweden
during and shortly after the First World War, and provides an overview of the
spread of the influenza epidemic in Sweden.
4.3.1 General economic conditions
One hundred years ago, Sweden was a radically different society from today.
Following a surge in economic liberalizations in the second half of the 19th
century, the country had evolved into a modern capitalist state with strong
institutions. These reforms included trade liberalization, modern patent laws,
and the introduction of joint-stock companies (Bergh 2007). The changes soon
gave rise to rapid economic growth.
24A related study from New Zealand (McSweeny et al. 2007) concludes that rural areas
were less heavily affected by the 1918 influenza; however, the analysis fail to control for the
age profile making this finding less informative.
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The first half of the 20th century was characterized by rapid industrializa-
tion. At the turn of the century, Swedish society was still largely agrarian:
according to the 1900 census, 53 per cent of the population earned their liv-
ing from agriculture and 29 per cent from manufacturing (Statistics Sweden
1907). By 1930, 39.4 per cent of the population still earned their living from
agriculture, compared to 35.7 per cent for manufacturing (Statistics Sweden
1936). This structural change occurred at a relatively even pace during these
three decades.
Sweden’s transformation into a modern industrialized country was largely
trade-driven. Figure 4.1 plots Swedish exports to some key trading partners
during the 1910-1930 period, expressed in 1917 crowns. Britain and Germany
consistently accounted for a large share of Sweden’s exports, even if their
relative roles shifted back and forth over time. Also, Scandinavian neighbors
were important trading partners throughout the period, and their trade with
Sweden offered some stability in an otherwise fairly volatile environment. It
should, however, be pointed out that the relative share of exports in GDP
fluctuated much less than the absolute numbers in the figure: exports never
went below 14.5 per cent of GDP (1918) or above 21.5 per cent (1913) (Krantz
and Schön 2007).
Figure 4.1: Swedish Exports 1910–1930.
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In terms of labor market regulations, the period considered falls in between
the deregulations that were implemented in the 19th century – such as the
abolition of guilds in 1846 and the introduction of free enterprise in 1864 –
and the increased regulation that followed the labor movement’s rise to power.
Thus, wages were relatively flexible and actually dropped in real terms in the
1913-17 period.
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4.3.2 Effects of the First World War
At the beginning of the war, Sweden, Norway and Denmark issued identically
worded declarations of neutrality. The Swedish army was mobilized shortly
after the outbreak of the war, and a ban on exports of arms, ammunition and
military equipment was introduced. However, the main disruption to Swedish
trade was caused by external forces: the naval blockade imposed by the UK
included the entire North Sea. The blockade was very restrictive and, as its
implementation was being stepped up, it lead to disruption in Sweden’s trade
with countries overseas. However, mainly imports were affected (Jörberg and
Krantz 1978).
The war also led to increased regulation of the domestic economy. The
government was given powers to dispose of resources essential to the military.
In 1916, new legislation authorized the government to regulate prices of gro-
ceries, fodder, fuel and clothing. This lead to rationing of meat, eggs, butter
and fish. However, a black market evolved and thus the regulations were of
limited importance in practice (Schön 2010). The period was also character-
ized by a surge in important social legislation. Even before the war, the first
steps had been taken to separate child and elderly care from general poor re-
lief. In 1914, a basic social security system was introduced, including a pension
scheme covering the entire population. In the same year, a public committee
responsible for unemployment was formed, which was to play an important
role in the shaping of active labor market policies (Jörberg and Krantz 1978).
Despite the disruption it brought in some parts of the economy, the war
provided a generally favorable economic environment to Sweden. There was
a massive surge in exports (iron ore, steel, engineering products) and a huge
trade surplus evolved (Magnusson 1996). Shortages in imported fuels led to
the electrification of industry production all over the country – improving the
competitiveness of Swedish industry. The agricultural sector also benefited
from the shortfall in foreign competition. It was only in residential production
that investment plunged and remained low throughout the war (Schön 2010).
However, the war gave rise to redistribution between different groups in
society. Owners of capital benefited more than workers, and the gains and
strains associated with the war were unevenly distributed between different
sectors of the economy (Schön 2010). It is important to keep this redistribution
in mind, since it was reversed in the post-war slump and thus it might represent
a confounding factor with respect to the regional exposure to the Spanish Flu
pandemic.
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4.3.3 The Roaring Twenties
Having emerged from the World War I largely unscathed, the Swedish economy
was subsequently to move on to another decade of rapid economic growth and
structural transformation. However, this period of growth was interrupted by a
sharp downturn in 1920-21 in which GDP decreased by five per cent in a single
year. Interestingly, the industries that had benefited most from the war – such
as sawmills and the iron and steel industry – were also the most hard hit by
the crisis (Magnusson 1996). There were dramatic increases in unemployment,
which reached a level of 25 per cent at the peak of the crisis. However, the
recovery was very quick: Swedish GDP increased by 8 per cent in 1922 and
the country faced steady economic growth for the rest of the decade (Jörberg
and Krantz 1978).
Moreover, the 1920s were characterized by fast growth in real wages: in
1930, they were at roughly twice their 1918 level, and not even in the sharp
downturn of 1921 did they stop growing. Thus, the decade was also charac-
terized by a gradual increase in returns to labor compared to capital returns
(Schön 2010). Even though unemployment remained relatively high through-
out the decade it is believed that the fast growth in wages was partly due to
the implementation of the shortening of the working day to eight hours in 1919
(Jörberg and Krantz 1978).25
4.3.4 The Spanish Flu Pandemic
With respect to the number of deaths caused, the Spanish Flu is one of the most
severe calamities ever to affect Sweden. It killed almost 38,000 individuals,
representing almost one per cent of the population. As in other parts of the
world, flu prevalence rates were much higher, but generally it is believed that
mortality rates amongst those infected approached 2 per cent.
The first case of the Spanish Flu in Sweden was reported in the south in late
June 1918. In early August an increasing number of cases are also reported to
have died from the flu in the northern provinces. However, as shown by Figure
4.2, until the late summer months of 1918 there was no reason to be concerned
about elevated influenza mortality in Sweden. During the first seven months
of 1918, 148 influenza deaths were reported, which is below the corresponding
25In 1910 the average work week corresponded to 57 hours of work. The working hour
act of 1919 stated that a working week should not be longer than six days of work with
no more than 48 working hours. Although the act in principle only covered workers in the
industry, most workers legally not covered by the new legislation, e.g. employees in the
service- and in the public sector, had corresponding working hour restrictions by collective
agreements or regulations. For example, government officials had a 45-hour working week in
1920. Following seasonality, farm workers were covered by contracts regulating the maximum
number of working hours on a yearly basis (Ryberg-Welander 2000).
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figure for 1917 (190 influenza deaths). Yet, once the situation changed in
August and September, it did so with a terrifying speed.
Figure 4.2: Monthly Influenza and Pneumonia Deaths. Sweden 1917–20.
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Figure 4.3 shows influenza mortality rates in Swedish counties 1918-1920
(per 100,000 inhabitants). Clearly flu mortality varied widely across counties,
with some areas experiencing almost three times higher rates than others. In
particular the counties Jämtland and Västernorrland, were severely hit. The
high mortality rates in the remote northern areas have, in part, a demographic
explanation as these regions tended to have a young population at the time.
However, it has also been hypothesized that the high regional variation in
mortality rates may be explained by remoteness, and that people living in
these areas had less immunological protection against the virus as they had
been less exposed to earlier flu waves. Regarding immunity it has moreover
been hypothesized that the W-shaped mortality distribution of the Spanish Flu
exhibited in Figure 4.4 may relate to exposure to the Russian flu in 1889-1890.
As discussed above, different industries fared differently during and after
the war. Since different regions tend to be specialized in different industries,
these fluctuations may become confounding factors. Table 4.1 tabulates all
the counties, their influenza exposure and some key statistics from the 1910
census and the year just before the influenza pandemic, namely 1917, when
available. Regions are ranked according to their 1918-20 influenza exposure.
Interestingly, there is virtually no correlation between sectoral composition
and Spanish Flu mortality, suggesting that the spread of the influenza virus
was largely unrelated to initial regional economic conditions.
Normal flu waves affecting Sweden typically have their outbreak and peaks
in February and March, but the Spanish Flu peaked in October and November.
During these two months only, the number of victims of the epidemic reached
20,000 individuals. Another, less severe, wave hit the country in March 1919
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Figure 4.3: 1918 Influenza Mortality in Swedish Counties.
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Figure 4.4: Age Distribution of Influenza Mortality.
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Table 4.1: Treatment Correlations.
Year 1918-20 1910 1917
Excess Popu- Agri- Manu- Com- Popu- Pop. Earnings
County Mortality lation culture fact. merce lation Density per Cap.
Gotlands 445.9 55,217 57.1 16.6 8.0 55,873 17.7 146.4
Södermanlands 463.5 178,568 46.4 27.2 9.4 187,891 27.6 333.1
Kalmar 480.3 228,129 48.1 23.8 9.7 228,998 19.8 183.9
Örebro 494.5 207,021 41.9 34.1 8.6 214,437 23.5 322.0
Jönköpings 504.3 214,454 47.0 28.3 7.3 222,607 19.3 246.7
Uppsala 506.1 128,171 44.9 25.7 7.7 133,506 25.1 301.2
Skaraborgs 510.6 241,284 58.9 18.6 6.5 242,081 28.5 166.1
Kristianstads 545.6 228,307 53.8 21.6 8.4 237,576 36.8 175.2
Östergötlands 552.0 294,179 42.0 29.9 9.8 302,175 27.4 272.5
Älvsborgs 553.3 287,692 53.3 25.0 6.5 297,629 23.4 201.4
Värmlands 562.9 260,135 53.3 25.1 6.8 262,525 13.6 250.0
Kronobergs 567.0 149,654 59.2 19.0 5.8 157,270 15.9 171.2
Västmanlands 577.6 155,920 43.5 31.6 7.8 165,238 24.6 355.8
Hallands 601.4 147,224 52.1 21.4 9.9 147,762 30.0 163.1
Stockholm county 602.0 229,181 35.8 31.8 11.5 230,212 29.7 448.2
Stockholm city 610.7 342,323 0.5 38.1 24.7 413,163 3,642.4 735.2
Göteborgs och Bohus 631.5 381,270 25.2 33.1 18.0 416,843 82.6 406.6
Blekinge 634.7 149,359 40.3 25.8 8.8 148,866 49.4 223.2
Malmöhus 654.6 457,214 30.4 34.3 14.8 481,657 99.7 372.3
Gävleborgs 712.9 253,792 38.1 32.8 11.1 263,989 13.4 328.8
Västerbottens 746.3 161,366 69.3 14.1 4.5 175,031 3.0 171.8
Kopparbergs 748.7 233,873 48.7 31.6 6.7 248,019 8.3 322.4
Västernorrlands 840.3 250,512 47.3 26.9 8.8 262,005 10.3 269.7
Norrbottens 873.7 161,132 54.1 22.4 8.8 177,285 1.7 236.4
Jämtlands 1,017.4 109,851 69.4 12.4 5.2 128,209 2.5 166.8
ρ Flu 1.0 0.01 0.075 -0.086 0.006 0.023 -0.022 0.016
The table shows the standardized excess influenza mortality 1918-20; population size and sectoral shares
(public and home sector omitted) according to the 1910 census (Statistics Sweden 1917); as well population,
population density (measured in inhabitants per square kilometer) and earnings per capita in 1917. In the last
row we present the correlations of the various variables with excess influenza mortality, which are weighted by
respective populations in 1910 and 1917.
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and new waves appeared until early 1920. Due to the fast spread of the disease
in the North, the national government tried to mobilize medical resources to
these areas. Moreover, local authorities took actions to limit the spread of
the disease and implemented public health measures, such as the banning
of public gatherings (Influensakommittén 1924). These actions however had
limited effectiveness as the virus was transmitted through the air.26
Figure 4.5 provides an overview of the timing of the influenza in Sweden.
The curves in the diagram show the ratio between 1918-20 monthly flu inci-
dence and incidence in a ‘normal’ year. The three dashed curves show the
progression of the epidemic among poor people in the three largest cities; and
these figures are contrasted with the situation in the entire population in the
rest of Sweden. Thus, the figure gives an indication of the socio-economic gra-
dient of the influenza. Accordingly, the poor people in Malmö and Stockholm
experienced a slightly lower increase in incidence rates compared to the rest of
the country, whereas poor people in Gothenburg were more severely affected.27
Figure 4.5: Incidence of Influenza in Different Locations and Socioeconomic
Groups.
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4.3.5 Assessment
The purpose of this Section has been to give an overview of the environment
in which the Spanish Flu pandemic spread in 1918, with a particular focus
on potential threats to the identification strategy employed in this Chapter.
26There is also detailed documentation on the various treatments that were tested to
prevent the spread of the flu in Sweden, see e.g. Influensakommittén (1924).
27Amongst poor people in Malmö, the average incidence rate was 9.1 times higher than
in a normal year, in Stockholm it was 7.5 times higher, and in Gothenburg 14 times higher.
The corresponding figure for the rest of Sweden was 9.7. However, the actual levels of rates
are not comparable across locations, since better access to medical services automatically
leads to higher recorded incidence and prevalence rates.
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We have identified two main threats to the identification strategy which merit
special attention. First, even though Sweden soon rebounded from the crisis
of the early 1920s, it is clear that the downturn had asymmetric effects be-
tween urban and rural areas: in particular, agriculture suffered from a decline
in prices when import markets opened after the war. Ironworks and sawmills,
which were typically in the countryside, were also particularly badly affected.
However, as shown above there was no clear urban-rural divide in the influenza
pandemic. A related issue is that the different regions may have been special-
ized in different sectors of production, and these differences may not be fully
captured by the urban/rural dichotomy. Since the industries that benefited
most from the war also had a less favorable evolution afterwards, it is essen-
tial to establish that the sectoral composition did not lead to counties already
diverging during the war. This point calls for a careful investigation of the
common time trend assumption for all outcome variables.
4.4 Econometric Approach
4.4.1 Defining the Treatment Indicator
Our analysis is conducted at the level of the 25 Swedish counties. As men-
tioned, the incidence and mortality of the pandemic exhibit considerable vari-
ation across regions. The main assumption underlying our analysis is that the
regional exposure to the Spanish influenza represents an exogenous shock and
that regions that were affected particularly hard would have followed the same
time trend as other regions in the absence of the pandemic. Thus, we define
treatment as the total excess regional influenza mortality through the years
1918-20. In our baseline specifications, we furthermore assume that the effects
of Spanish Flu mortality is constant over time and a linear function of the
excess mortality.
Since the outcome variables are measured annually, we need to correct for
the timing of the flu. Most importantly, since the 1918 wave of the epidemic
reached its peak only in October and November, it could not have a full effect
on the economy in that year. Unfortunately, we do not have monthly mortality
data at the county level. However, given that the time period between infection
and death was so short (typically 6 – 11 days), we approximate the timing of
the fatalities using the timing of influenza incidence.
Thus, we introduce the following notation: yearly flu mortality in county
i is denoted mit; and monthly flu morbidity denoted pjit – where t is the year
and j is the month. We define both variables as proportions of the county
population at the end of year t− 1. Furthermore, we define the corresponding
variables in a ‘normal’ year (using averages from 1915-17) as mi0 and pji0.
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Using these variables, we can define the effective excess mortality meit in
year t > 1917 as
meit = (mit −mi0)
∑12
j=1
(
pjit−pji0
2 +
∑j−1
k=1
(
pkit − pki0
))
12∑12k=1 (pkit − pki0) (4.21)
= (mit −mi0)
∑12
j=1 (12.5− j)
(
pjit − pji0
)
12∑12k=1 (pkit − pki0)
In words, mit − mi0 is the excess mortality rate on an annual basis. The
denominator of the next term normalizes weights such that we adjust for the
fact that pjit captures morbidity and not mortality. In the numerator, we first
have the ‘excess morbidity rate’ of the current month: we divide it by two to
correct for the fact that not all cases appear at the beginning of the month.
The second term in the numerator captures the cumulative effect of influenza
exposure in previous months. For instance, consider any morbidity in year t
exceeding the baseline monthly incidence, i.e., pit > pi0. If the flu occurs in
December the second term reads 1/24, while it would read 23/24 if the flu
already hit in January.
Having thus defined the excess flu mortality within a year, we can calculate
the cumulative excess mortality at an annual basis. Denoting this variable wit,
it is defined as
wit =

0 if t < 1918∑t−1
j=1918 (mij −mi0) +meit if t ∈ [1918, 1920]∑1920
j=1918 (mij −mi0) if t > 1920
(4.22)
where, notably, previous years are represented bymij, notmeij: in the following
year, we do not need to correct for the timing of period t − 1 deaths. The
treatment indicator is adjusted for the proportion of individuals aged 0-40
according to the 1920 census.
These equations might not seem very intuitive but, in fact, we are simply
integrating the number of cumulative deaths over time. This aspect is em-
phasized in Figure 4.6, where we plot the treatment variable together with
the cumulative number of excess deaths. Clearly, the treatment variable adds
the integral of new deaths occurring during the current year to deaths that
occurred in previous years. This way, the probable impact of these deaths on
annual data are captured more convincingly.28
28We also use alternative treatment indicators, such as an age-adjusted influenza mor-
tality instead of the excess mortality rate, and our result are robust to such alternative
specifications. Unfortunately we do not have county data on prime age flu mortality, how-
ever, for the city of Malmö we have collected individual level data, which suggests a strong
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Figure 4.6: Derivation of the Treatment Variable.
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The method we use is an extension of the standard difference-in-differences
estimator; our extension is simply that we need to allow for varying treatment
intensity (Lechner 2010). Thus, the functional form imposed adds a further as-
sumption to the standard set of assumptions, and it should clearly be formally
tested.
4.4.2 Identification
Our empirical analysis crucially rests on the exogeneity assumption, i.e., that
the regional exposure to the influenza pandemic was essentially random, and
in particular, not correlated with potential outcomes. This assumption is not
directly testable, but since it is essential for identification, we have exposed it
to a battery of indirect tests, which are described in detail below.
Visual inspection of time trends. The common time trend assumption
appears more plausible if one can show that regions with different exposure
to the influenza have moved together in the past. Thus, we split the sample
into two groups and plot time trends and confidence intervals for all outcome
variables considered. If the trends of the two groups diverge already before the
‘treatment’ in 1918, this is evidence suggesting that the common time trend
assumption is not warranted. This graphical test will be performed before the
main regressions.
Placebo regressions. By counterfactually assuming that the influenza
pandemic hit Sweden between 1915-17 instead of 1918-20, we get an indirect
test of not only the common time trend assumption: a placebo regression
correlation between prime age male flu mortality and overall flu mortality.
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also tells us something about the statistical properties of the estimator. An
insignificant but precisely estimated placebo coefficient suggest that we have
acceptable size, whereas an estimate which is significantly different from zero
either suggests that the common time trend assumption is violated, or that
false positives is an issue. False positives may arise whenever the standard
errors are downward biased – for example due to temporal or spatial autocor-
relation – and the placebo regressions thus represent a useful test as to whether
our dataset suffers from any of these problems. The specification applying a
placebo approach is included as one of our regressions.
Relating influenza exposure to pre-influenza covariates. This test
goes beyond what is actually necessary for the DID estimator to work, since
it is not required that counties are at the same levels before the intervention
– only that they follow common time trends. Nevertheless, given the geo-
graphical gradient in the influenza, there is the concern that our estimates
are confounded by differences in the sectoral composition of the economy and
other distinct traits of the pre-influenza regional economies. Thus, we calculate
the correlation between our ‘treatment’ variable and various economic indica-
tors. Doing so, we clearly face a multiple testing problem: random variation
in these variables would sooner or later lead to us finding a strong correlation
with some covariate. Nevertheless, for identification we require that the corre-
lation between influenza exposure and these additional variables is negligible.
Section 3.4 discusses and Table 4.1 presents the results for this test.
Region-specific time trends. In a separate set of specifications, we
allow the regions to diverge over time by including region-specific time trends.
Including these trends demands more of the data since more parameters need
to be estimated and since there is a risk of multicollinearity with our treatment
indicator. For this reason, it may be expected that results are somewhat weaker
when these trends are included. Hence, we interpret point estimates which
do not deviate significantly from our baseline specification as evidence that
the estimated effect may indeed be interpreted as causal. The specification
applying region-specific time trend is included among our other regressions.
Inclusion of covariates. The DID estimator does not allow inclusion of
endogenous variables such as covariates that are possibly also affected by the
influenza. However, there are some variables that are plausibly exogenous.
It seems reasonable to assume that influenza morbidity (i.e. infections) was
exogenous, and also the economic performance of vital trading partners can be
assumed to be exogenous from the point of view of the regional economy. If
the treatment indicator is truly exogenous, it should be robust to the inclusion
of such covariates. However, we take this analysis one step further by also
considering covariates which are potentially endogenous. This obviously gives
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rise to a ‘bad control problem’ (Angrist and Pischke 2008), so these estimates
need to be interpreted with caution, but it does seem reasonable to check
whether results are robust to the inclusion of possible confounders such as
birth rates, population density, degree of urbanization, and internal migration.
Specifications including additional covariates are included in our regressions.
Collapsing regions. There are several issues related to the spatial struc-
ture of the dataset. First, there is the already mentioned problem of spatial
dependence of various kinds. Second, we expect migration of workers and cap-
ital to even out some of the impact of the pandemic. Third, capital returns are
typically registered in the county of the capital holder, which does not have
to be the same region as the region where the capital is located. All of these
issues can be addressed to some extent by collapsing the counties into larger
geographical units. Thus, in a separate set of specifications we collapse the
25 counties into six ‘super-regions’ with approximately one million inhabitants
each. Migration movements between these larger units are much smaller than
between the original regions – and thus this alternative specification provides
a useful test of whether our results are driven by these other factors.29 The
additional estimations using data for larger regions are presented in Appendix
C.
4.4.3 Empirical Specification
For all outcome variables considered the main baseline specification is
yit = αi + βwit + λt + it (4.23)
where yit is the outcome variable (i.e. capital returns, earnings or poverty),
αi is a county fixed effect, wit is our treatment indicator, λt is a year fixed
effect, and it is a residual disturbance. It is straightforward to show that an
OLS estimate of β captures the treatment effect if standard assumptions are
fulfilled.
It is well known that the DID estimator is sensitive to functional form
assumptions. In our case, the natural alternatives are to use either levels or
logarithms of the outcome variables. Since the counties are at very different
levels at the outset with respect to the outcome variables, a logarithmic spec-
ification seems preferable. However, as a robustness check Appendix C also
provides estimates for the outcome variables specified in levels.
In an alternative set of specifications, we allow the impact of the influenza
pandemic to vary over time:
29We also run a specification including a spatial lag of the treatment variable – an indi-
cation of the flu mortality in neighbor regions weighted by distance.
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yit = αi + βwit + γwit1 (t > 1920) + λt + it (4.24)
where γ captures treatment effect heterogeneity over time, and 1 (t > τ) is a
dummy variable indicating that the year is after 1920.
The placebo regression will take a very similar form:
yit = αi + δwi,t+3 + λt + it if t < 1918 (4.25)
In words, we estimate the ‘effect’ of a counterfactual placebo epidemic, which
is assumed to have occurred in the years 1915-17 with the incidence rates of
1918-20. If the placebo parameter δ is precisely estimated and close to zero, it
can be seen as evidence for the common time trend. Moreover, it will give us
an indication of whether spatial autocorrelation is a problem in the dataset.
4.4.4 Estimating Standard Errors
Inference in DID models has attracted considerable attention in the literature
over the past decade. Since our estimates are based on relatively long panels,
particular attention needs to be devoted to autocorrelation.30
In a seminal paper, Bertrand et al. (2004) discuss the problems associated
with autocorrelation in difference-in-differences studies and compare different
solutions. One solution which is not discussed in their paper, but outlined by
Wooldridge (2009), Stock and Watson (2008) and Arellano (2003), is to use
robust standard errors in a fixed effects specification. This combination, which
we use in our baseline specifications, is equivalent to clustering at the regional
level and thus deals with the autocorrelation problem.
As an additional robustness check, we also reduce the time dimension into
five time periods. The estimating equations remain the same as those above,
but we now use a collapsed version of the outcome variable, defined as follows:
y˜it =

1
T0
∑1917
s=t0 yis if t = 1917
yit if t ∈ [1918, 1920]
1
T1
∑t1
s=1921 yis if t = 1921
(4.26)
where T0 is the number of time periods before 1918; t0 is the first year covered
by the panel; T1 is the number of time periods after 1920, and t1 is the last
year covered by the panel. The treatment variable w˜it is defined analogously:
30Since we use data aggregated at the regional level throughout, common group errors
as discussed by Donald and Lang (2007) are unlikely to represent a major problem.
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w˜it =
0 if t = 1917wit if t ∈ [1918, 1921] (4.27)
Thus, we require estimated effects to be robust to this change in specification.31
4.5 Data and Variables
Our analysis of the economic effects of the Spanish Flu is conducted at the level
of counties (Swedish: län). The data comes from high-quality administrative
records. Sweden has a long tradition of collecting official statistics. Statistics
Sweden was founded in 1858 and from 1911 onwards the bureau published the
series Sveriges officiella statistik, divided into nine topics providing information
on various issues, on a yearly basis. In addition, most public authorities have
a convention of providing official statistics related to their activities.32
There are two sources of county-level influenza statistics available for Swe-
den and they differ to some extent. We use data from Statistics Sweden, which
are generally believed to be of high quality and more accurate compared to
the influenza statistics provided by Medicinalstyrelsen – the authority respon-
sible for national health services at the time. Medicinalstyrelsen’s data tend
to underestimate the number of cases and also report deaths by place of death
and not place of residence (Hyrenius 1914). Statistics Sweden, on the other
hand, implemented more detailed and stricter reporting procedures in 1911,
generating more complete death cause statistics and improving the reporting
from rural areas (Hultkvist 1940).33 With respect to accuracy, reporting from
urban areas were most likely, however, superior to reporting from rural areas,
although it should be noted that special reporting procedures applied to deaths
31A third alternative would be to rely on the GLS estimator originally suggested by Kiefer
(1980). In a recent paper, Hausman and Kuersteiner (2008) analyze the properties of this
GLS estimator. Their main conclusions are that a FGLS procedure generally outperforms
procedures where the time dimension is reduced by aggregating observations. Even though
their size correction is promising, we decided not to follow that route here. The estimated
correlation matrix exhibited positive autocorrelation in the short term but negative auto-
correlation in the long term – and, thus, standard errors often turned out smaller than in
the original OLS specification.
32Official data for the time period covered in our analysis is available in hard copies and
sometimes as scanned documents. The information used in this Chapter has been digitalized
by the authors and their research assistants.
33Before 1911 there was no clear guidance on what could be defined as a death cause
and how to record the main cause of death and often several death causes were reported
in turn reducing data accuracy (Hyrenius 1914). The new procedures likely also improved
preciseness and the correctness of death cause statistics as the main death cause of a deceased
hereinafter always was decided upon by a doctor. Clergymen had to make monthly reports
on the likely cause of death of persons in cases where no doctor had been involved. These
notes were then reviewed and confirmed by a GP who reported the final cause of death to
the bureau. For details see the introductory Chapter in Dödsorsaker 1911 (Statistics Sweden
1915).
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related to epidemics in both rural and urban areas (Hyrenius 1914).34
We use data from Statistics Sweden on county-level influenza deaths re-
ported on a yearly basis. As described below, we use this information together
with monthly influenza incidence statistics from Medicinalstyrelsen, to derive
our treatment variable. Incidence data are of a lower quality than the mor-
tality data due to the fact that the patient had to visit a physician to be
recorded. However, doctors were obliged to report verified cases of the flu
(Influensakommittén 1924) and governmental historical records (see e.g. Influ-
ensabyrån 1919) suggest that people did visit health care centers when they
had the flu and that the pandemic clearly increased the demand for GPs.
In baseline regressions we use yearly data for the time period 1912-1930 and
focus on three economic outcomes. The first outcome variable is capital in-
comes per capita defined as incomes from e.g. asset yields, rents and dividends
taken from official tax records (Statistisk Årsbok).35 We also use earnings per
capita, referring to all taxed earnings from employment and pensions per capita
collected from the same source.36 From 1903 it was mandatory for all adults in
Sweden to declare their incomes to the tax authorities. Everyone had to state
their yearly earnings (including payment in kind and pensions), after deduc-
tions of pension contributions and for business expenses, and capital incomes
to local tax boards that examined and controlled the declarations and those
with an annual income of more than 600 crowns were taxed. Clearly there
might be differences between the taxed income amount and actual incomes.
However, as discussed by Roine and Waldenström (2009) the administrative
routine in Sweden has been very thorough through the twentieth century and
Swedish tax data are quite reliable. Moreover, contemporary sources report
that the main difficulty was to get accurate information for property taxation
rather than incorrectly reported incomes (Statistics Sweden 1921).37
The third outcome variable is poverty rates, referring to the number of
inhabitants in public poorhouses as a proportion of the total population in
each region, collected from the yearly publication Fattigvården. Following in-
formation from Statistics Sweden (1911), people who were not able to support
themselves or could not be supported by their family were eligible for the pub-
34Special reporting procedures also applied to violent deaths and suicide.
35All monetary outcome variables are adjusted to real measures using 1917 as base year.
The measure used for adjusting the variables is regional cost of living numbers provided by
Statistics Sweden. All results are robust to using the Swedish national CPI, also available
from Statistics Sweden.
36National pensions have basically always been regarded as taxable income in Sweden.
As discussed by Elmér (1960) the amounts were small during the first decades and likely
often not even declared.
37The standardized self declaration form had to be signed on word of honor. The punish-
ment for submitting incorrect or improper information, which thereby led to that earnings
were not taxed, was a fine between four to ten times the amount not reported (Riksskattev-
erket 2003).
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lic poorhouses governed by the municipality.38 All applicants to poorhouses
were carefully registered and exposed to a means test. An individual that
was accepted to a poorhouse received housing, clothing, food, medical care
and medicine, and the coverage of funeral costs, but were also declared legally
incompetent (Rauhut 2002).39 Statistics Sweden provides information on the
number of poor since 1871 when a new law demanding all municipalities to
yearly provide statistical accounts is implemented. Information on the total
number of poor, but also their sex, age and marital status was systematically
reported to the authority using standardized forms (for an example, see Jorner
2008). In order to avoid spurious effects of the influenza working through the
denominators of the per capita variables, we use the average county population
over the year throughout.
According to the yearly documentation and summary reports from our data
sources, all variables seem to have been consistently collected across the time
period of interest. Notably, Statistics Sweden implement quality improving
changes in their data collection routines from 1910.40 Importantly, as discussed
by Jorner (2008), Statistics Sweden’s death causes are classified according to
the 1911 nomenclature until 1930 and we have not noted any changes in any of
the definitions of the other above indicators that could influence our results.41
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. For the sake of
comparability, all monetary variables have been expressed in 1917 crowns ac-
cording to the average cost of living in the region. We provide averages of
the variables for the period before (up until 1917), during (1918-20) and after
(1920-30) the pandemic. Concerning the earnings variable – which together
with the capital returns variable is based on official tax records – the numbers
seem to be well in line with those available from other sources. As can be seen
in the table, average taxable earnings per capita were 381 crowns during the
1918–20 period. The corresponding figure for 1920 only is 432 crowns (not
shown). According to the 1920 census, male industrial workers earned 1,600
crowns per year on average (females 1,000), whereas agricultural workers typ-
ically earned less than 1,000 crowns and female workers in agriculture as little
38As discussed by Elmér (1960) the 1913 pension reform reduced the number of old
people in the poorhouses significantly wherefore demographic population structure should
not explain regional variation in poverty.
39The inhabitants of poorhouses could consequently not vote in elections or referendums,
nor get married or move away from the municipality.
40From 1910 data is more often collected directly from relevant informants rather than
from administrative sources. The new routines follows from the investigation presented by
the 1905 statistical committee on how Statistics Sweden should accomplish their mission
(Jorner 2008).
41As described by Elmér (1960) the Swedish pension system was basically unchanged
during the period 1913-1936. Recent research also indicates that there have not been any
systematic changes in the level of tax avoidance and evasion during the studied time period
(Roine and Waldenström 2009)
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as 544 crowns.42 Thus, if one considers the fact that only 49.9 per cent of the
population was working, the average earnings of 432 crowns for 1920 seem to
be of a similar order of magnitude.
Table 4.2: Summary statistics.
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Before During After
Capital Income (SEK/capita) 475 39.659 42.349 22.593 42.843 49.622
Earnings (SEK/capita) 475 404.124 235.660 276.929 381.107 499.151
Poverty (%) 475 4.615 1.408 4.183 4.043 5.157
Trade Demand (SEK) 475 140.922 44.101 129.786 116.579 159.164
Population (, 000) 475 236.476 98.254 227.957 235.197 242.723
Flu Incidence, Per Capita 475 0.006 0.020 0.000 0.026 0.000
Cum. Flu Incidence, Per Capita 475 0.066 0.056 0.000 0.080 0.105
Cum. Flu Mortality (wit; %) 475 0.395 0.309 0.000 0.469 0.626
Population Density (Inhabitants per km2) 475 176.360 736.628 162.173 172.428 187.570
Rural Population (%) 475 75.665 19.551 77.496 75.790 74.389
Birth Rate (h) 475 19.867 3.872 22.391 21.542 17.440
Internal Migration (h) 475 -0.281 8.172 -0.251 0.852 -0.805
Immigration (h) 475 1.051 0.669 1.185 1.231 0.881
Emigration (h) 475 1.972 1.461 2.174 1.226 2.169
The table shows descriptive statistics for the variables, and shows means of all variables before (t<1918),
during (t ≥ 1918 & t ≤ 1920) and after (t>1920) the Spanish Flu pandemic. Incidence (infections) and
mortality have been calculated as excess rates.
A concern is that the estimated effect of influenza mortality may actually
be capturing long-lasting effects of influenza prevalence. The growing literature
on effects of in utero exposure provides but one example of how the effects of
the influenza might manifest themselves at the regional level (see e.g. Almond
2006). Thus, we include influenza incidence in some separate specifications as
a robustness check. Figure 4.7 shows the relationship between excess morbidity
and excess mortality at the regional level. Even though the variables are clearly
positively related, they are not as strongly correlated as one might expect: in
the year 1918, the correlation coefficient for flu is 0.43.
Another concern regarding the internal validity is the volatility of the world
economy during the time period studied. Section 4.3 suggests that the Swedish
economy appears to have weathered crises in the surrounding world relatively
well. Nevertheless, the Spanish Flu pandemic was preceded by the First World
War and the Russian Revolution, and largely coincided with the 1918-19 rev-
olution in Germany (one of Sweden’s main trading partners) and the civil war
in Russia (including Finland, bordering Sweden). If these and other external
events caused disruption to the economy, and if these influences were spatially
heterogeneous in a way that coincides with the exposure to the epidemic, then
our estimates of the effect of the epidemic may be biased.
In order to check the robustness of our findings we take the volatility of
the economic environment into account by also including information on GDP
in other countries in some specifications. Information on GDP and population
42Own calculations based on Statistics Sweden (1926) and a CPI deflator of 1.6524.
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Figure 4.7: Excess Morbidity and Mortality at the Regional Level.
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size is available for the 27 countries which together represent virtually all of
the Swedish exports of the time. Our trade variable is derived in two steps.
First, we estimate a partial gravity function43, where Swedish exports to other
countries were explained with reference to their distance, their GDP and their
GDP per capita:
ln (PXst) = δ0 + δ1 ln (GDPst) + δ2 ln (GDPst/Popst) + δ3Ds + υst (4.28)
where PXst are Swedish exports to country s in year t, GDPst is the gross
domestic product of country s in year t, Popst is the population size, and Ds is
the distance from Stockholm to the capital of country s. We estimate equation
(4.28) using the random effects estimator. The results indicate that distance
and total GDP are strongly significant, whereas GDP per capita is marginally
significant.
In the next step we generate the variable P̂X it for each county i. This
variable refers to the total exports that would be expected in year t if Sweden
were located at the centroid of county i:
P̂X it =
27∑
s=1
eδˆ0GDP δˆ1st
(
GDPst
Popst
)δˆ2
Dδˆ3si (4.29)
whereDsi now represents the distance between county i and country s. Clearly,
43Anderson (1979) provides the first theoretical foundation of a gravity trade model; cf.
Rose (2000) for an overview of the literature.
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P̂X it has no obvious interpretation in economic terms, partly because equa-
tion (4.28) is only half a gravity equation. Nevertheless, we believe that this
variable goes a long way towards controlling for asymmetric shocks related to
the business cycle and major events in neighboring countries.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Common Time Trend: Visual Evidence
Our case differs from the standard DID setting in the sense that we have
more than two degrees of treatment intensity, and hence counties included in
the analysis do not form two distinct groups. However, in terms of the to-
tal excess influenza mortality experienced over the entire 1918-20 period, we
may distinguish two different strata of exposure. Most counties fall within the
range of 440-700 additional deaths per 100,000 population. Above that, there
is a smaller group of six counties which experienced between 700 and 1,017
additional deaths. To provide some visual evidence concerning the common
time trend assumption we contrast these two groups.44 In Figures 4.8 to 4.10,
counties are weighted by their 1917 population size45, and all monetary vari-
ables are expressed in 1917 crowns (adjusted according to the regional price
level obtained from average regional cost of living). The solid curve in Figure
8 pictures growth in capital incomes for counties which were hit particularly
hard by the epidemic. The dotted curve plots the corresponding series for
the less severely affected counties, while the gray curves show 95 % confidence
intervals.
The graphs indicate that the common time trend is a reasonable assump-
tion before the pandemic hit: the curves are quite close and their confidence
intervals overlap. However, during and after the pandemic, the two groups
diverge for most outcome variables.
Figure 4.9 suggests that more strongly affected counties experienced slower
earnings growth, and Figure 4.10 suggests that poverty increased by the pan-
demic. Both observations might be driven by a change in poverty rates. Thus,
we define an alternative earnings variable, where total annual earnings at the
county level are divided by the number of inhabitants who are not poor. Figure
4.11 provides visual evidence for the modified earnings variable. The common
time trend assumption now appears to be even more plausible than for the
original variable, but otherwise no important changes are discernible.
In conclusion, there are no blatant violations of the common time trend in
44Allowing for more groups does not change the results, but make the figures more difficult
to read.
45The results not using any weights are very similar to the results presented in the text.
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Figure 4.8: Common Time Trend for Capital Income.
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Figure 4.9: Common Time Trend for Earnings.
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Figure 4.10: Common Time Trend for Poverty.
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Figure 4.11: Common Time Trend for Non-Poor Earnings.
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our data, and the pandemic appears to have had an impact on our outcome
variables of interest. Clearly, however, the above evidence is too crude and
summaric to provide a reliable estimate of the effects. Hence, we now turn to
more rigorous regression-based evidence.
4.6.2 Regression Analysis
Table 4.3, Panel A presents the results for capital income.46 The first column
presents the overall effect of the pandemic. According to our estimate, each
additional death per 100,000 inhabitants was associated with a reduction in
capital income per capita by 0.083 per cent. To get an idea about the magni-
tude, one may compare the 25th and the 75th percentile, with an incidence of
0.291 and 0.616 respectively. The difference between these two counties would
correspond to a reduction in capital incomes per capita by 27 per cent.
In the second column, we contrast the effects during (1918–20) and after
(1921–30) the pandemic (as defined in equation 4.24). Parts of the effect are
discernible during the pandemic itself, whereas there is an additional effect
kicking in afterwards. In column three we include regional time trends. As
this variable exhibits a strong correlation with our treatment variable it is not
surprising that the estimated effect weakens somewhat. Columns four and
five control for cumulative morbidity and current morbidity respectively. The
sixth column presents estimates controlling for export shocks (see the discus-
sion before equation 4.28 for further details). Moreover, in column seven we
include additional control variables (birth rates, internal and external migra-
tion, population density, percent of rural population).47 Throughout these
different specifications the variation in the estimated treatment effect is very
limited. Finally, column eight allows for a ‘placebo epidemic’ (from equation
4.25). This estimate is nowhere near statistical significance and it is very pre-
cisely estimated. Thus, our observation from Figure 4.8 is confirmed and the
common time trend assumption is maintained.
In columns nine and ten, we collapse the time period into five periods in
order to reduce problems related to autocorrelation (see equations 4.26 and
4.27 for details). The estimates clearly indicate that autocorrelation is an
issue. Nevertheless, the effects observed after the epidemic are still significant
at the five per cent level. Thus, we may conclude that we have found very
strong and robust evidence of a substantial immediate effect of the pandemic
on capital returns, and fairly strong evidence of a further reduction in capital
46In the baseline analysis we take the natural logarithm of all dependent variables. In
Appendix C we provide estimates for the outcome variables in levels (Table C-1).
47We also perform a regression with migration as a dependent variable to see whether
the Spanish Flu affected migration behavior. The treatment indicator turns out to be
insignificant suggesting that people were not “fleeing” from the flu.
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returns after the pandemic.
Table 4.3: Regression Results, Logarithm of Outcome Variables.
Panel A: Capital income (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
wit -0.831∗∗∗ -0.560∗∗∗ -0.363∗ -0.519∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ -0.560∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.478∗∗
0.197 0.182 0.202 0.211 0.182 0.167 0.182 0.187 0.189
wit × 1 (t > 1920) -0.317∗ -0.223 -0.318∗ -0.322∗ -0.277 -0.225 -0.266
0.174 0.193 0.175 0.175 0.169 0.191 0.202
Placebo (wit+3) 0.00170
0.105
Cum. Incidence -0.399
0.619
Incidence -0.553
0.736
Trade Demand 2.502∗∗∗
0.881
Constant 3.034∗∗∗ 3.034∗∗∗ 3.034∗∗∗ 3.034∗∗∗ 3.034∗∗∗ -9.213∗∗ 3.321∗∗∗ 3.034∗∗∗ 3.080∗∗∗ 3.080∗∗∗
0.0306 0.0306 0.0201 0.0291 0.0305 4.305 0.592 0.0202 0.0292 0.0293
Further Controls No No No No No No Yes No No No
Regional Time Trends No No Yes No No No No No No No
Observations 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 150 125 125
R2 0.958 0.958 0.973 0.958 0.958 0.960 0.961 0.765 0.954 0.954
Panel B: Earnings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
wit -0.204 -0.220 -0.186 -0.119 -0.222 -0.226 -0.244 -0.206 -0.215
0.239 0.202 0.168 0.217 0.201 0.204 0.174 0.200 0.184
wit × 1 (t > 1920) 0.0187 0.0342 0.0143 0.0123 0.0221 0.166∗∗ 0.0248
0.0787 0.0990 0.0792 0.0812 0.0779 0.0651 0.0843
Placebo (wit+3) -0.0423
0.115
Cum. Incidence -0.984∗∗
0.364
Incidence -0.678
0.575
Trade Demand 0.214
0.671
Constant 5.570∗∗∗ 5.570∗∗∗ 5.570∗∗∗ 5.570∗∗∗ 5.570∗∗∗ 4.523 4.775∗∗∗ 5.570∗∗∗ 5.660∗∗∗ 5.660∗∗∗
0.0308 0.0308 0.0156 0.0264 0.0305 3.275 0.285 0.0221 0.0168 0.0169
Further Controls No No No No No No Yes No No No
Regional Time Trends No No Yes No No No No No No No
Observations 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 150 125 125
R2 0.969 0.969 0.987 0.971 0.969 0.969 0.976 0.613 0.964 0.964
Panel C: Non-Poor Earnings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
wit -0.166 -0.219 -0.204 -0.0991 -0.220 -0.223 -0.240 -0.188 -0.214
0.235 0.200 0.168 0.219 0.198 0.201 0.173 0.197 0.182
wit × 1 (t > 1920) 0.0614 0.0674 0.0562 0.0560 0.0643 0.199∗∗∗ 0.0668
0.0730 0.0914 0.0737 0.0750 0.0725 0.0644 0.0783
Placebo (wit+3) -0.0353
0.112
Cum. Incidence -1.159∗∗∗
0.333
Incidence -0.564
0.525
Trade Demand 0.189
0.683
Constant 5.611∗∗∗ 5.611∗∗∗ 5.611∗∗∗ 5.611∗∗∗ 5.611∗∗∗ 4.686 4.868∗∗∗ 5.611∗∗∗ 5.705∗∗∗ 5.705∗∗∗
0.0312 0.0312 0.0143 0.0259 0.0310 3.332 0.277 0.0217 0.0171 0.0172
Further Controls No No No No No No Yes No No No
Regional Time Trends No No Yes No No No No No No No
Observations 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 150 125 125
R2 0.971 0.971 0.988 0.974 0.971 0.971 0.978 0.627 0.965 0.966
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Panel D: Poverty Share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
wit 0.642∗∗ 0.0201 -0.174∗∗ 0.271 0.0227 0.0399 0.0699 0.312∗ 0.0452
0.242 0.0985 0.0813 0.182 0.0940 0.101 0.0988 0.168 0.102
wit × 1 (t > 1920) 0.727∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗
0.242 0.260 0.245 0.246 0.243 0.187 0.263
Placebo (wit+3) 0.0321
0.0944
Cum. Incidence -2.431∗∗
1.025
Incidence 1.448∗
0.813
Trade Demand -0.832
0.630
Constant 1.440∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗ 5.512∗ 2.086∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗ 1.452∗∗∗ 1.452∗∗∗
0.0272 0.0272 0.0259 0.0222 0.0277 3.064 0.366 0.0116 0.0197 0.0197
Further Controls No No No No No No Yes No No No
Regional Time Trends No No Yes No No No No No No No
Observations 475 475 475 475 475 475 475 150 125 125
R2 0.554 0.575 0.804 0.648 0.579 0.577 0.759 0.141 0.535 0.593
The table shows four panels with results from fixed effects regressions. In the first specification we regress the natural logarithm of the dependent variable
(which varies with each panel) on our treatment variable wit. The second column additionally interacts the treatment variable with a dummy which equals
one for data points after the Spanish Flu. The third column includes region-specific time trends. Column 4 (5) controls for (cumulative) flu infection rates.
Column 6 includes trade demand as an additional control. For the derivation of this variable, see Section 4.5. Specification 7 includes further controls,
including birth rates, migration within Sweden and abroad, population density and percent of population in rural areas. Column 8 presents the placebo
regression which is estimated using years before 1918 and the third lead of the treatment variable (wi,t+3). The final specifications 9 and 10 collapse the
data in order to control for autocorrelation. All regressions include year dummies which are not displayed and are weighted by the population in 1917. The
second row presents robust standard errors. As discussed by Wooldridge (2009), Stock and Watson (2008) and Arellano (2003), in a fixed effects model,
robust standard errors are equivalent to regionally clustered standard errors. The asterisks represent significance at the following p values: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 4.3, Panel B provides estimates for the earnings variable. For this
outcome there is much less evidence of a flu effect. The point estimate of the
overall effect is −0.2, which, according to our previous comparison, would im-
ply a relative decline of 6.5 per cent in the 75th percentile county compared
with the 25th percentile. Importantly, the placebo estimate is smaller and
estimated with a similar degree of precision. Hence, the common time trend
assumption cannot be rejected, and we may thus conclude that the epidemic
appears to have had no effect at all on earnings per capita.48 Next, Table 4.3,
Panel C, presents the results when focusing on earnings of the non-poor popu-
lation. Normalizing earnings using the non-poor instead of the total population
does not change our conclusions: the estimated effect is still insignificant and
very similar to our previous estimates.
Table 4.3, Panel D reports results for poverty rates. The pandemic appears
to have had a strong and lasting positive effect on poverty. The overall effect is
estimated at 0.64. Comparing the 25th and the 75th percentile, the difference
in flu mortality would give rise to an increase in poverty by 20 per cent. Again,
the influenza effect is quite substantial – but it only appears after the pandemic
receded. It is important to remember that there is a direct mechanism at
work, which has little to do with the functioning of the economy, to the extent
that deceased individuals leave dependents behind, who are unable to support
themselves. Two pieces of evidence however suggest that this factor is not
the main driver of the positive relationship between the influenza and poverty.
First, we performed an additional analysis on disaggregated poverty statistics.
This analysis shows that the baseline effect is neither driven by widows nor
48We also obtained data on agricultural wages. Data are not available for all counties
and hence we do not include the results; however, the empirical evidence for this variable
suggests that no flu-effect was observed on agricultural wages either.
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by orphans. Secondly, a close inspection of Table C-1 Panel C in Appendix
C further reveals that dependents cannot be responsible for the entire effect:
according to our estimates from the specification in levels, each death caused
by the epidemic led to four additional poorhouse residents – and, considering
the age pyramid in those days, it is implausible that all newly poor would were
dependents of a deceased person.
Also for poverty the placebo estimate is insignificant, small and, in relative
terms, precisely estimated. Thus, in line with the visual evidence the common
time trend assumption seems to be confirmed also in this case. We conclude
that the pandemic appears to lead to a large increase in poverty rates in the
medium term.
Appendix C provides estimates for the outcome variables in levels (Table C-
1). Clearly, as discerned from the reported R2, our less preferred specification
performs much worse in terms of explanatory power, and the statistical sig-
nificance of estimated effects is lost in some cases. Nevertheless, these results
appear to be generally reconcilable with estimates based on the logarithmic
specifications.49
As mentioned in Section 5.1, several concerns about confounders in the
analysis may be addressed by collapsing the 25 counties into larger geographical
units. The estimates from these ‘super-regions’, also presented in Table C-1 in
Appendix C, show that baseline results are robust to this alternative regional
division.
In order to further check the robustness of our findings, we perform ad-
ditional regressions not included in this version. First, to handle potential
spatial heterogeneity of regions, we run regressions including the spatial lag
of the treatment variable – i.e. the flu mortality in neighbor regions weighted
by distance. Our point estimates of the treatment effect on poverty is hardly
affected and also the non-finding for earnings persists. However, for capital
income the standard error increases, reducing statistical significance. Second,
since we find that earnings are unaffected by the flu we included earnings as a
further control variable in the poverty and capital income regressions. Base-
line results are completely unaffected by this modification. A third concern is
whether the pandemic actually came as a surprise (especially the later waves).
In order to address potential anticipation effects we estimate the effect includ-
ing only the treatment of 1918. Baseline findings are not affected by these
changes. Finally, to avoid the potential bias following from deaths caused
by the flu being recorded as pneumonia cases – which, according to Figure
4.2, should not be a big problem – we also use information on influenza and
49Since all our dependent variables are weighted by total population and the number of
inhabitants is directly affected by the flu, we also re-estimate our regressions dividing them
by the population of 1917. This does not affect our results.
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pneumonia from Statistics Sweden to derive a second version of our treatment
variable. Results are not affected.
In conclusion, we find strong evidence for the pandemic having a positive
impact on poverty in the medium term, and relatively strong evidence that
capital incomes were negatively affected by the Spanish Flu. However, there
is no evidence at all that earnings or labor productivity were affected by the
pandemic. Placebo estimates are insignificant and close to zero suggesting that
the common time trend assumption can be retained in all cases.
4.6.3 Reconciliation with the theoretical literature
Most of the predictions delivered by the theoretical model in Section 4.2 failed
to be confirmed by our empirical analysis. We do not observe the expected
immediate increase in wages – instead, the immediate impact on earnings is
negative throughout, but the point estimate is small and nowhere near statis-
tical significance at conventional levels. Besides, we observe a rapid decline in
capital returns, even though these are predicted to increase by the same pro-
portion as wages. Moreover, we observe an effect of the pandemic on poverty
which goes far beyond the direct effect coming from dependents losing their
breadwinners: on average, each influenza death resulted in four individuals
moving into poorhouses. This finding suggests that poverty rates would have
increased even if these dependents could be disregarded.
On the other hand, our results clearly suggest that more heavily affected
counties experienced slower growth than the less affected ones in the aftermath
of the pandemic. This appears to be the only prediction of the theoretical
model which is not rejected by our empirical analysis. Since regional GDP
is made up of returns to labor and capital, it is quite clear that the regional
economies suffered a setback in economic activity during the pandemic (capital
returns dropped and wages remained constant) which was reinforced in the
years following the pandemic (capital returns dipped further whereas no further
change in wages was observed).
In summary, our empirical evidence seems to support the notion of imbal-
ance effects giving rise to slower growth in the post-influenza period, but it
contrasts sharply with predictions of the model when it comes to the immediate
impact on GDP and concerning the distribution of this impact between capital
and labor. Below we provide a simple sketch of how our empirical findings can
be reconciled with growth theory. Since the noted changes in the post-epidemic
period are expected, it seems reasonable to focus on the immediate impact of
the pandemic.
As emphasized by Boucekkine et al. (2007), it is commonly believed that
population growth and population density have played an important role in the
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transition from stagnation to modern growth, and the Spanish Flu pandemic
possibly entailed a partial reversal of this process. In our case, the results
suggest that there is a Solow neutral agglomeration externality in production,
i.e. an effect of the density of the local market which tends to increase the
marginal productivity of capital. This possibility has been analyzed in some
detail by Acemoglu (2003) in the context of a growth model in which tech-
nological change may increase the productivity of either labor or capital. For
illustrative purposes, we now consider a strongly simplified version of the pro-
duction function for final goods, where we disregard the variables representing
education u and human capital h:
Y = A
(
aKφ + bNφ
)1/φ
(4.30)
In this model, a Solow neutral agglomeration externality would be represented
by the parameter a, which also determines the share of capital returns in
GDP.50 Taking the derivative of GDP per capita with respect to population
size, we get
dy
dN =
1
φ
[
da
dN −
φa
N
]
Akφ
(
akφ + b
) 1−φ
φ (4.31)
A sufficient condition for getting the desired result is that the agglomeration
externality is positive and that
da
dN
N
a
> φ (4.32)
Using this property, it is straightforward to show that the immediate impact
of a pandemic will be
1. A reduction in GDP per capita.
2. A disproportionate reduction in capital returns, and thus
3. A redistribution of factor returns from capital to labor.
The literature on agglomeration economies has typically focused on local
spillovers of knowledge and ideas, and it is less usual to find an agglomeration
effect related to the marginal productivity of capital. However, seminal con-
tributions by Dixit (1973) and Helsley and Strange (1991) have emphasized
the role of scale economies and capital markets in production. Helsley and
Strange (1991) show that if capital assets are specialized and immobile, their
value in production will depend crucially on the population density of the re-
gion. Cingano and Schivardi (2004) identify a robust impact of specialization
50Note that a positive externality of labor, represented by the parameter b, would lead to
a disproportionate decrease in wages, in contrast to our results. Since we are looking for a
theoretical model that can explain our findings, we disregard this possibility in what follows.
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and city size on firm-level total factor productivity. In a more recent contribu-
tion, Durlauf et al. (2008) analyze the performance of different growth theories
under the assumption of model uncertainty, and conclude that externalities in
physical capital obtain a much higher explanatory power (and thus inclusion
probability) than many variables associated with standard growth theories.
As alternative explanations for our somewhat counterintuitive results would
be selective mortality and scarring. Selective mortality could give rise to our
results if physically fit individuals had higher mortality than the rest. Such
a selection would seem unlikely in general, but since the 1918 influenza was
particularly prevalent among young and healthy adults, it is not completely
implausible. However, even though this selective mortality were strong enough
to lead to a reduction in GDP per capita (despite capital deepening) it cannot
explain the change in the shares of labor and capital incomes in GDP. To the
extent that scarring occurs, i.e. that influenza survivors experience a deterio-
ration in their health, we would also observe a reduction in labor productivity
which could offset and possibly exceed the effect of capital deepening. But
again, this would not lead to capital returns being particularly hard hit, and
besides, the fact that our results are robust to the inclusion of infection rates
strongly suggests that scarring does not drive our results.
4.7 Discussion
It has been argued that regional differences in exposure to the 1918 influenza
pandemic were largely random. If this holds to be true, these regional patterns
in mortality rates can be exploited to estimate the effects of a substantial
health shock to the economy. Such an exercise has the potential to shed light
on at least three important issues. Firstly, providing an estimate of the actual
economic consequences of the 1918 pandemic. Secondly, giving us an idea of
the possible effects of current and future pandemics on the performance of
the economy. Thirdly, we might be able to say something in general about
the functioning of the economy, and how labor supply shocks are transmitted
through the system.
We have shown that the Lucas (1988) model of endogenous growth delivers
a set of clear predictions of how an economy can be expected to react to
a epidemic of this kind. The immediate effect will be an increase in wages
and capital returns, and a reduction in interest rates. This effect is a direct
consequence of capital deepening and it will normally not be accommodated
by workers moving from education into production. For the medium term, the
model instead predicts negative imbalance effects on growth as long as the ratio
of physical capital to human capital remains above the long-run equilibrium
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value.
Our study finds no evidence against the assumption that the epidemic was a
largely random shock to Swedish regions. The common time trend assumption
appears to be satisfied for all variables, and we also fail to identify a socioe-
conomic gradient in the incidence of the epidemic. Besides, since influenza
incidence and mortality tend to follow the same spatial patterns in general,
it is reassuring that our main results are robust to the inclusion of variables
capturing different aspects of influenza incidence. Thus, it is our tentative
conclusion that differences in excess mortality rates across regions are largely
exogenous.
Our main findings are generally very robust. For capital incomes, we find
that the pandemic had a strong negative impact, and this impact appears to
have been a combination of immediate and medium-term responses. According
to our estimates, the highest quartile (with respect to influenza mortality)
experienced a drop of 14 per cent during the pandemic and an additional
12 per cent afterwards. For earnings, on the other hand, we are unable to
detect any effect either during or after the pandemic. For poverty, finally, we
find a strong and positive effect, which seems to have appeared only once the
epidemic had receded in 1920. For this variable, the top quartile suffered an
increase in poverty by 23 per cent compared to the bottom quartile.
Strong as these results may seem, they do not fit very well with the most
popular macroeconomic models. On the one hand, we do get the result that
heavily affected counties had lower growth rates after the epidemic. On the
other hand, our findings that earnings were unaffected and capital incomes
dropped is much more difficult to explain. Likewise, our finding that poverty
rates increased is also difficult to reconcile with the increased scarcity of labor.
If our empirical results reflect the true causal effect of the pandemic on the
economy, they give some useful insights into how the regional economy should
be modeled. Clearly, there is a redistribution between capital and labor tak-
ing place, and this redistribution in turn suggests that the marginal product
of capital is subject to an agglomeration externality. There is a rich literature
in regional science on how such externalities might arise, and some previous
empirical research supports the notion of an externality related to physical
capital. This clearly seems to be an important issue for further research to un-
derstand the economic consequences following major health- and labor supply
shocks.
Before reverse the causal chain in the next Chapter we briefly summarize
our findings. The analysis of Sweden showed that there are large effects of
the Spanish Flu on capital income and poverty, while wages were not affected.
Overall this would suggest a decrease in GDP per capita, as shown in our
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theoretical model in this Chapter. However, in the Chapter 2 we do not find
these effects in all countries. There could be two factors explaining this: the
nature of the disease and the analyzed countries. Compared to the Spanish
Flu, HIV is a much more slow-moving and persistent disease. This gives more
time to react and stabilize growth. In terms of analyzed countries it might
well be that foreign aid funds helped African countries to deal with HIV, while
this was not possible for the Spanish Flu because it happened much faster and
affected the whole world. Moreover, Bloom and Mahal (1997b) argue that
African countries have many “unused resources” in terms of labor force, which
might explain the non-finding in some African countries. Finally, one of the
main problems in Africa remains a high birth rate and our results in Chapter
3 show that that HIV did surely not decrease fertility.
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CHAPTER
5
Sickness Absence and the Business
Cycle:
Moral Hazard, Labor Force
Composition or Neither?
5.1 Motivation
After we analyzed how the economy is affected by infectious diseases, we reverse
the causal channel in this Chapter and investigate how the business cycle affects
the spread of infectious diseases. It is a stylized fact that sickness absence is
procyclical. In the literature this has mainly been documented by showing
a negative correlation between sickness absence and the unemployment rate:
During periods of low unemployment sickness absence is high and vice-versa.
One frequently cited explanation for the phenomena of procyclical absence
rates are labor force composition effects (see for instance Leigh 1985). The
explanation is based on individuals who exhibit a higher tendency to be sick.
Due to this health condition, they will be unemployed more often, especially
during recessions. During booms, however, they will also be able to find jobs,
but will cause higher sickness absence and thus procyclical absence rates, due
to their worse health.
While health surely plays an important role for reporting sick leave, there
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might be also other relevant factors. Many scholars report that incentives
matter for sickness absence as well. Too high sick pay might lead to moral
hazard and overreporting of sickness (see for instance Johansson and Palme
2005, Puhani and Sonderhof 2010, Ziebarth and Karlsson 2010).
These opportunity costs of sickness absence might change over the business
cycle leading to procyclical absence rates. It could be argued that individu-
als have lower costs of absence when unemployment is low, since they are
more difficult to replace. On the other hand, their fear of job loss might be
higher during a recession inducing them to stay at home only when it is abso-
lutely necessary. A similar argument was put forward by Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984), who suggest a model where unemployment works as a disciplining de-
vice, reducing workers’ moral hazard and leading to increased effort during an
economic recession. This higher effort could lead to lower sickness absence and
could explain procyclical sickness absence.
Several empirical findings support this view. For instance, Ichino and
Riphahn (2005) look at a large Italian bank and find that once the 12-week
probation period of newly employed individuals has elapsed, the absence rate
increases sharply due to greater job protection and a lower firing risk after
the probation period. Lindbeck et al. (2006), using Swedish data, also look at
job security and find that more job security leads to higher absence. Another
study by Bratberg and Monstad (2012), where the authors employ a negative
financial shock that hit specific employers as an instrument, can also confirm
this finding.
While job security might have an impact on shirking and thus sickness ab-
sence, the (local) unemployment rate might not necessarily be a good proxy
for job security. In particular, workers might be mobile and/or might not ob-
serve the (local) unemployment rate. Therefore, we suggest a new explanation
driven by presenteeism (working while sick) and infections. During expansive
periods the workload of employees is higher than usual. For instance Millard
et al. (1997) report higher average hours during periods of expansion. Some
employees who get sick during this period might still decide to come to work
(possibly with the help of some medicine) because their tasks cannot be taken
over by somebody else due to increased work specialization. If the physical
distress is caused by a contagious disease, appearance at work might lead to
infection of their co-workers and cause procyclical sickness absence.
Presenteeism has been subject to much medical research in the last decade.
Aronsson et al. (2000) conducted a survey and found that around 50% of the
employees went to work at least once within the last year despite feeling sick.
Another study by Goetzel et al. (2004) analyzed the costs of the ten most
costly diseases for companies. Using data from the US, the authors find that
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the costs for presenteeism exceed the costs for absenteeism by far.
Several studies analyze what causes presenteeism. Demerouti et al. (2009)
for instance report that higher job demand – like more projects and more time
pressure – leads to more presenteeism. Moreover, Aronsson et al. (2000) and
Aronsson and Gustafsson (2005) find that presenteeism is higher if tasks are
more specialized and cannot be taken over by co-workers and for individuals
with more time pressure. Hansen and Andersen (2008) also provide evidence
that time pressure leads to more presenteeism.
A recent paper by Barmby and Larguem (2009) documents infections at the
workplace and provides further support for the suggested mechanism. They
are the first to combine absence literature with the epidemiology of infectious
diseases. Using daily absence data of a factory in the UK, the authors find
significant effects of workers’ absence on the absence of their peers. Even
though they have no data on whether the absence was caused by infectious
diseases, it is suggested that infectious diseases are the main force behind their
findings.
The empirical literature aimed to test the two explanations based on com-
position effects and moral hazard by analyzing how the unemployment rate is
related to sickness absence.51 Leigh (1985) is the first to study how unemploy-
ment affects sickness absence. Their findings, based on individual level data
from the US, suggest that both composition effects and moral hazard play an
important role. Since the effect for the whole labor force (employed and unem-
ployed) is generally larger (in absolute values) than for employed individuals
only, they conclude that composition effects are an issue. Moreover, they in-
terpret the negative correlation among employed individuals as an indication
for the moral hazard hypothesis in the spirit of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
However, it is not clear whether the fear of job loss drives the finding of Leigh
(1985). As we will show below, our explanation based on presenteeism and
infectious creates similar predictions about sickness absence and the business
cycle.
The fact that sickness absence is procyclical is also confirmed by Johansson
and Palme (1996). Using Swedish data, they also find that the unemployment
rate has a significant negative influence on sickness absence. However, they do
not investigate this finding further and don’t discuss possible explanations.
A more recent paper by Scoppa and Vuri (2012) also investigates whether
moral hazard is the driving force behind procyclical sickness absence. Using
51There is a related literature on procyclical mortality started by Ruhm (2000). However,
in a recent paper Miller et al. (2009) suggest that the mechanism involves more road accidents
due to more traffic during periods of economic growth. Relating this to the workplace, Davies
et al. (2009) looks at occupational injuries and also finds that minor injuries are procyclical,
while they find no effects for major injuries. However, workplace accidents are not procyclical
in our data and thus cannot be the driving mechanism. We therefore disregard this channel.
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data from Italy, they find that workers in small firms react more to local
unemployment than workers in larger firms, while employees in the public
sector show no reaction at all. Again they argue that this is because workers
in small firms have a greater fear of job loss, since they are less protected in
terms of employment protection legislation. However, this result could also
be driven by the fact that smaller firms have greater difficulties reacting to
the business cycle and hiring new workers and thus the exerted pressure on
existing workers is even larger during economic booms.
A further investigation of the two explanations for procyclical sickness ab-
sence is presented by Arai and Thoursie (2005). They suggest that the two
hypotheses generate opposite predictions on the correlation between sick rates
and the share of temporary contracts. With many temporary contracts job
insecurity is high and thus absence should be low and therefore there should
be a negative relationship. On the other hand temporary contracts are for
marginal workers, which suggests a positive relationship between temporary
contracts and absence. The authors rely on aggregated industry region data
from labor contract data and absence rates in Sweden and find a negative cor-
relation between the two measures. Thus they conclude that the moral hazard
effect dominates.
Audas and Goddard (2001) use US data and – relying on time-series econo-
metrics – estimate a cointegration model looking both at the labor supply and
demand side. On the labor supply side they find a negative relationship be-
tween sickness absence and unemployment and are thus able to confirm pre-
vious findings. On the demand side, theory would suggest that during times
of high product demand sickness absence is more costly. The authors confirm
the theoretical predictions since they find that monthly industry production is
negatively related to sickness absence.
Using data from Norway, Askildsen et al. (2005) also study how the unem-
ployment rate affects sickness absence. In Norway a doctor’s certificate is not
needed for the first 14 days of absence. Therefore, the authors are only able
to analyze absence spells longer than 14 days. They use individual-level panel
data and find that the negative relationship between absence and unemploy-
ment is more pronounced for the stable labor force workers (“insiders”), while
the effect is weaker over the whole labor force. Therefore they can rule out a
pure composition effect and suggest that the moral hazard hypothesis drives
their results.
A similar result is found in Fahr and Frick (2007) using data from Germany.
The authors use state level data from 1991-2004 and find that older workers
react most to the unemployment rate. They suggest that this is caused by the
higher opportunity costs of losing their jobs. Thus they argue that the results
116
CHAPTER 5. SICKNESS ABSENCE AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE
are driven by moral hazard effects.
Dyrstad and Ose (2002) using data from Norway can also confirm this re-
sult. They distinguish between composition and moral hazard effects using the
level of unemployment. The authors suggest that moral hazard effects dom-
inate if the level unemployment is high, since relatively few individuals with
bad health are in the labor market. On the other hand, if unemployment is
low, composition effects dominate, while the fear of job loss is negligible. The
authors a use smooth transition regressions such that high and low levels of
unemployment arise endogenously and find that for long-term sickness disci-
pline effects matter, while for short term sickness both effects are present for
men, while neither is present for women.
Nordberg and Røed (2009) also look at the relationship between unem-
ployment and sickness absence using individual level data from Norway for
long-term sickness (15 days or more). They also find that absence is procycli-
cal and suggest that the finding is due to the moral hazard of employees. Their
empirical model ensures that the results are not driven by the composition of
the labor force, although in a second step they show that sorting also plays an
important role. Thus they find empirical evidence for both explanations.
Summing up, many scholars find that absence rates are procyclical. More-
over, most findings seem to suggest that the fear of job loss causes this finding.
However, the fact that most of the analyzed countries provide quite generous
unemployment benefits raises doubts whether this mechanism is an adequate
explanation. Furthermore, for long-term sickness absence (longer than two
weeks) it seems difficult to argue that moral hazard is the main driving force
(as suggested in Askildsen et al. 2005). Moreover, as seen in Audas and God-
dard (2001) labor demand is countercyclical. In particular, sickness absence is
more costly for firms during peak times. Therefore it is surprising that firms
are not able to reduce sickness absence by exerting more pressure and higher
monitoring during economic booms in order to reduce absenteeism. Hence, we
suggest an alternative channel, where the additional sickness absence during
economic booms is caused by infections. We argue that most of the empirical
papers above do not directly test the model suggested by Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984), since it is not clear whether the fear of job loss provokes lower sickness
absence during times of high unemployment. As we will show in our theoret-
ical model below, our explanation is based on the fact that sickness absence
is initially lower during periods of economic booms, due to higher monitoring
and more pressure. In fact the additional pressure will incentivize sick individ-
uals to go to work even though they are sick. For infectious diseases this will
lead to infections of coworkers and thus cause procyclical sickness absence.
In a second step, we use data from 112 (out of 145) public health insurance
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funds in Germany to test this model. The data is aggregated at state level and
covers the years 1999 to 2010. Due to the panel data structure, we are able
to control for unobserved heterogeneity between German counties. In terms
of data our contribution is that we can analyze the cause of sickness, which is
provided in different categories. Therefore we are able to disentangle the cor-
relation between unemployment and overall sickness behavior from infectious
diseases.
The results show that sickness absence for infectious diseases shows a more
pronounced relationship with the business cycle than sickness absence for non-
infectious diseases. This provides support for the mechanism suggested above.
However, for diseases of the respiratory system (such as the flu) we find no
relation to the business cycle at all. We suggest that this might be related
to the fact that for these diseases too many infections do not happen at the
workplace.
Our analysis extends the previous literature in several ways. Firstly, we
provide a new explanation for the negative correlation between sick leave and
the unemployment rate. Secondly, we are able to test different theories on
this negative correlation due to the cause of sickness absence. German sick-
ness funds are obliged by law to collect data on their insured individuals.
Therefore, our data is more reliable than results based on survey data and the
measurement error in this data is lower than in other studies.
This Chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we provide a short
theoretical model. In Section 5.3, we present an introduction to the health
care system and sickness payments in Germany. Section 5.4 provides the data
and empirical specification. Finally, we present the results in Section 5.5 and
discuss them in Section 5.6.
5.2 A model of sickness absence with infec-
tions
We assume an economy with two states ξt, booming (ξt = h) and in recession
(ξt = l). Time is discrete in our model and we assume that one time interval
is equal to one week. As we will discuss in more detail below, this assumption
is handy for dealing with sickness and recovery. The states of the economy
will vary in cycles to resemble the business cycle, meaning that we will have
many weeks forming a long time interval of a booming economy followed by
a recession. Whether the economy is booming or in recession affects the in-
come of working individuals y(ξt), with 2 > y(h) > 1 > y(l) > 0. Income for
non-working individuals, i.e. individuals on sick leave, is normalized to zero.
The reason for income when working being higher than zero is to ensure that
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individuals go to work when they are healthy.52 The higher income in the good
state of the economy can be justified in various ways. One could think of an
incentive contract where the worker gets a higher income when the sales of
the company increase. Non-monetary costs and benefits could also play a role.
There are probably more projects in a company during a favorable economic
period, which might lead to private benefits for the worker through feeling
needed in the company. Moreover, since income on sick leave is normalized to
zero, it is, ceteris paribus, more costly to go on sick leave when the economy
is in a good state. More projects might lead to more upcoming deadlines and
usually the time shortly before deadlines is characterized by high pressure and
therefore sick leave might be an option only for very serious sicknesses. Another
related explanation is that tasks are usually quite specialized and therefore the
workload will not decrease when calling in sick, making sick leave more costly
during periods of economic growth. Finally, it seems likely that labor demand
is higher in good states and that the supervisor exerts some pressure on the
employee making sick leave more costly.
We denote sickness with the variable θt, with θt = 1 in case of sickness and
θt = 0 otherwise. Working individuals face some costs of working while sick
equal to ciθt. These costs differ between individuals. Costs will be low (ci = 1)
for a proportion q of the population and high (ci = 2) for the remaining fraction
1− q.53 We need both groups for our model to ensure that some individuals
come to work and infect others, while other individuals stay at home and
cause an overall higher sickness absence. Finally, we assume the following
utility function:
Uit = y(ξt)− ciθt. (5.1)
All individuals have information on their current sickness status θt and compare
costs and benefits of working as opposed to sick leave. Each week the workers
decide on whether to go to work or stay on sick leave, given their income from
working y(ξt) and sickness costs ciθt.
Given some time-varying sickness probability pt, which will be discussed
more in detail below, we assume a sufficiently large population (normalized to
one) so that pt also represents the fraction of the population falling sick. Table
5.1 below displays the proportions of individuals who will be working and on
sick leave in the various states of the economy.
52In countries where sick pay is equal to the salary (as it is the case also in Germany)
this can be justified by the fact that calling in sick when healthy might lead to discovery
and job loss, especially if this occurs frequently. Moreover, individuals who claim that they
are sick when they are not might feel guilty about this behavior which might reduce their
non-monetary income.
53Continuous sickness costs with a threshold above which sickness costs are too high to
go to work in the good state would produce similar results.
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No matter what the current state of the economy, healthy individuals
(1− pt) will go to work since they earn a positive income, while they have
to bear no costs for sickness. For non-healthy individuals (pt) work participa-
tion depends on the current state of the economy. If the economy is in a low
state they only earn y(l) < 1 and face sickness costs of one or two respectively.
In any case these costs exceed income and therefore both groups decide to
go on sick leave. In the good state of the economy opportunity costs change
since working individuals now earn a higher income y(h) > 1. For individuals
with low sickness costs (ptq) this will suffice to prefer work to sick leave, while
individuals with high sickness costs (pt(1− q)) still prefer sick leave.
Table 5.1: Proportion of Population Working and on Sick Leave
working, θt = 0 working, θt = 1 sick leave
ξt = l 1− pt 0 pt
ξt = h 1− pt ptq pt(1− q)
The Table displays the fractions which are working, sick
(θt = 1) and on sick leave in the two states of the econ-
omy, namely the booming (ξt = h) and the recession state
(ξt = l).
The final ingredient for our model are infections and recovery. The timing
of infections and recovery is as follows: At the beginning of every week t there
is some probability pt for individuals to fall sick. Depending on their sick-
ness status θt and the current state of the economy ξt, sick individuals choose
whether to work or not. Finally, at the end of the week all previously sick
individuals recover, thus one week t resembles the time needed for recovery.
We assume that infections occur at the workplace, where healthy individuals
(susceptible) will be infected by their sick coworkers. The infected co-workers
will not fall sick immediately, but will fall sick only after an incubation time
equal to one week as well. For this reason the infections will affect the sick-
ness probability in the next period pt+1. Figure 5.1 below summarizes these
dynamics in the two states of the economy.
During a period of recession (ξt = l) there will be no sick individuals at work
and therefore no infections occur and the sickness rate (pt = pex) does not
change from one period to the next. All individuals recover at the end of the
week. Subsequently, a new week starts where the sickness probability is again
equal to an exogenously fixed parameter. If the economy is in a good state
however, some fraction of sick individuals ptq will come to work and infect
their peers at the workplace. Again, by the end of the week all previously
sick individuals recover. However, the individuals who have just been infected
do not recover and fall sick in the following week and increase the fraction
of sick individuals. Finally, also in this state we have an exogenous sickness
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Figure 5.1: Timeline
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probability pex – which is restricted to non-infected individuals.
Summing up, we will have the following dynamics for the probability of
falling sick:
pt+1 = f(pt) = pex(1− iStIt) + iStIt (5.2)
=
 pex if ξt = lpex(1− iptq(1− pt)) + iptq(1− pt) if ξt = h
The dynamics above follow from adapting the SIS (susceptible-infected-
susceptible) endemic model to our setup. Individuals in the model are either
infected (I) or susceptible (S). The infection rate at any point in time reads as:
iStIt, where i is a parameter measuring how easily the disease is transmitted
between individuals and St and It are the fraction of susceptible and infected
individuals respectively. The model assumes that all persons in the population
meet once and infections occur at contact. The transmission parameter i can
be interpreted as the percentage of meetings resulting in an infection. Thus if
i = 5, then 5% of all meetings result in infections. Replacing St and It with the
respective fractions from columns one and two in Table 5.1 above and adding
some exogenous sickness rate pex we obtain the dynamics above (5.2). In the
booming state, the infection rate might change at each point in time, with the
resulting change in dynamics. However, depending on the parameter choice
an equilibrium will be reached where in each period the number of infections
equals the number of recoveries.54
54In this kind of model a recovery rate also usually appears. However, for simplicity we
assumed that all individuals recover at the end of one period and thus we normalized the
recovery rate to one.
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The SIS model is the classic framework of mathematically analyzing infec-
tious diseases and was first discussed in the medical literature by Ross (1916)
and Kermack and McKendrick (1927). In the basic models individuals are
initially susceptible and become infected afterwards. After a certain time they
recover and become susceptible again. These models were used to study epi-
demics in order to identify different dynamics and find conditions for outbreaks
of epidemics and how epidemics can be eradicated through vaccinations. The
models were developed further by many scholars, who introduced time varying
transmission parameters, stochastic infections, nonlinear infection probabili-
ties and added more population groups, such as recovered individuals who
develop immunity (see for instance Philipson 2000, Capasso 2008, for recent
surveys). In the economic literature one can also find applications of the SIS
model. For instance, Gersovitz and Hammer (2004) look at the general prob-
lem of the social planner and how to prevent the spread of diseases. Francis
(2004), on the other hand, studies the special case of optimal subsidies for flu
vaccination. Finally, Laxminarayan and Brown (2001) investigate the optimal
use of antibiotic resistance.55
We proceed by calculating the equilibria of the sequence for the booming
economy. A fixpoint will be reached if pt+1 = pt. Given the structure of the
sequence above the fixpoints in this case will equal:
p∗± =
1
2iq
(
−1 + iq ±
√
1− 2iq + 4iqpex + i2q2
)
. (5.3)
Figure 5.2 below draws graphs for three exemplary combinations of {i, q, pex}.
Fixpoints are obtained when the 45 degree line is crossed.
Finally, we obtain the following proposition stating the conditions for stable
equilibria.
Proposition 1 The infection rate will reach an equilibrium with higher sick-
ness absence during periods of economic booms and lower sickness absence in
recessions
if
(
pex = 0 and
1
q
< i <
3
q
)
or (5.4)0 < pex < 1− q21 + 2q and 1− q(1− pex)2 − q(1− pex) < i <
2
√
1− pex + p2ex + 1− 2pex
q(1− pex)

Proof. See Appendix D.
55Similar models are also used in the economics of innovation literature in order to model
new innovations and their diffusion (see Dosi and Nelson 2010, for a recent survey).
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Figure 5.2: Cobweb Diagram
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Intuitively, if the transmission parameter i or and/or the fraction of sick
people going to work q are too large the fixpoints are not stable. Moreover,
an excessively high exogenous sickness rate pex will increase sickness absence
during recessions and therefore decrease the procyclical association of sickness
absence. Furthermore, if the transmission parameter i is to small the disease
will die out (if pex = 0) or the sickness absence will be smaller during economic
booms (if pex > 0). With respect to the fraction of sick people going to work q
the analysis is more complicated. On the one hand, if many sick individuals go
to work there will be no infections. On the other hand, many individuals going
to work means nobody stays at home and therefore sickness absence cannot
increase.
Summing up, our model shows that infections at the workplace can lead to
higher sick leave during periods of economic booms. Figure 5.3 below graphs
this development. The dashed line represents the booms and recessions in the
economy (ξt) while the solid line represents the fraction of individuals on sick
leave. Initially, the good state of the economy persists, leading to infections
and an increase in sickness absence. As the economy turns into a recession,
sickness increases initially since now all sick individuals are on sick leave while
before only individuals with high sickness costs were on sick leave. Afterwards
no infections occur and sick leave decreases rapidly. At the end of the recession
sick leave shortly decreases again, since during the boom only individuals with
high sickness costs go on sick leave.
We will test the model by looking at the relationship between aggregate sick
leave data and the business cycle in Germany. Since the mechanism described
above will only appear for infectious diseases, we expect larger point estimates
for infectious diseases as compared to non-infectious diseases. In fact, our
model predicts a counter-cyclical relationship for non-infectious diseases. Since
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Figure 5.3: Development over the Business Cycle
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more people come to work even though they are sick during booms, and no
mechanism of infections exists, we should find lower sickness absence during
booms for non-infectious diseases. We proceed by describing the institutional
setting in Germany, before we present the data and the results.
5.3 Institutional Background
5.3.1 Health Insurance in Germany
In Germany, both private and public health-care providers coexist and nearly
all inhabitants are covered by health insurance. Around 90% of individuals
are with public health care providers (German Federal Ministry of Health
2012). Individuals with an annual salary above 45,900 e in 2003 and self-
employed can choose between public and private health insurance, while below
this threshold public health insurance is mandatory for employees.56 Students
and unemployed form special groups. However, they are also mostly insured
with public providers. Health insurance is financed by a premium that is paid
as a share of salary, and non-working spouses and children are covered by the
family health care insurance of the bread-winner.
In the public sector there were a total of 145 health insurance funds in
September 2012 (German Federal Ministry of Health 2012). Since 1996, indi-
viduals in Germany are free in the selection of their statutory health provider,
while before they were allocated to the different funds, based on their occupa-
tion or industry. The packages offered by the different health insurance funds
are very similar, because basic health provision is the same at federal level and
ensures that most health expenses are covered. Moreover, there are additional
56This threshold changes every year, depending on the average salary growth (current
value in 2013 50,850 e). For more information see §6 Sozialgesetzbuch.
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packages that might be chosen and paid separately, which give special cover-
age for eyeglasses, dental services, etc. The health insurance premium does
not depend on the individual health status and future health risks. Therefore,
the basic product offered is quite similar and competition happens mainly at
a price level.
Public health insurance is financed by mandatory payroll deductions of
15.5% from the individual payroll. Payments are split between employer and
employees with a share of 7.3% and 8.2% of gross wage respectively. These
funds are collected and used to finance the public insurance providers. If
the provider has a negative balance or a surplus, an additional deduction or
premium may result. Health insurance providers are competing for the insured
with the lowest risk of bad health and high payments, while at the same time
they are not allowed to reject individuals because of their bad health. However,
a risk equalization scheme is in place, where funds with a good risk insurance
pool have to contribute, while the fund compensates providers with more bad
risk pools.
5.3.2 Sick pay and monitoring
Compared to other countries, the sick pay system in Germany is quite generous.
In terms of rights, employees get fully reimbursed for their foregone wage
during the first six weeks of sickness.57 After this initial period reimbursement
goes down to 80% and the health insurance fund has to bear the costs, while
the first six weeks are paid by the employer.
On the other hand, employees have the duty to provide a doctor’s certifi-
cate as of their fourth day of sickness or earlier if asked so by the employer.
The doctor’s certificate provides the primary monitoring. Moreover, there is
an independent medical service, which performs additional monitoring. It is
usually consulted by the health insurance funds or the employer, when doubts
about work absence exist. Doubts may arise due to frequent sickness of in-
dividuals or certain doctors issuing an unusually high number of certificates.
The medical service employs independent doctors who may examine the doc-
uments of the patient or even the patients themselves. In fact in 2011 about
1.5 million cases were examined by the medical service. (Medizinischer Dienst
der Krankenversicherung (MDK) 2012)
In Germany sick pay is available both for unemployed and for employed
individuals. Unemployed individuals are supposed to search actively for a new
job. Since sickness provides an additional hurdle to job search, unemployed
individuals with sickness absence are entitled to sick pay. The first six weeks
57Reimbursement was dropped to 80% for these six weeks from 1996 to 1998. See Puhani
and Sonderhof (2010) for further details.
125
CHAPTER 5. SICKNESS ABSENCE AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE
of sickness absence are paid by the unemployment agency. One might argue
that the unemployed have no incentive to call in sick, since the sick pay equals
their unemployment benefits. However, during the first six to twelve months
of unemployment – depending on the age and the previous employment of the
individual – the benefits obtained from the unemployment agency depend on
the previous salary and – depending on whether the recipients have children
– amount to around 60 or 67% of the previous salary. After this period they
are reduced to basic social security, which is independent from previous salary.
Therefore, a period of sickness (notified to the authorities) results in a longer
time interval of higher unemployment benefits.
5.4 Data and Empirical Specification
5.4.1 Data
German insurance providers are grouped as follows. Out of the 145 health in-
surance funds 11 funds form the AOK (Allgemeine Ortskrankenkassen), with a
total of 11.3 million members. The category with the largest number of mem-
bers is the VdEk (Verein der Ersatzkassen) with 13.5 million members and 6
health insurance funds – noteworthy health insurance funds with many mem-
bers in this category include Barmer and the TK (Techniker Krankenkasse).
Then come the BKK (Betriebskrankenkassen), with a total of 112 health in-
surance funds and 6.2 million members. Other insurance funds are the IKK
(Innungskrankenkassen) with 5.4 million members, the Knappschaft with 1.8
million members and the LKK (Landwirtschaftliche Krankenkasse) with 0.8
million (German Federal Ministry of Health 2012). The sickness funds are
competing with each other for customers, even though they are linked by
these broader categories. However, among the AOK health insurance funds
competition is somehow limited due to their regional specialization.
Our data consists of BKK members.58 Our primary outcome variable is
sickness absence aggregated at state level. The data was collected from differ-
ent yearly issues of the health report (Gesundheitsreport), a yearly newsletter
published by BKK. Since there are 112 BKK funds offering different packages
and different prices there is no obvious selection into a specific fund. The result
is a twelve year panel (ranging from 1999 to 2011, with missing data for 2006),
which has data on sickness absence aggregated at the state level (NUTS 1)
of individuals who are paying-members of the BKK. What should be noted is
that only reported cases are included. For sicknesses that lasts three days or
less it is not mandatory to provide a doctor’s certificate and thus there will be
58Data from other insurance providers did not distinguish the cause of sickness absence
at state level.
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an underreporting of these cases.
The paying members consist of non-self-employed individuals from the work
force with an income below the threshold described at the beginning of Section
5.3.1. Moreover, short-term unemployed individuals are also included in the
sample.59 Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between sickness absence of
employed and (short-term) unemployed individuals. Therefore, we are not able
to analyze to which degree sickness absence is driven by labor force composition
effects.
We add additional data from various sources. Additional data on de-
mographics of the members was collected by contacting representatives from
BKK. Moreover, we obtained additional demographic data from the German
Employment Agency (Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2013). This data
was matched with economic data and health at state level, consisting of the
unemployment and death rate. The data for these two variables was obtained
from the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013a,b).
Sickness absence is categorized into different categories based on the In-
ternational Classification of Diseases (ICD). From these categories we form 3
groups in order to test the hypothesis from our theoretical model, i.e., whether
the relationship between sickness absence and the business cycle differs between
infectious and non-infectious diseases. More specifically, we expect a higher
coefficient (in absolute terms) for infectious diseases. The three groups thus
consist of non-infectious diseases, infectious diseases and infectious diseases of
the respiratory system. We separate these last two groups, since the model
parameters for infection and transmission might differ for different kinds of
infectious diseases. Respiratory diseases are more infectious, which might af-
fect the transmission parameter i. Moreover, the proportion of individuals
going to work sick q and the exogenous sickness probability pex might also
differ. Finally, diseases of the respiratory system include both infectious and
non-infectious diseases. Even though most cases of sickness absence in this
category are due to infectious diseases (as shown below) it might be preferable
to have a separate group for this mixed category. The details on how these
three groups are formed from the ICD categories are available in Table D-1 in
Appendix D.60
59The main distinction between paying members and insured individuals is that the mem-
bers are paying regular fees as a percentage of their salary and in this way they obtain insur-
ance for themselves and their family members, such as children and non-working spouses.
Since our focus is on sickness absence of employed individuals we are mainly interested in
the outcomes for paying members.
60Data after 2000 uses the categories displayed in the Table above, based on the 10th
revision of the International Classification of Disease (ICD-10). Earlier data (1999-2000)
relies on the older ICD-9 classification. However, the year dummies will capture this recat-
egorization since they affect all counties equally. Moreover, following the fact sheet of the
American Medical Association (2012) the main difference between the 9th and 10th revision
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Before we come to the empirical specification and the results we will make
the categorization more intuitive and easier to follow by providing some ex-
amples for the various categories. Most days at work are missed due to back
pain. For this distress in 2010 around 450,000 absence spells were started,
which resulted in a total absence of around 7 Million days. Back pain is cate-
gorized with M54 and forms about half of the diseases of the musculoskeletal
system (category M) as defined in Table D-1. Other common conditions from
the same category are herniated disc (M51), knee (M23) and shoulder (M75)
problems. The category of diseases of the musculoskeletal system is the main
entry in the group of the non-infectious diseases by far. The second largest cat-
egory is composed of injuries and poisoning (S-T), with about 520,000 cases
in 2010, with only one third resulting from workplace injuries. Category R
stands for other symptoms such as malaise and fatigue (R53), abdominal and
pelvic pain (R10), dizziness and giddiness (R42) and headache (R51). This
category is also included in the group of non-infectious diseases. The only
categories not included in this group are certain infectious and parasitic dis-
eases (categories A to B) and diseases of the respiratory system (category J).
In terms of infectious diseases (categories A to B) the most common one is
an “infectious gastroenteritis” with close to 300,000 cases and 1,3 Million days
and various viral infections (B34) with 200,000 infections and 1 Million days.
All the entries from categories A to B form our second group. Respiratory
diseases (category J) form the last group. The most common sickness is an
“acute upper respiratory infection” (J06). However, this category also includes
chronic diseases of the respiratory system (J40-J47) making up 15% of sickness
absence cases due to diseases of the respiratory system.
Summing up, we will form three groups, where the first group includes non-
infectious diseases. The second group consists of various infectious diseases
(Categories A to B), while the third category is made up of diseases of the
respiratory system (J).
Table 5.2 displays the summary statistics. In total we have 192 observa-
tions formed by 16 German states observed in 12 years (1999-2011 with 2006
missing). The first three rows show the summary statistics for the different
disease groups. Non-infectious diseases show the highest sickness absence with
sickness absence 70.4 spells per 100 members per year. The second group is
is a more detailed categorization. Due to the fact that our data is in broad categories in
any case, there is little difference between the two categories for our analysis. The only
main difference is that in earlier data categories G and H were previously aggregated to
one category. We also performed additional regressions with ICD-10 data only (and thus
using only data after 2000), however this did not affect the results. Another minor issue is
that the classifications are updated every year and therefore there exist slight differences.
However, again at our broad level this should not be a problem, and since the updates hap-
pen simultaneously in the whole country our time dummies will most likely capture arising
differences.
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formed by infectious diseases, with 8.9 sickness spells started. Finally, for res-
piratory diseases 32 sickness spells were started each year. Moreover, there
appear no large differences in terms of gender. Only for respiratory diseases
we find that women are sick more often, while for the other two groups no
statistically significant differences appear. The number of members measures
330,000 on average in every state in Germany. Moreover, about half of the
members are female. As is standard in this literature, we use the unemploy-
ment rate to measure the business cycle. The unemployment rate measures
11% on average. In terms of age we find the largest share between 30 and 45
years. The smallest share is found for the oldest age group, which is not sur-
prising given that individuals start to draw a pension with 65-67, depending
on their birth year. Finally, we use the age-adjusted death rate in order to
proxy for average health within each state. Here we have an average of 503
deaths per 100,000 inhabitants.
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics, Panel of 16 states, 1999-2011 (2006 missing)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Non-Infectious 70.40 5.83 57.86 87.69 192
Male Non-Infect. 71.19 6.33 60.86 92.28 192
Female Non-Infect. 71.35 7.25 55.42 90.18 192
Infectious 8.92 2.06 4.02 15.96 192
Male Infect. 8.82 2.23 3.9 16.61 192
Female Infect. 9.02 1.92 4.29 15.21 192
Respiratory 32.36 3.86 25.09 47.54 192
Male Resp. 30.21 4.2 22.45 46.15 192
Female Resp. 34.83 3.99 26.38 49.25 192
Members (in Thousands) 330.86 282.47 35.91 995 192
Share Female 45.31 3.86 30.49 50.97 192
Unemployment 11.14 4.5 3.8 20.5 192
Male Unemp. 11.19 4.44 3.7 21.1 192
Female Unemp. 11.06 4.75 3.9 23.3 192
Share Aged 30 minus 22.38 1.62 18.98 27.16 192
Share Aged 30-45 40.83 4.05 30.91 47.69 192
Share Aged 45-60 33.35 4.15 26.65 43.39 192
Share Aged 60 plus 3.44 0.94 1.22 5.84 192
Death Rate 503.03 42.16 399.3 609 192
This table shows the summary statistics. Sickness absence is divided in three
groups, based on the cause. These groups consist of non-infectious diseases (group
1), infectious diseases (group 2) and diseases of the respiratory system (group 3).
For each group we present the sickness spells started per 100 members. Moreover,
we present overall sickness spells and spells divided by gender.
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5.4.2 Empirical specification
Our baseline looks as follows:
Sjt = α + βEjt + γDjt + jt, (5.5)
where Sjt stands for the natural logarithm of sickness absence in state j at
time t. In terms of sickness absence we consider the number of sickness spells
started. This is in accordance with our model above, since we have no clear
predictions in terms of the length of sickness absence. The variable Ejt captures
the economic condition in state j at time t. As is standard in this literature, we
will use the unemployment rate as a proxy for the business cycle. Furthermore,
we control for demographic characteristics Djt. Expressing our hypothesis
using the equation above, we expect a higher β (in absolute value) for infectious
diseases than for non-infectious diseases.
We estimate different specifications and also add further variables. First,
we control for the age-adjusted death rate as a proxy for average health in each
state. Moreover, we also add specifications with year dummies. Infectious dis-
eases such as the flu might appear in (yearly) cycles with different intensities,
due to mutation of the virus. Since these cycles are unrelated to unemploy-
ment they would add unnecessary noise to our model. Third, there could be
unobserved heterogeneity at state level. For instance general health, availabil-
ity of doctors and other variables influencing health might differ from state
to state. Moreover, standard variables that could influence individual absen-
teeism could differ by state, examples of such variables are martial status and
how many children individuals have on average. Therefore, we also estimate
a fixed effects model. These specifications are more demanding since most of
the variation will be captured by the state and year dummies. Standard er-
rors will be clustered at state level. We also estimated robust standard errors.
However, they were smaller than the clustered standard errors displayed here.
Before we analyze the results we will briefly discuss potential endogeneity
problems. Sickness absence could be due to chronic illnesses that might lead
to a decrease in the unemployment rate due to individuals dropping out of
the working force. However, such cases of sickness absence are not included in
our data, since we only look at sickness absence of paying members of health
insurance funds.
Another potential threat is reverse causality in the sense that sickness ab-
sence might lead to unemployment. However, this would create a positive link
between the two variables, and thus it would only lead to an underestimation
of the true effect. Moreover, this should not harm our identification since the
mechanism should not differ between infectious and non-infectious diseases.
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Regression Results
Table 5.3 displays the results. In Panel A we present the results for non-
infectious diseases. In the first column we present the results of an OLS re-
gression. In the second column we include the death rate as a proxy for health.
Columns 3 and 4 include time dummies. Finally, the last two columns show
the results from the fixed effects regression.
The results show that older individuals exhibit higher sickness absence.
Surprisingly in the regressions a higher share of females leads to less sickness
absence. However, this might be related to the fact that we separate sickness
absence by its cause.61 Moreover, a higher death rate increases sickness ab-
sence. Finally, we find a small positive influence of unemployment on sickness
absence of non-infectious diseases. This positive effect meets the predictions
of our theoretical model, where sickness absence of non-infectious diseases in-
creases during booms, due to less people staying at home when they are sick.
However, this result is not significant in all specifications. An explanation for
this non-significance can be found in Bell et al. (2012), who show that working
more hours than desired has negative effects on health. This is also supported
by the medical literature. Many studies in this literature find that sickness pre-
senteeism leads to higher future sickness absence (see for instance Bergström,
Bodin, Hagberg, Aronsson and Josephson 2009, Bergström, Bodin, Hagberg,
Lindh, Aronsson and Josephson 2009, Hansen and Andersen 2009).
In Panel B we show the results for infectious diseases. Here the influence of
unemployment is much larger and highly significant in all specifications. Since
unemployment is countercyclical, previous empirical results would predict a
negative relationship between unemployment and sickness absence. This is
what we find in the results. Quantitatively we find that an increase of the
unemployment rate by one percentage point will decrease sickness absence of
infectious diseases by 2.5-4%. Moreover, there are almost no differences in sick-
ness absence in terms of gender and age. The death rate has also little influence
in most specifications, especially after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
at state level. This finding is not surprising since infectious diseases occur for
all ages. While it is true that the immun system of elderly individuals might be
more affected leading to longer sickness absence, we only measure the number
of sickness spells started and not the length.
Finally, Panel C presents the results for respiratory diseases. Again the
estimates for unemployment are quite small in most specifications. The share
of females, the age group and the death rate also show no significant influence.
61For studies explaining higher female sickness absence see Laaksonen et al. (2008).
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Table 5.3: Regression Results
Panel A: Non-Infectious Diseases (Group 1) as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment 0.00744∗∗ 0.000355 0.00637∗ 0.00289 -0.00436 -0.00514
0.00304 0.00330 0.00316 0.00417 0.00352 0.00373
Share Female -0.0143∗∗∗ -0.00956∗∗ -0.00995∗∗ -0.00784∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗ -0.0187∗∗∗
0.00401 0.00390 0.00365 0.00322 0.00523 0.00554
Share Aged 30-45 -0.00787 -0.0138 0.00162 -0.00160 0.0330∗ 0.0307∗
0.00778 0.00893 0.0107 0.0124 0.0169 0.0158
Share Aged 45-60 -0.00527 -0.00328 0.00651 0.00634 0.0538∗∗∗ 0.0523∗∗∗
0.00752 0.00864 0.00687 0.00731 0.0159 0.0149
Share Aged 60 plus 0.0305 0.0361∗ 0.0191 0.0227 0.0494∗ 0.0494∗
0.0186 0.0195 0.0215 0.0227 0.0267 0.0266
Death Rate 0.00142∗∗∗ 0.000752 0.000422
0.000379 0.000681 0.000560
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
R2 0.247 0.328 0.602 0.619 0.768 0.769
Panel B: Infectious Diseases (Group 2) as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment -0.0258∗∗∗ -0.0387∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0329∗∗∗ -0.0384∗∗∗ -0.0399∗∗∗
0.00649 0.00855 0.00735 0.0105 0.00751 0.00841
Share Female 0.00591 0.0145 0.00287 0.00789 0.0108 0.00984
0.00749 0.00896 0.00982 0.0101 0.0123 0.0122
Share Aged 30-45 0.0292∗∗ 0.0184 0.0361∗ 0.0284 0.0410 0.0366
0.0111 0.0120 0.0190 0.0186 0.0334 0.0304
Share Aged 45-60 0.0158 0.0194 0.0248∗ 0.0244∗ 0.0351 0.0323
0.0118 0.0122 0.0129 0.0136 0.0326 0.0314
Share Aged 60 plus 0.139∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.0849∗∗ 0.0935∗∗ -0.00792 -0.00790
0.0340 0.0358 0.0365 0.0322 0.0466 0.0464
Death Rate 0.00260∗∗∗ 0.00180 0.000807
0.000829 0.00119 0.00112
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
R2 0.453 0.491 0.758 0.771 0.859 0.860
Panel C: Respiratory Diseases (Group 3) as Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment -0.00623 -0.00932 -0.00990∗∗ -0.00854 0.00134 0.00102
0.00485 0.00559 0.00366 0.00649 0.00542 0.00503
Share Female -0.00785 -0.00580 0.00274 0.00192 -0.00491 -0.00511
0.00583 0.00567 0.00546 0.00480 0.00805 0.00862
Share Aged 30-45 -0.00480 -0.00737 0.0131 0.0144 0.0109 0.00993
0.0137 0.0146 0.0142 0.0161 0.0187 0.0163
Share Aged 45-60 -0.00302 -0.00215 0.0131 0.0132∗ 0.0260 0.0254
0.0126 0.0131 0.00779 0.00747 0.0193 0.0175
Share Aged 60 plus 0.00882 0.0112 0.000412 -0.000980 0.0406 0.0406
0.0210 0.0225 0.0312 0.0321 0.0307 0.0307
Death Rate 0.000621 -0.000293 0.000176
0.000582 0.000970 0.000708
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
R2 0.110 0.119 0.595 0.597 0.745 0.745
The regressions are weighed by the average number of members in each state. The second row presents
robust standard errors. The stars represent significance at the following p-values: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5.4: Regression Results for Infectious Diseases Divided by Gender
Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Unemployment -0.0416∗∗∗ -0.0345∗∗ -0.0440∗∗∗ -0.0339∗∗∗ -0.0294∗∗∗ -0.0331∗∗∗
0.0103 0.0126 0.0111 0.00612 0.00762 0.00625
Share Female 0.0138 0.00538 0.00526 0.0146 0.00972 0.0137
0.00884 0.00988 0.0124 0.00926 0.0104 0.0121
Share Aged 30-45 0.0301∗∗ 0.0364 0.0531 0.00631 0.0197 0.0217
0.0137 0.0213 0.0361 0.0117 0.0163 0.0251
Share Aged 45-60 0.0193 0.0219 0.0521 0.0184 0.0258∗∗ 0.0146
0.0141 0.0166 0.0366 0.0110 0.0109 0.0259
Share Aged 60 plus 0.192∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ -0.000198 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0553∗ -0.00357
0.0362 0.0374 0.0510 0.0349 0.0314 0.0436
Death Rate 0.00241∗∗ 0.00142 0.000498 0.00266∗∗∗ 0.00201∗ 0.000800
0.000955 0.00139 0.00113 0.000699 0.000990 0.00119
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
R2 0.512 0.755 0.841 0.471 0.784 0.874
The regressions are weighted by the average number of members in each state. The second row presents
robust standard errors. The stars represent significance at the following p-values: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
This finding is more surprising, and we will address it in the discussion below.
5.5.2 Robustness Checks
Before we discuss the results we perform some robustness checks. First, we
divide our results for infectious diseases by gender in order to see whether the
mechanism appears for females and males. For these regressions we use data
on sickness absence and unemployment divided by gender. The results, shown
in Table 5.4, suggest that the mechanism appears for both males and females.
Moreover, the effect seems more pronounced for men.
In order to exclude spurious results we first difference our data. In the case
of serial correlation, first differencing of the data will lead to a higher efficiency.
Table 5.5 displays the results of the first differenced data.
Due to the fact that the year 2006 is missing for our dependent variables,
the number of observations drop. The point estimates for unemployment are
again significant and negative. Quantitatively the effect is a little larger at
first, however, once we include year dummies the results are quite similar to
our previous estimates with a coefficient of around -4%.
Summing up, the data seems to confirm the hypothesis we derived from
the theoretical model. Only for infectious diseases we find a procyclical rela-
tionship as predicted by our theoretical model.
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Table 5.5: Regression Results for Infectious Diseases (Group 2) After First
Differencing the Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment -0.0765∗∗∗ -0.0787∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗ -0.0390∗∗
0.0196 0.0200 0.0165 0.0160
Share Female 0.0180 0.0185 0.0112 0.0108
0.0202 0.0203 0.0165 0.0165
Share Aged 30-45 0.0949∗ 0.0936∗ 0.0744∗ 0.0693∗
0.0495 0.0493 0.0375 0.0369
Share Aged 45-60 -0.0302 -0.0354 -0.00563 -0.00829
0.0763 0.0745 0.0459 0.0457
Share Aged 60 plus 0.202∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗ -0.0744 -0.0751
0.0678 0.0694 0.0867 0.0866
Death Rate 0.00145∗∗ 0.00110
0.000624 0.00106
[1em] Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes
Observations 160 160 160 160
R2 0.275 0.281 0.844 0.845
The regressions are weighted by the average number of members in each state. The
second row presents robust standard errors. The stars represent significance at the
following p-values: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
5.6 Discussion
Our results suggest sickness absence due to infectious diseases is procyclical,
while non-infectious diseases show hardly any relation to the business cycle. In
terms of which explanation is the driving force behind the procyclical nature
of sickness absence we cannot reject the labor force composition explanations.
Since our data includes both employed and unemployed individuals and we
cannot distinguish between them, we cannot test whether the sickness absence
would be even stronger when excluding unemployed individuals. Finally, we
do not find any support for the moral hazard explanation in our data, since
moral hazard can not explain why the relationship is only found for infectious
diseases. Rather, one would expect to find a more pronounced relationship to
the business cycle independent of the cause of sickness if moral hazard was the
driving force.
While our findings suggest that infectious diseases are procyclical, it is
surprising that the relationship does not arise for diseases of the respiratory
system. For diseases like common colds and other diseases of the respiratory
system there seems to be no relation with the business cycle. There are several
possible explanations for this finding. Firstly, diseases of the respiratory system
consist of both infectious and non-infectious diseases. Therefore, this finding
could be driven by non-infectious diseases contained in this category. However,
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as seen at the end of Section 5.4.1 most sickness cases in this category are due
to infectious diseases. A more likely explanation is that the model parameters
are such that sickness absence is not procyclical (and thus Proposition 1 will
not hold). For instance, one could argue that the fraction q of individuals going
to work while sick is comparatively high for some diseases in this category, such
as a common cold. This seems likely especially when considering that most
cases for sickness absence are only registered if they last longer than three
days. If this parameter is too high, there will be many infections, however
only quite few individuals stay at home causing only very small or no cyclical
patterns of sickness absence. Another reason for this finding could be that the
exogenous sickness probability pex is quite high for diseases of the respiratory
system. The flu usually appears in cycles with very high prevalence rates every
winter. For instance, Turkington and Ashby (2007) estimate that every year
up to 50 million people will be infected in the US. During times of very high
prevalence infections may be very high and this might cause the observation
that we observe no relationship with the business cycle. One would need higher
frequency data in order to investigate this point further.
In this Chapter we analyzed the question why sickness absence increases
during periods of economic growth. The literature so far suggests two possible
explanations. The first is driven by the composition of the labor force, with
individuals with a lower health status who only work in times of economic
booms. A second explanation is given by moral hazard, since employees might
have a lower fear of job loss in more expansive periods.
We provide a third explanation caused by a heavier workload, resulting
in more presenteeism and infections during a period of favorable economic
conditions. We first present the theoretical underpinnings of these explanations
and then test the explanation using sickness absence data. Since our data
includes categories showing the cause of the sickness, we are able to identify
what cause mainly drives the negative relationship between sickness absence
and unemployment. We find that infectious diseases show the most pronounced
association.
In terms of policy recommendation, the results suggest that there are hid-
den costs of incentive wages and other forms of motivation, since they might
lead to more presenteeism, especially when the economy is booming and sales
are high. As shown in this paper, presenteeism will lead to infection of co-
workers, causing overall higher absence rates during economic booms. In order
to prevent this mechanism it seems promising to encourage employees to go on
sickness absence, in particular if the distress is caused by infectious diseases,
to avoid costly infections and possible pandemics.
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Conclusion
This dissertation analyzed the interactions between infectious diseases and
the economy. The different Chapters theoretically and empirically examined
different channels of interaction. Within each Chapter we initially provided a
theoretical foundation which built upon extensions and adaptations of existing
models and partly new models. In a second step we presented the empirical
analyses and the corresponding results using modern empirical methods. We
analyzed HIV/AIDS, the Spanish Flu and infectious diseases at the workplace.
HIV/AIDS and the Spanish Flu are special since they mainly affect prime-
age individuals, and thus have considerable effects on labor supply. In the
first half of this dissertation we investigated how infectious diseases affect the
economy. In the second half the reverse relationship was analyzed, namely
how the business cycle affects the spread of diseases. In this last Chapter, we
briefly summarize the results and investigate paths for further research.
The second Chapter analyzed how HIV prevalence affects the Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) in the twelve most heavily affected countries, i.e. the
countries which have ever exhibited a HIV prevalence rate of 10% or more.
Here the analysis was divided into a theoretical approach following a Solow
growth model and an empirical approach using data and results from previ-
ous empirical studies on how different determinants affect the growth path of
a country. The twelve countries were analyzed by means of synthetic control
groups, a new method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). For every
country under consideration a synthetic control group was formed, consisting
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of a weighted average of donor countries not affected by HIV (HIV preva-
lence rate smaller than 1%). The results in the different countries were very
heterogeneous. While some countries showed no effect at all, other countries
exhibited a reduction in GDP between 25 and 77%, compared to the scenario
without HIV.
Since we revealed very different effects in Chapter 2, we tried to restrict the
possible channels in Chapter 3 by analyzing demographic effects of HIV. More
specifically, in this Chapter we estimated how HIV affects life expectancy, and
death and birth rates. In order to find better control groups the synthetic
control group method was extended to several variables. As expected there
were very clear-cut effects on life expectancy and the death rate. Average
life expectancy decreased by almost 15 years, while the death rate increased
by seven deaths on average (per 1,000 inhabitants) due to HIV. In terms of
the birth rate the effects were once more quite heterogeneous. On average we
estimated a very small and statistically insignificant effect, while in Zambia a
positive effect was found.
Zambia was also the country where we revealed the largest effects in terms
of GDP. Combining the findings of Chapters 2 and 3 we found that the channel
working through fertility seems very important. Most countries in the world
experienced a drop in fertility over the last decade. Chen (2010) suggests that
this is due to increased life expectancy and a more concentrated investment in
fewer children. This pattern seems to be missing for some African countries
affected by HIV. However, other countries of high HIV prevalence such as
Swaziland, experienced drop in terms of fertility. In general we found that the
effects of HIV on GDP were intensified by a non-decline in the fertility rate.
Summing up, the results call for more case studies, in order to analyze in
more depth the effects in the single countries. This is needed to better un-
derstand the mechanisms and the policies for preventing severe drops in GDP.
Some case studies can already be found in the literature. See, for instance,
Arndt (2006) for a case study in Mozambique, MacFarlan and Sgherri (2006)
for Botswana and Robalino et al. (2002) for Kenya. However, more research
is needed to obtain a clearer picture.
Due to the effect heterogeneity between countries observed in the last Chap-
ters, we provided an in depth analysis of one country in Chapter 4. One reason
for the effect heterogeneity is that different countries took different measures
to prevent the spread of the disease. Therefore, in this Chapter we analyzed
the economic consequences of the Spanish Flu – a disease that occurred very
rapidly and thus prevention was very limited. The disease spread between 1918
and 1920. Due to the time period it is difficult to separate effects of the Span-
ish Flu from the consequences of World War I. Therefore the analysis focused
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on a country which was neutral during the War: Sweden. Other reasons for
analyzing the effects on Sweden were the good data availability and vast differ-
ences in terms of prevalence and mortality between Swedish counties. These
differences were used to measure the effects of the Spanish Flu. The results
showed that capital income decreased more in counties with more flu-related
deaths, while poverty increased. However, there was robust evidence that the
influenza had no discernible effect on earnings. This finding was surprising
since it goes against most previous empirical studies as well as theoretical pre-
dictions. We suggested how these findings relate to the growth literature and
proposed that an externality on capital could explain the findings. However,
more theoretical research is needed here also.
In Chapter 5 the causal channel was reversed and we analyzed how the
business cycle affects the spread of diseases. The procyclical nature of sick-
ness absence has been documented by many scholars in the literature. So
far, the explanations have been based on labor force composition and moral
hazard. We proposed and tested a third mechanism caused by presenteeism
(i.e. working while sick) and infections. We suggested that the workload is
higher during an economic boom and thus employees go to work even when
they do not feel well. In a theoretical model focusing on infectious diseases,
we showed that this provokes infections of co-workers leading to overall higher
sickness absence during economic upturns. Using county-level aggregated data
from 112 German public sickness funds (out of 145 in total) we confirmed this
hypothesis by finding that infectious diseases show the largest procyclical pat-
tern. For this explanation further empirical studies are needed as well. Firstly,
higher frequency data (e.g. monthly data) would allow to study the dynam-
ics of infections more in detail. Moreover, unemployment is probably not the
best indicator here. Data on individual working hours would provide an even
clearer picture about the mechanism. Finally, studies in other countries are
needed in order to investigate the external validity of our findings.
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Appendix
A Data Sources of Chapter 2
HIV data: Our primary data source is Oster (2007). Moreover we combine
this with data from UN (2008). In order to minimize the HIV prevalence in
our control group we only include countries in the control group where the
maximum of these two measures in any year does not exceed one.
Total GDP, GDP per capita and population: Most of our data comes
from the World Bank database (Mundial 2011). Here we combined GDP data
from different available variables and transformed all data to purchasing power
parity level in current dollar currency. For some countries (Alan Heston et al.
2006) had richer data on GDP per capita. Combining this dataset with a
richer dataset for population from (Rosling 2012), we replace missing values
in the original data both at the total level and in per capita terms.
Gross capital formation (total and per capita): Again the Development
Indicators from World Bank are our main source Mundial (2011). Moreover
we use gross capital formation data from United Nations Cheung (2008).
Moreover we replaced missing values by dividing total capital formation by
the number of inhabitants from (Rosling 2012).
Regime characteristics: Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2009)
Political Violence: Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset (Marshall
2010)
Human Capital: This variable is measured in terms of year of schooling
as provided by (Barro 2001). Moreover, we find high correlation between this
measure and Lutz et al. (2007), who measured percent of population that
completed primary, secondary and tertiary education respectively. Therefore
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we replace missing values in the Barro dataset with data from Lutz transformed
into years of schooling.
Labor force, percent of females in the labor force, arable land in hectares,
percent of population living in rural areas and population growth(total and
per capita): World Bank database development indicators (Mundial 2011).
Again we replaced missing values by dividing total values by the number of
inhabitants from (Rosling 2012)
Furthermore we use data from different papers from the empirical literature:
Climate and soil quality and data on physical geography (e.g. average
meters above sea level) and population from Gallup et al. (2001)
Ethnic and cultural fractionalization from Fearon (2003)
Religion, influences from colonialization, life expectancy, fertility and other
determinants of economic growth from Ciccone and Jarocinski (2010)
Quality of the government along several dimensions such as bureaucratic
delays, the estimated size of the black market, the level of corruption and other
variables from La Porta et al. (1999) and Englebert (2002)
Globalization index provided by Dreher (2006)
Ratio of GDP to GNP from Alan Heston et al. (2006)
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B Data Sources for Chapter 3
HIV data: Our primary data source is Oster (2007). Moreover we combine
this with data from UN (2008). In order to minimize the HIV prevalence in
our control group we only include countries in the control group where the
maximum of these two measures in any year does not exceed one.
Birth rate, death rate, fertility rate and life expectancy: World Bank
database development indicators (Mundial 2011). Again we replaced missing
values by dividing total values by the number of inhabitants from (Rosling
2012)
Human Capital: This variable is measured in terms of year of schooling
as provided by (Barro 2001). Moreover, we find high correlation between this
measure and Lutz et al. (2007), who measured percent of population that
completed primary, secondary and tertiary education respectively. Therefore
we replace missing values in the Barro dataset with data from Lutz transformed
into years of schooling.
Total GDP, GDP per capita and population: Most of our data comes
from the World Bank database (Mundial 2011). Here we combined GDP data
from different available variables and transformed all data to purchasing power
parity level in current dollar currency. For some countries (Alan Heston et al.
2006) had richer data on GDP per capita. Combining this dataset with a
richer dataset for population from (Rosling 2012), we replace missing values
in the original data both at the total level and in per capita terms.
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C Alternative Specifications (Chapter 4)
Table C-1: Regression Results. Alternative Specifications.
Outcome Variable in Levels Results for Super-Regions
Panel A: Capital income (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
wit -35.08 -10.84 -18.17 -8.139 -1.246∗∗ -1.023 -1.086∗ -1.001
34.08 28.71 38.49 36.12 0.345 0.667 0.538 0.703
wit × 1 (t > 1920) -28.35∗∗ -26.39∗∗ -0.253 -0.198
11.21 11.55 0.375 0.404
Placebo (wi,t+3) 1.016 -0.112
5.043 0.196
Constant 27.89∗∗∗ 27.89∗∗∗ 27.89∗∗∗ 27.81∗∗∗ 27.81∗∗∗ 3.136∗∗∗ 3.136∗∗∗ 3.136∗∗∗ 3.179∗∗∗ 3.179∗∗∗
3.958 3.962 1.492 3.742 3.761 0.0503 0.0506 0.0334 0.0474 0.0486
Further Controls No No No No No No No No No No
Regional Time Trends No No No No No No No No No No
Observations 475 475 150 125 125 114 114 36 30 30
R2 0.603 0.604 0.318 0.595 0.597 0.983 0.983 0.885 0.979 0.979
Panel B: Earnings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
wit -49.21 -52.92 -41.57 -44.05 -0.327 -0.303 -0.376 -0.371
121.4 55.36 96.96 60.96 0.185 0.321 0.207 0.282
wit × 1 (t > 1920) 4.341 6.539 -0.0276 -0.0108
114.4 124.5 0.180 0.185
Placebo (wi,t+3) -11.26 -0.0131
37.15 0.177
Constant 301.5∗∗∗ 301.5∗∗∗ 301.5∗∗∗ 318.2∗∗∗ 318.2∗∗∗ 5.634∗∗∗ 5.634∗∗∗ 5.634∗∗∗ 5.714∗∗∗ 5.714∗∗∗
10.59 10.60 11.90 6.372 6.406 0.0399 0.0401 0.0311 0.0208 0.0213
Further Controls No No No No No No No No No No
Regional Time Trends No No No No No No No No No No
Observations 475 475 150 125 125 114 114 36 30 30
R2 0.836 0.836 0.357 0.827 0.827 0.989 0.989 0.740 0.986 0.986
Panel C: Poverty (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
wit 3.719∗∗∗ 0.143 1.782∗ 0.217 0.967∗∗∗ 0.131 0.587∗∗ 0.193
1.203 0.526 0.884 0.500 0.172 0.178 0.166 0.158
wit × 1 (t > 1920) 4.183∗∗∗ 4.119∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.914∗∗∗
0.937 1.040 0.0432 0.0705
Placebo (wi,t+3) 0.230 0.0508
0.404 0.115
Constant 4.393∗∗∗ 4.393∗∗∗ 4.393∗∗∗ 4.453∗∗∗ 4.453∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗
0.151 0.151 0.0505 0.127 0.128 0.0266 0.0268 0.0179 0.0205 0.0207
Further Controls No No No No No No No No No No
Regional Time Trends No No No No No No No No No No
Observations 475 475 150 125 125 114 114 36 30 30
R2 0.487 0.512 0.150 0.468 0.545 0.803 0.832 0.262 0.783 0.867
The table shows three panels with results from fixed effects regressions. In the first specification we regress the dependent variable (which varies with each
panel) on our treatment variable wit. The second column additionally interacts the treatment variable with a dummy which equals one for data points after
the Spanish Flu. The third column presents the placebo regression which is estimated using years before 1918 and the third lead of the treatment variable
(wi,t+3). The final specifications 4 and 5 collapse the data in order to control for autocorrelation. Columns 6–10 present exactly the same specifications but
for the logarithmic outcome variables. In these additional specifications we have collapsed the 25 counties into six ‘super-regions’ with approximately one
million inhabitants each. All regressions include year dummies which are not displayed and are weighted by the population in 1917. The second row presents
robust standard errors. As discussed by Wooldridge (2009), Stock and Watson (2008) and Arellano (2003), in a fixed effects model, robust standard errors
are equivalent to regionally clustered standard errors. The asterisks represent significance at the following p values: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
D Proofs and Tables (Chapter 5)
Proof of Proposition 1
We calculate the conditions for stability of the fixpoints to identify whether in
a neighborhood around the fixpoints attraction or repellence occurs. For this
we first calculate the slope of the sequence at the fixpoints which equals:
f ′(p∗±) = 1±
√
4iqpex(1− pex) + (1− iq(1− pex))2. (6.1)
For stable fixpoints we must have |f ′(p∗±)| < 1. Therefore the first fixpoint
(p∗+) will be always unstable since the derivative is greater or equal to one.
Finally, considering the solution for pex > 0 and restricting the sample to
stable fixpoints with f ′(p∗−) > −1, non-negative sickness probabilities (pt, i, q ≥ 0)
and a higher sick leave during recessions pt(1− q) > pex as found in the empirical
literature, we obtain the following inequalities:
(
pex = 0 and
1
q
< i <
3
q
)
or (6.2)0 < pex < 1− q21 + 2q and 1− q(1− pex)2 − q(1− pex) < i <
2
√
1− pex + p2ex + 1− 2pex
q(1− pex)


159
Tables
Table D-1: Sickness categories based on 10th revision of International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10)
Category Disease Total Spells 2010 Total Days 2010 Group
A00–B99: Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 553,546 3,155,185 2
C00–D48: Neoplasms (Cancer) 80,466 3,061,937 1
E00–E90: Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 29,197 552,346 1
F00–F99: Mental and behavioral disorders 268,300 10,182,958 1
G00–H95: Diseases of the nervous system, the eye and the ear 261,876 3,256,858 1
I00–I99: Diseases of the circulatory system 166,238 3,581,913 3
J00–J99: Diseases of the respiratory system 1,657,966 11,025,228 1
K00–K93: Diseases of the digestive system 692,823 4,489,656 1
L00–L99: Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue 81,112 1,040,655 1
M00–M99: Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 1,037,963 21,315,233 1
N00–N99: Diseases of the genitourinary system 135,265 1,420,881 1
O00–O99 Pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium 47,025 628,066 1
R00–R99: Symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified 299,819 3,077,885 1
S00–T98: Injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes 519,493 10,539,770 1
Z00–Z99 Factors influencing health status and contact with health services 81,792 1,689,116 1
Total 5,912,881 79,017,687
Resulting from Workplace Accidents 170,224 3,602,501
The table shows the categories for the diseases of our data source, with additional workplace accidents (already included in the previous cases). Moreover
we report the total number of started sickness spells in 2010 for Germany. In the final column we show how we grouped the categories into three groups for
the regression. These groups are non-infectious diseases (1), infectious diseases (2) and diseases of the respiratory system (3).
Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die Arbeit - abgesehen von den in ihr ausdrücklich
genannten Hilfen - selbstständig verfasst habe.
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